Narrative Wars

 

 

Why Are Some Democracies More Stable Than Others?

Two countries can both call themselves democracies.

Both may hold elections.

Both may have constitutions, parliaments, courts, political parties and newspapers.

Yet one democracy can survive economic crises, unpopular governments, corruption scandals, wars and bitter elections without threatening the political system itself.

The other may descend into constitutional crisis after a disputed election, experience military intervention, see courts captured by politicians or move gradually toward authoritarian government.

Why?

The answer is that democratic stability depends on much more than elections.

Stable democracies usually combine several reinforcing characteristics:

• strong political institutions;

• credible rule of law;

• peaceful transfers of power;

• professional public administration;

• economic opportunity;

• relatively inclusive political systems;

• active civil society;

• credible information institutions;

• political cultures that accept compromise;

• and citizens who believe they have a meaningful voice.

Weakness in one area does not automatically destroy democracy. But when several weaknesses combine—corruption, inequality, polarization, institutional capture, economic insecurity and distrust—the political system becomes much more vulnerable.

International IDEA's 2025 Global State of Democracy report organizes democratic performance around four broad categories: Representation, Rights, Rule of Law and Participation. Its latest assessment found deterioration across many countries, particularly in judicial independence, press freedom and electoral integrity.

The fundamental lesson is therefore simple:

Stable democracy is not merely a system for choosing governments. It is a system capable of surviving governments.

1. Strong Institutions Matter More Than Strong Leaders

One major difference between stable and unstable democracies is the relationship between individuals and institutions.

In an unstable political system, institutions may depend heavily on whoever currently holds power.

When a new president arrives:

senior officials change,

police leadership changes,

prosecutors change,

regulators change,

government contracts change,

media relationships change,

and sometimes judicial appointments become politically contested.

The state begins to look like an extension of the ruling party.

Stable democracies operate differently.

Presidents and prime ministers come and go, but much of the institutional machinery continues functioning.

Civil servants remain.

Courts continue hearing cases.

Election administrators continue working.

Central banks continue operating.

Local governments continue delivering services.

Government statistics continue being published.

The state therefore develops an identity independent of individual political leaders.

That distinction is critical.

A stable democracy says:

“Politicians temporarily control government.”

An unstable democracy can gradually become:

“Whoever controls government controls the state.”

The stronger the distinction between party and state, the more resilient democracy tends to become.

2. The Rule of Law Changes Everything

Perhaps no factor is more important to democratic stability than the rule of law.

A constitution means little if powerful people can ignore it.

Courts mean little if judges fear politicians.

Anticorruption laws mean little if only political opponents are prosecuted.

Property rights mean little if governments can confiscate assets arbitrarily.

Election laws mean little if ruling parties can change them whenever they face defeat.

The rule of law means that political authority is constrained by rules that apply even when leaders dislike the consequences.

According to the World Justice Project's 2025 Rule of Law Index, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden and New Zealand occupied the top five positions globally. Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Australia and other established democracies also ranked highly.

This does not mean those countries have perfect governments.

They do not.

The important feature is institutional predictability.

Citizens, businesses, opposition parties and government officials generally know that rules cannot simply be rewritten overnight for personal advantage.

Predictability creates political stability.

When people trust courts rather than mobs, democratic disputes are easier to resolve peacefully.

3. Stable Democracies Know How to Lose Elections

Democracy is usually described as the right to vote.

But perhaps the more important democratic skill is the ability to lose.

A stable democracy requires political parties to believe:

“If we lose today, we can compete again tomorrow.”

This creates powerful incentives for restraint.

The governing party does not need to destroy the opposition.

The opposition does not need to overthrow the government.

The loser waits for another election.

This is one reason peaceful alternation of power is so important.

Botswana demonstrated the principle dramatically in 2024. After the Botswana Democratic Party had governed continuously since independence in 1966, voters elected an opposition coalition. International observers described the election as peaceful and orderly, and political power changed hands after 58 years of one-party electoral dominance.

That matters because democratic stability is ultimately tested when incumbents lose.

Anyone can support elections while winning them.

The harder democratic test is:

Will those controlling the state surrender power when citizens choose someone else?

4. Political Culture Matters

Constitutions alone cannot produce stable democracy.

Countries can copy nearly identical constitutions and obtain radically different political outcomes.

Why?

Because written rules exist alongside unwritten democratic norms.

These include ideas such as:

• political opponents are legitimate;

• elections should determine governments;

• violence is unacceptable;

• judges should not simply obey politicians;

• opposition parties have a right to exist;

• governments should not use state institutions for revenge;

• compromise is sometimes necessary;

• losing an election is temporary;

• and disagreement does not make someone an enemy of the nation.

Political scientists sometimes describe these behaviors as democratic norms or democratic restraint.

They are difficult to legislate.

A constitution may legally permit a president to exercise a particular power.

A democratic political culture may still tell the president:

“You should not use that power merely because you can.”

Stable democracy therefore requires both law and self-restraint.

5. Polarization Can Destroy Democratic Stability

Political disagreement is normal.

Extreme polarization is different.

When citizens begin viewing political opponents as existential threats, democratic calculations change.

Suppose supporters of Party A believe:

“If Party B takes power, our country will be destroyed.”

Party B's supporters believe exactly the same thing about Party A.

Both sides may eventually conclude that preventing the opponent from governing matters more than protecting democratic rules.

That creates dangerous incentives.

Court packing becomes justified.

Election manipulation becomes justified.

Political prosecutions become justified.

Media censorship becomes justified.

Even violence may become easier to rationalize.

Stable democracies therefore do not necessarily have less disagreement.

They are often better at keeping disagreement inside institutional boundaries.

Citizens may say:

“I strongly oppose your government.”

without saying:

“You have no legitimate right to govern.”

That small distinction has enormous consequences.

6. Economic Stability Helps—but Wealth Alone Does Not Create Democracy

Economic conditions also influence democratic resilience.

Countries experiencing prolonged unemployment, inflation, inequality or declining living standards can experience increased political frustration.

Citizens begin asking:

What has democracy delivered?

Why are politicians getting richer?

Why can I not find employment?

Why can my children not afford housing?

Why are public services deteriorating?

When democratic government becomes associated with economic failure, anti-system politicians gain opportunities.

Economic insecurity is closely related to institutional trust. Across OECD countries surveyed, only about 35% of people concerned about their financial future reported high or moderately high trust in national government, compared with 52% among those with fewer economic concerns.

But wealth alone cannot explain democratic stability.

Some wealthy states are not democracies.

Some middle-income and relatively small economies maintain strong democratic traditions.

Economic prosperity helps democracy partly because it provides governments with resources to provide education, infrastructure, social protection and public services.

But what often matters more is whether economic opportunity is perceived as fairly distributed.

A society can become wealthy while remaining politically unstable if citizens believe that only a small elite benefits.

7. Extreme Inequality Can Become Political Inequality

Economic inequality becomes especially dangerous when wealth translates directly into political influence.

If citizens observe that wealthy individuals can:

finance elections,

hire lobbyists,

control media organizations,

obtain privileged political access,

influence legislation,

and shape government appointments,

they may conclude that democratic equality exists only inside the polling station.

This undermines political legitimacy.

The wealthy citizen and the poor citizen each have one vote.

But one may possess far greater influence over what happens between elections.

Stable democracies therefore usually require mechanisms that prevent economic power from completely dominating political power.

These may include:

campaign-finance regulation,

political-finance transparency,

anticorruption agencies,

competitive markets,

social protections,

strong public institutions,

and independent courts.

Perfect economic equality is neither necessary nor realistic.

But extreme political exclusion combined with extreme economic inequality can make democratic resentment explosive.

8. Government Must Actually Work

Democratic legitimacy also depends on state capacity.

Citizens may strongly support democratic principles and still become frustrated if government cannot perform basic functions.

Can it provide electricity?

Can children attend functioning schools?

Can hospitals treat patients?

Can police maintain security?

Can roads be built?

Can taxes be collected fairly?

Can businesses obtain licenses without bribery?

Can courts resolve disputes within a reasonable time?

Can citizens receive identification documents?

A democracy incapable of delivering basic public services may eventually lose legitimacy.

This reveals an important distinction:

democracy and state capacity are not the same thing.

A country may have competitive elections but an ineffective state.

Stable democracies generally combine accountability with administrative competence.

Citizens need both:

the ability to remove bad governments

and

a government capable of doing something after being elected.

9. Trust Matters—but Blind Trust Is Not Necessary

Stable democracy does not require citizens to trust politicians completely.

Healthy skepticism is democratic.

Citizens should question government.

Journalists should investigate.

Opposition parties should criticize.

Courts should scrutinize.

But some forms of institutional trust are necessary.

Citizens must possess enough confidence to believe that:

votes will be counted,

courts can settle disputes,

public institutions will generally follow procedures,

and losing an election does not mean political exclusion.

OECD research illustrates how strongly trust is related to political agency.

Among people who feel they have a say in government decisions, 69% report high or moderately high trust in national government. Among those who feel they lack such a voice, the figure falls to just 22%.

That suggests something fundamental:

People are more likely to trust democracy when democracy allows them to feel politically relevant.

10. Civic Participation Makes Democracy More Resilient

Voting once every four or five years is not sufficient to sustain democratic culture.

Stable democracies usually possess broader forms of civic participation:

community organizations,

professional associations,

trade unions,

religious institutions,

student organizations,

advocacy organizations,

independent journalism,

local political organizations,

protests,

petitions,

public consultations,

and volunteer associations.

These institutions create what is often called civil society.

Civil society gives citizens political experience outside government.

People learn to organize.

Negotiate.

Compromise.

Elect leaders.

Resolve disagreements.

Hold organizations accountable.

Civic participation can also create alternative centers of power capable of resisting government overreach.

International IDEA's 2025 assessment found that Participation was more resilient globally than several other dimensions of democracy, even as Representation, Rights and Rule of Law experienced significant deterioration.

This suggests that active citizens can remain an important democratic defense even when formal institutions weaken.

11. Stable Democracies Usually Have Credible Opposition Parties

A democracy cannot remain stable if politics revolves around one leader.

Neither can it function well if opposition parties exist only to destroy governments rather than replace them responsibly.

Stable democracies need opposition parties capable of becoming governments.

That means opposition movements must develop:

policy programs,

qualified candidates,

organizational structures,

local branches,

fundraising mechanisms,

expertise,

and internal leadership succession.

This helps transform politics from personal conflict into institutional competition.

Instead of:

Leader A versus Leader B

the political system becomes:

Government program A versus government program B.

Institutionalized political parties make democratic succession less dangerous.

12. Electoral Systems Can Influence Stability

The design of elections also matters.

Winner-take-all systems can produce clear governments but may leave large groups feeling unrepresented.

Proportional systems often represent more political viewpoints but may produce coalition instability.

Presidential systems provide direct executive legitimacy but can generate conflict when presidents and legislatures claim competing democratic mandates.

Parliamentary systems can remove ineffective governments more easily but may experience frequent coalition changes.

No electoral system is universally superior.

The important question is whether the rules fit the country's social structure and create incentives for cooperation.

In ethnically or religiously fragmented societies, an electoral system that allows one group permanently to dominate everyone else can create instability.

Institutions that encourage coalition-building may reduce this risk.

13. Social Diversity Does Not Automatically Destabilize Democracy

Some people assume that culturally homogeneous countries are naturally more democratic.

Reality is more complicated.

Multiethnic, multilingual and multireligious democracies can remain stable.

What matters is whether political institutions convert diversity into permanent exclusion.

If one ethnic community believes:

“No matter how we vote, another group will always control the government,”

democratic loyalty may weaken.

Federalism, decentralization, proportional representation, minority protections and coalition politics can help diverse societies manage these tensions.

The objective is not to eliminate identity.

It is to prevent political competition from becoming a permanent struggle over which identity owns the state.

14. Uruguay Shows the Importance of Institutional Continuity

Uruguay provides a useful example from Latin America.

International IDEA currently places Uruguay among the world's stronger performers in several democratic dimensions. Its 2025 profile ranks it highly in Representation and particularly strongly in Participation, while noting challenges including crime, inequality and some deterioration in rights and rule-of-law indicators.

Uruguay's stability does not mean the population agrees politically.

The country has competitive center-left and center-right political blocs.

Governments change.

Policy changes.

But political competition generally occurs within a widely accepted constitutional framework.

The political battle is largely over who should govern, rather than over whether the political system should survive.

That is a critical characteristic of democratic maturity.

15. Mauritius Demonstrates Both Resilience and Warning Signs

Mauritius offers another instructive case.

It has a long record of competitive multiparty elections and relatively strong civic participation. In its November 2024 election, the opposition coalition won overwhelmingly, and international observers assessed the vote as credible, transparent and peaceful. Turnout reached 79.3%.

Yet Mauritius also demonstrates that established democracies cannot become complacent.

Before that election, authorities briefly suspended access to social-media platforms, generating concerns over freedom of expression. International IDEA has also documented previous deterioration in areas such as credible elections and effective parliament.

The broader lesson is important:

Democratic stability is never permanently acquired.

Institutions must continually be defended.

16. New Democracies Face Different Problems

Older democracies have an advantage: institutional memory.

Citizens may have experienced numerous peaceful elections.

Judges have established traditions of independence.

Military institutions have become accustomed to civilian authority.

Political parties know they may return to power after losing.

Election administrators possess experience.

Newer democracies may not yet have developed these habits.

If a country's history contains coups, civil wars or authoritarian governments, political actors may fear losing power more intensely.

The first peaceful transition is therefore important.

The second is important.

The third is important.

Over time, peaceful succession becomes normal.

Democratic stability develops partly through repetition.

17. Military Professionalism Is Especially Important

In many fragile democracies, there is another political actor waiting outside civilian institutions:

the military.

If armed forces believe they possess a legitimate right to intervene whenever civilian politics becomes chaotic, democracy remains permanently vulnerable.

Stable democracies usually establish a strong norm:

Soldiers defend the constitutional state; voters choose the government.

Civilian governments must also avoid politicizing the military.

Promotions, budgets and command structures should not become partisan rewards.

Once military allegiance shifts from the constitution toward particular political factions, elections can become dangerous.

18. Corruption Can Hollow Out Democracy

Citizens may tolerate ideological disagreement.

They often become far more cynical when politics appears to function primarily as personal enrichment.

If government positions provide access to:

contracts,

land,

licenses,

mineral concessions,

state companies,

public employment,

or protection from prosecution,

elections become battles over economic survival.

Political parties then fight not merely over policy but over access to state resources.

This makes losing power terrifying.

It also makes winning power extraordinarily profitable.

Stable democracy therefore requires credible anticorruption mechanisms.

The smaller the economic reward for capturing the state, the easier peaceful political competition becomes.

19. Information Systems Matter More Than Ever

Modern democratic stability also depends on whether citizens share enough factual reality to resolve political disputes.

Democracy does not require everyone to agree.

But citizens need institutions capable of establishing basic facts.

Independent journalism.

Reliable election authorities.

Government statistics.

Scientific agencies.

Courts.

Universities.

Professional fact-checking.

If every institution becomes associated with a political faction, democratic disagreement becomes much harder to resolve.

One side believes the election was fair.

Another believes it was stolen.

One side trusts national statistics.

Another believes they are fabricated.

One side trusts courts.

Another views judges as partisan agents.

When there is no trusted mechanism for resolving factual disputes, political conflict can become permanent.

20. Stable Democracies Correct Problems Before They Become Existential

Perhaps the greatest advantage of resilient democracies is not that they avoid crises.

They do not.

Stable democracies experience corruption scandals.

Economic recessions.

Protests.

Government collapses.

Polarization.

Security threats.

Political extremism.

The difference is that institutions absorb these shocks.

A scandal leads to an investigation rather than a coup.

An unpopular government leads to an election rather than a revolution.

A constitutional dispute goes to court rather than the military.

A protest results in negotiation rather than regime collapse.

Democratic resilience is therefore the capacity to convert potentially violent conflicts into institutional processes.

What Makes a Democracy Stable?

The strongest democracies usually combine several characteristics simultaneously.

Institutional strength means rules survive individual leaders.

Rule of law means government itself remains legally constrained.

Economic inclusion gives citizens a stake in political stability.

State capacity allows democracy to deliver practical results.

Political culture makes compromise legitimate.

Opposition rights ensure losing does not mean exclusion.

Independent media maintains public accountability.

Civil society creates alternative centers of participation.

Professional armed forces remain outside partisan politics.

Political agency makes citizens feel democracy actually belongs to them.

No single ingredient is sufficient.

A wealthy democracy can become unstable.

A strong constitution can be ignored.

High voter turnout can coexist with corruption.

Independent courts cannot save democracy indefinitely if political leaders refuse to obey them.

Stability comes from the interaction among these institutions and norms.

Stable Democracy Is a Habit, Not Just a Constitution

Why are some democracies more stable than others?

Because democracy survives when political actors believe the system is more valuable than winning any single political battle.

Stable democracies develop a powerful shared understanding:

Governments are temporary.

Institutions are permanent.

Opponents are legitimate.

Courts must remain independent.

The military does not choose governments.

Citizens have the right to criticize authority.

The winner cannot take everything.

The loser does not lose citizenship.

And today's opposition may become tomorrow's government.

This explains why copying another country's constitution rarely creates instant democratic stability.

Institutions need legitimacy.

Rules need enforcement.

Political parties need discipline.

Citizens need political agency.

Governments need competence.

And political leaders need restraint.

The World Justice Project's 2025 findings are particularly revealing: the countries performing most strongly on rule of law are also predominantly societies with deeply institutionalized democratic governance. Yet its wider global assessment found rule-of-law deterioration in many countries, showing that even mature systems require continual protection.

International IDEA similarly warns that more than half of the countries it assessed experienced deterioration in at least one important dimension of democratic performance over the preceding five years.

Democracy therefore should never be considered politically indestructible.

The deepest difference between stable and unstable democracies may ultimately come down to one question:

When political actors have the power to damage democratic institutions for their own advantage, do they choose to do it?

Strong constitutions make abuse harder.

Independent courts make abuse riskier.

Active citizens make abuse more visible.

Free media make abuse harder to conceal.

Competitive elections make abuse punishable.

Political culture makes abuse unacceptable.

When all of these forces reinforce one another, democracy becomes resilient.

When they weaken simultaneously, elections alone may not be enough to save it.

The most stable democracy, therefore, is not necessarily the society with the fewest disagreements.

It is the society that has built the strongest institutions and political habits for disagreeing without destroying the system that allows everyone to disagree.

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THE SAHEL- Russia and the Sahel: Security Partner or New Dependency? Assessing Military Cooperation, Political Influence, Resource Interests and Public Perceptions

 

THE SAHEL

Russia and the Sahel: Security Partner or New Dependency?

Assessing Military Cooperation, Political Influence, Resource Interests and Public Perceptions

Russia's rapid expansion across the Sahel represents one of the most consequential shifts in African geopolitics in decades.

Only a few years ago, France was the dominant external security partner in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Thousands of French troops operated across the region under Operation Barkhane. The United States maintained intelligence and drone facilities in Niger. European forces provided training. The United Nations deployed a large peacekeeping mission in Mali.

That architecture has largely collapsed.

Mali expelled French forces and later demanded the departure of the UN mission. Burkina Faso ended France's military deployment. Niger expelled both French and American forces after its 2023 coup. At the same time, the three military-led governments created the Alliance of Sahel States, or AES, and began developing increasingly close relationships with Moscow.

Russia moved quickly into the opening.

Russian military instructors arrived. Weapons were supplied. Wagner Group personnel fought alongside Malian troops. After Wagner's restructuring following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps assumed an increasingly important role.

By July 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the foreign ministers of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger were openly describing their expanding military and military-technical relationship as part of a broader Russia-AES partnership. Moscow also committed itself to strengthening the AES's emerging Unified Force.

Russia is therefore no longer merely exploiting France's retreat.

It is helping construct a new security architecture in the Central Sahel.

But this raises a crucial question:

Are Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger escaping Western dependency—or simply exchanging one external security partner for another?

The answer is complicated.

Russia offers these governments something they genuinely want: weapons, political support, security assistance and fewer lectures about governance.

But precisely because the relationship is becoming strategically important, it also contains the foundations of a new dependency.

1. Why Russia Became Attractive

To understand Russia's appeal, one must first understand what Sahelian governments believed had failed.

France's Operation Barkhane eventually deployed around 5,100 troops across the Sahel. The United States had more than 1,000 personnel in Niger before its withdrawal and had spent more than $100 million constructing Air Base 201 near Agadez for regional intelligence and drone operations.

Yet jihadist violence continued spreading.

The insurgency moved from northern Mali into central Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and increasingly threatened coastal West Africa.

From the perspective of the military governments that subsequently seized power, this presented an obvious political argument:

If Western forces had operated in the Sahel for years without defeating terrorism, why should the same security arrangement continue?

Russia offered an alternative.

Moscow presented itself not as a former colonial power but as a partner willing to respect sovereignty.

It was prepared to deal directly with military governments.

It did not make military assistance heavily conditional on rapid democratic transitions.

It was willing to provide weapons and personnel.

And perhaps most importantly, it treated the governments themselves as legitimate negotiating partners at a time when many Western governments were condemning their coups.

That distinction became enormously valuable.

2. From Wagner to Africa Corps

Russia's initial military expansion in Mali was closely associated with the Wagner Group.

Beginning in late 2021, Wagner personnel operated alongside Malian armed forces following the deterioration of Mali's relationship with France.

The Wagner model was unusual.

It combined:

military training,

combat operations,

leadership protection,

information activities,

and potentially commercial opportunities.

This provided Moscow with political influence without initially requiring the deployment of conventional Russian armed forces.

But after Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died in 2023, Moscow increasingly brought African operations under direct state control.

Wagner announced its departure from Mali in June 2025, but the Africa Corps, controlled much more directly by Russia's Defence Ministry, remained. Reuters reported that a large proportion of Africa Corps personnel came from the former Wagner network.

This transition matters.

The distinction between "Russian mercenaries" and official Russian geopolitical strategy has become increasingly difficult to maintain.

Africa Corps represents something closer to an institutionalised Russian state security presence.

That means relations between Moscow and the AES are becoming less improvised and more strategic.

3. Mali Became Russia's Sahelian Laboratory

Mali provides the clearest demonstration of both the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian approach.

One of the Malian government's most significant military achievements came in November 2023, when its forces retook Kidal, the northern stronghold long associated with Tuareg separatist movements.

Witnesses reported Russian personnel supporting Malian forces during the advance.

Politically, this was enormously significant.

For Mali's military government, Kidal represented something previous governments—despite French and UN assistance—had struggled to accomplish:

the restoration of central-government control over a symbolically vital part of national territory.

This gave the Russian partnership credibility.

But the situation did not remain static.

In July 2024, Russian and Malian forces suffered a major defeat around Tinzaouaten, where Wagner acknowledged significant losses after clashes involving Tuareg rebels and jihadist fighters.

Then came an even more serious deterioration.

In April 2026, coordinated jihadist and Tuareg-led attacks struck multiple targets, including Bamako, killed Mali's defence minister and forced Russian-supported government forces to retreat from several northern positions. Reuters described the developments as raising serious questions about the effectiveness of the security system that had replaced French and UN involvement.

Further coordinated attacks followed in July 2026 across northern, central and southern Mali.

The lesson is familiar.

Russia can provide battlefield capability.

It cannot guarantee strategic victory.

4. Russia's Military Model Is Different From the Western Model

The Russian and Western approaches to Sahel security are not identical.

The Western model

France, the United States, European states and international organisations generally constructed a multi-layered security architecture.

It included:

counterterrorism operations;

special forces;

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance;

training;

development assistance;

UN peacekeeping;

institution-building;

regional diplomacy;

and political pressure concerning elections, human rights and constitutional rule.

The system had enormous resources.

But it was bureaucratic.

It involved multiple governments and institutions.

It often imposed political conditions.

And in the case of France, it carried the burden of colonial history.

Many Sahelians increasingly perceived the arrangement as paternalistic.

The Russian model

Russia's offer is generally narrower and more transactional.

It focuses heavily on:

weapons;

combat support;

military instructors;

regime protection;

intelligence cooperation;

military technology;

diplomatic backing;

and fewer political conditions.

This allows Moscow to move quickly.

If a military government wants helicopters, air-defence equipment or combat personnel, Russia is often willing to discuss the request without first demanding an electoral timetable.

That is enormously attractive to regimes facing both insurgencies and international isolation.

But there is a trade-off.

Western partnerships, for all their failures, often included substantial civilian development, humanitarian, governance and institutional programmes.

Russia's comparative advantage remains heavily concentrated in the security sector.

That creates a danger.

A government may gain a more politically accommodating military partner while losing access to a much wider ecosystem of development assistance and international cooperation.

5. Niger Demonstrates How Quickly Russia Can Fill a Vacuum

Niger provides another example.

Following the July 2023 military coup, relations between Niamey and Western governments deteriorated rapidly.

France withdrew approximately 1,500 troops.

The United States subsequently withdrew nearly 1,000 personnel and abandoned its major intelligence infrastructure, including Air Base 201. The U.S. withdrawal was completed in September 2024.

Russia moved in.

In April 2024, Russian military instructors and an air-defence system arrived in Niger to train Nigerien forces and expand military cooperation.

The partnership has since deepened.

During an attack on Niamey's airport in January 2026, Niger's leader publicly praised Russian personnel for helping defend the installation. His broader allegations that France and neighbouring states were behind the attack were made without supporting evidence, but the episode illustrated how Russian troops had become integrated into the government's security narrative.

This is important politically.

Russia does not need to defeat the entire insurgency immediately to demonstrate usefulness.

If Russian forces help protect strategic installations, political leaders or military bases, governments can point to tangible security benefits.

6. Burkina Faso Has Also Moved Toward Moscow

Burkina Faso expelled French troops in 2023 and subsequently expanded cooperation with Russia.

An initial contingent of about 100 Russian personnel arrived in early 2024, with Africa Corps indicating that the deployment could eventually reach around 300.

President Ibrahim Traoré's government has simultaneously cultivated an explicitly sovereignty-focused political identity.

Russia fits comfortably within that narrative.

Moscow is portrayed not as an occupying power but as one of several partners assisting an African government that has chosen its own strategic direction.

This distinction should not be dismissed simply as propaganda.

African governments do have the right to choose their security partners.

The problem arises when choice gradually becomes dependence.

7. The AES Is Transforming Bilateral Relationships Into a Regional Partnership

Russia's most significant achievement may ultimately be its transition from dealing separately with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to dealing with the AES collectively.

In April 2025, Moscow pledged support for a planned 5,000-member AES joint force, including weapons, training and technical assistance.

By July 2026, that partnership had deepened further.

Russia and AES foreign ministers meeting in Niamey welcomed expanding military and military-technical cooperation, including Africa Corps support, and Moscow committed itself to strengthening both national armed forces and the AES Unified Force.

This creates an important geopolitical possibility.

Instead of Russia maintaining isolated military missions in individual countries, Moscow could become a major external partner of an entire Sahelian security bloc.

That would substantially increase Russian influence.

It would also substantially increase the consequences if the AES became overly reliant on Russian equipment, logistics, intelligence or personnel.

8. Public Perception Is One of Russia's Greatest Advantages

Russia has succeeded not merely because governments like Moscow.

At least in parts of the Sahel, Russia has also acquired significant popular appeal.

Reliable region-wide polling remains limited, so sweeping claims that "the Sahel supports Russia" should be treated cautiously.

But Mali provides unusually strong evidence.

Afrobarometer surveyed 1,200 Malian adults in December 2024.

The results were striking.

88% viewed Russia's economic and political influence positively.

79% viewed China's influence positively.

Only 40% viewed U.S. influence positively.

Just 9% gave a positive assessment of French influence.

Among respondents aware of the Russia-Ukraine war, 72% said Mali should side with Russia.

These figures demonstrate that Russia's position cannot simply be explained as an arrangement imposed on Mali by its military leadership.

There is genuine pro-Russian sentiment among a significant part of the population.

9. Why Is Russia Popular?

Several factors contribute.

Russia lacks France's colonial baggage

The Soviet Union cultivated anti-colonial relationships across Africa and supported several liberation movements.

Contemporary Russia uses this history aggressively in its diplomacy.

Whether today's Russian Federation should be treated as a continuation of Soviet anti-colonial policy is debatable.

Politically, however, the narrative is effective.

Moscow emphasises sovereignty

Russian officials frequently frame relations around:

non-interference,

multipolarity,

state sovereignty,

and opposition to Western domination.

That vocabulary resonates strongly in countries where resentment of France and Western political pressure has increased.

Russia appears willing to provide weapons

Security is an immediate concern.

Governments fighting insurgencies may value equipment and battlefield assistance more highly than governance programmes or diplomatic advice.

Russia treats military governments as legitimate partners

Where Western states speak of transitions and sanctions, Moscow speaks of cooperation.

For governments under international pressure, the difference is substantial.

10. But Popularity Can Be Temporary

There is an important warning here.

France itself was once popular.

French troops were welcomed enthusiastically by many Malians when Operation Serval intervened in 2013.

A decade later, France was expelled.

Why?

Because expectations and outcomes diverged.

The same process could eventually affect Russia.

If Russian forces remain for years while:

terrorist attacks increase,

civilian insecurity continues,

economic conditions remain difficult,

or foreign personnel become associated with abuses,

public attitudes could change.

Geopolitical popularity is rarely permanent.

Russia should therefore not assume that today's anti-French sentiment guarantees tomorrow's pro-Russian sentiment.

11. Human Rights Abuses Could Become Russia's Strategic Weakness

One of the most serious criticisms of Russian security involvement concerns civilian protection.

Human Rights Watch and other organisations have repeatedly accused Malian armed forces and Russian personnel of killings and abuses against civilians.

Reuters reported in April 2026, citing ACLED data and Human Rights Watch analysis, that government and allied forces were responsible for substantial numbers of civilian deaths in both Mali and Burkina Faso. In Mali, this category included Russian Wagner and Africa Corps personnel.

This matters beyond humanitarian concerns.

Civilian abuse is strategically counterproductive.

Counterinsurgency ultimately depends on intelligence from local populations.

If communities fear security forces, they become less willing to cooperate.

Insurgent organisations can then portray themselves as defenders of persecuted communities.

Abuses therefore risk becoming recruitment material for jihadists.

France encountered this problem when supporting regional armies.

Russia may encounter the same problem even more severely if its approach prioritises aggressive military operations over civilian protection and political reconciliation.

12. The Resource Question: Is Russia After Sahelian Minerals?

This issue requires particular caution.

A popular narrative says Russian security assistance is simply exchanged for gold, uranium and other resources.

There is some historical basis for concern.

Wagner-linked networks have been heavily associated with mineral concessions elsewhere in Africa, particularly in the Central African Republic and Sudan.

But the reality in Mali is more complicated.

A 2025 investigation reported by Reuters found that Wagner's activities in Mali did not ultimately secure the mining concessions it had sought, and President Assimi Goïta reportedly restricted access to such opportunities.

So the simple formula—

Russian mercenaries arrive, receive a gold mine, and send the profits to Moscow

—is too crude to describe every Sahelian relationship.

However, Russia's commercial interest in strategic resources is unquestionably increasing.

13. Mali: Gold and a New Russian Economic Partnership

Mali is one of Africa's important gold producers.

In June 2025, construction began on a new gold refinery near Bamako developed with Russia's Yadran Group and a Swiss partner.

The planned facility has capacity to process approximately 200 tonnes annually, far more than Mali's own current gold production, suggesting ambitions to serve as a regional refining centre.

Crucially, the Malian state retains a controlling stake.

This arrangement deserves attention.

From Mali's perspective, the refinery represents resource sovereignty.

Instead of exporting raw gold for refining elsewhere, Mali wants more value to remain inside the country.

From Russia's perspective, participation creates commercial relationships, strategic access and long-term political influence.

Both countries can therefore benefit.

Dependency is not inevitable.

The key issue is the structure of the contract.

Who controls production?

Who receives profits?

Who provides technology?

Who controls marketing?

Where is the gold sold?

What debts or guarantees are involved?

Those questions determine whether a resource partnership increases Malian sovereignty or weakens it.

14. Niger: Uranium Could Become Much More Strategically Important

Niger creates an even more consequential resource relationship.

After the military takeover, the government moved against the longstanding position of French nuclear company Orano and asserted greater state control over uranium production.

At the same time, relations with Russia expanded.

In July 2025, Russia's state nuclear corporation Rosatom and Niger signed a memorandum covering peaceful nuclear cooperation, including electricity, training and nuclear medicine.

Then in September 2025, Niger's mines minister publicly proposed developing uranium deposits jointly with Russia and expressed ambitions for two large nuclear reactors in partnership with Rosatom.

This could create one of the deepest Russia-Sahel relationships yet.

A nuclear-energy partnership is fundamentally different from selling rifles.

Nuclear projects can involve:

decades-long financing,

fuel supply,

technical training,

maintenance,

regulatory cooperation,

and infrastructure dependence.

Rosatom therefore provides Russia with a potentially powerful long-term geopolitical instrument.

15. Nuclear Cooperation Could Produce Development—or Dependency

For Niger, Russian nuclear cooperation could be transformative if it eventually contributes to reliable electricity and technical capacity.

But nuclear projects are extremely capital-intensive.

If Russia:

finances construction,

provides technology,

supplies fuel,

trains personnel,

maintains reactors,

and participates in uranium development,

then Niger could become deeply dependent on one external partner across an entire strategic industry.

This is precisely the type of structural relationship Sahelian governments claim they want to escape.

The lesson is therefore simple:

resource nationalism does not automatically equal resource sovereignty.

Removing a French company is not sufficient.

The replacement arrangement must also preserve competition, transparency and national bargaining power.

16. Russia's Economic Weakness Could Limit Its Influence

Russia possesses one important disadvantage compared with Western Europe and China.

Its overall economic presence in Africa remains relatively modest.

Russia's strength is concentrated in areas such as:

arms,

security,

grain,

energy,

mining,

and nuclear technology.

The European Union and China have historically maintained much broader African trade and investment relationships.

CSIS has noted that Russia's economic engagement with Africa remains much smaller than that of the EU or China, even while its security influence can be disproportionately large.

This creates a paradox.

Russia may become the Sahel's most politically visible security partner without becoming its most important economic partner.

That limits Moscow's capacity to solve the deeper problems feeding instability:

unemployment,

education,

roads,

industrialisation,

agriculture,

electricity,

healthcare,

and urban development.

Security cooperation can protect governments.

It cannot by itself transform economies.

17. Russia Provides Something Western Governments Often Would Not: Regime Security

This may be the most important difference of all.

Western security assistance is usually officially designed around protecting states and populations.

Russia's model can be more closely aligned with protecting incumbent governments.

For military regimes, these objectives overlap—but they are not identical.

A partner willing to provide:

presidential protection,

elite military units,

intelligence,

arms,

and political backing

becomes extremely valuable to rulers concerned not only about jihadists but also coups, rebellions and domestic opposition.

This creates what might be described as a regime-security bargain.

The government receives survival assistance.

Russia receives privileged political access.

The danger is obvious.

If the survival of a government becomes dependent on Russian assistance, Moscow acquires leverage over that government.

That is dependency even if no formal colonial relationship exists.

18. Information and Political Influence Matter Too

Russia's role is not exclusively military.

Moscow has developed sophisticated information strategies throughout Africa.

Russian narratives emphasise:

Western hypocrisy,

colonial exploitation,

multipolarity,

African sovereignty,

traditional values,

and resistance to foreign interference.

Some of these themes resonate because they connect with real historical grievances.

But information campaigns can also blur the distinction between legitimate criticism and manipulation.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has argued that Russia has supported extensive information operations across the Sahel designed to weaken confidence in Western partners and strengthen governments aligned with Moscow.

This creates another dependency risk.

Sovereignty should mean that African citizens control their political debates.

If French influence is replaced by Russian information manipulation, the ideological source of foreign influence has changed—but the underlying problem has not disappeared.

19. Russia Also Gains Diplomatic Benefits

The Sahel partnership provides Moscow with something larger than security contracts.

Russia wants international partners.

Since its invasion of Ukraine and resulting confrontation with Western governments, Africa has become even more diplomatically important to Moscow.

Relationships with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger help Russia demonstrate that Western attempts at international isolation have limits.

The AES governments can also cooperate with Russia in multilateral organisations.

This exchange is therefore reciprocal.

The Sahel receives security and political support.

Russia receives diplomatic legitimacy and international partners.

That is normal geopolitics.

But it illustrates why the relationship cannot be understood purely as Russian charity toward African sovereignty.

Moscow has interests too.

20. Western Partnerships Had Serious Failures—but Also Capabilities Russia Has Not Replaced

Any fair comparison must acknowledge both sides.

France and Western governments failed to contain the expansion of jihadist violence.

Their partnerships became politically unpopular.

Colonial memory severely damaged France's legitimacy.

Western demands concerning elections and governance were often perceived as interference.

And large foreign military deployments created dependence rather than sustainable local security capacity.

Those failures were real.

But the Western security system also provided capabilities that Russia has not fully replaced.

These included:

high-end intelligence and surveillance;

large-scale development assistance;

airlift;

humanitarian funding;

UN logistics;

European training missions;

diplomatic networks;

and cooperation across numerous West African governments.

The departure of Western and UN forces therefore produced genuine capability gaps.

Russia has filled some of them.

It has not filled all of them.

21. Western Conditionality vs Russian Non-Conditionality

This contrast lies at the heart of the competition.

Western governments often say:

We will assist you, but elections, human rights and constitutional governance matter.

Russia effectively says:

We will work with whoever controls the state.

For military governments, the Russian approach is naturally attractive.

But what looks like "respect for sovereignty" to one audience may look like "support for authoritarian survival" to another.

Likewise, what Western governments call "democratic conditionality" may be understood locally as political interference.

Neither narrative tells the entire story.

The geopolitical choice is therefore not simply between freedom and authoritarianism.

It is partly about who gets to define the conditions of partnership.

22. Has Russia Improved Security?

The evidence so far is mixed.

There have been tangible gains.

Malian forces regained Kidal in 2023 with Russian support.

Russian assistance has increased military capabilities.

The governments have acquired more equipment and developed closer joint military coordination.

Russian personnel have helped protect strategic installations.

But the broader security indicators remain deeply troubling.

Jihadist organisations continue conducting sophisticated attacks.

Large areas remain insecure.

Malian military positions have suffered serious setbacks.

Burkina Faso continues facing severe insurgent violence.

Niger remains threatened by both Islamic State-linked and al-Qaeda-linked networks.

Indeed, Russia and the AES agreed in July 2026 to deepen cooperation precisely because jihadist pressure was still increasing.

The fundamental verdict must therefore be:

Russia has strengthened certain governments militarily, but it has not yet demonstrated that its model can defeat the Sahel insurgency.

23. The Same Strategic Trap May Be Reappearing

This is where the comparison with France becomes uncomfortable.

France entered Mali to defeat jihadist forces.

It won important battles.

It killed senior militant leaders.

It trained local forces.

It remained for years.

Yet insecurity expanded.

Eventually citizens began asking:

Why are foreign soldiers still here if the war is getting worse?

Russia could eventually confront exactly the same question.

The uniforms will be different.

The political rhetoric will be different.

The historical relationship will be different.

But the strategic problem is the same:

external military power cannot substitute for legitimate governance.

24. Terrorism Is Not Only a Military Problem

The Sahel conflicts involve much more than jihadist ideology.

They interact with:

local disputes;

weak justice systems;

farmer-herder conflicts;

ethnic tensions;

corruption;

state absence;

poverty;

smuggling economies;

climate pressures;

unemployment;

and abuses by security forces.

Military operations can suppress armed groups.

But sustainable victory requires government institutions capable of occupying the political space afterwards.

Who provides justice?

Who operates schools?

Who protects markets?

Who settles land disputes?

Who creates employment?

Who controls local taxation?

Who earns community trust?

If the answer is not the state, militants can return.

Russia cannot solve these problems for Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger.

Neither could France.

Ultimately, only Sahelian institutions can.

25. What Would a Healthy Russia-Sahel Partnership Look Like?

Russia does not inevitably have to become a new dependency.

The outcome will depend heavily on decisions made by the AES governments themselves.

A strategically autonomous relationship would involve several principles.

Diversify military suppliers

Do not rely exclusively on Russian weapons, spare parts, intelligence or training.

Maintain African command authority

Foreign forces should support national and AES forces rather than become indispensable operational commanders.

Keep resource contracts transparent

Gold, uranium, oil or infrastructure agreements should be structured so that national governments retain genuine bargaining power.

Build local technical capacity

Every foreign project should train engineers, technicians, military planners and administrators capable of eventually operating systems independently.

Maintain diplomatic diversity

The AES should work simultaneously with Russia, China, Turkey, India, Gulf states, African neighbours, Europe and—where interests overlap—the United States.

Preserve the right to say no

The ultimate test of sovereignty is whether a smaller state can reject the demands of a larger partner without fearing the collapse of its security system.

26. The Best Strategy Is Not Pro-Western or Pro-Russian

The strongest possible Sahelian foreign policy would not be based on choosing Moscow over Paris or Washington.

It would be based on strategic diversification.

Buy drones where the technology is best.

Build infrastructure with whichever partner offers sustainable financing.

Cooperate with Russia where interests align.

Cooperate with China where interests align.

Work with Turkey, India, Morocco, Gulf states, Europe and the United States when advantageous.

Strengthen African institutions wherever possible.

And avoid giving any external power exclusive control over security, resources, finance or infrastructure.

That is what genuine multipolarity should mean.

Not multiple great powers competing to dominate Africa.

But African governments using competition among great powers to increase their own room for manoeuvre.

Security Partner or New Dependency?

Russia today is unquestionably a real security partner to Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

Calling the relationship imaginary or reducing all Russian involvement to propaganda would ignore reality.

Russia has deployed personnel.

It has supplied equipment.

It trains forces.

It participates in combat-related operations.

It supports the AES Unified Force.

It provides diplomatic backing.

It is developing gold, energy and nuclear relationships.

And significant sections of Malian public opinion view Russia favourably.

But the possibility of new dependency is equally real.

The warning signs include:

growing reliance on Africa Corps;

dependence on Russian military equipment and expertise;

political relationships focused heavily on incumbent regimes;

expanding nuclear and mineral partnerships;

information influence;

and the possibility that deteriorating security will require even greater Russian involvement.

The central geopolitical mistake would therefore be to define independence simply as the absence of France.

That standard is far too low.

Sovereignty Means More Than Changing Partners

The rise of Russia in the Sahel represents both an African assertion of sovereignty and a classic exercise in great-power geopolitics.

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger were dissatisfied with the existing Western security order.

They exercised their sovereign authority to terminate partnerships and choose alternatives.

Russia recognised the opportunity and responded rapidly.

That does not make the AES governments Russian puppets.

Nor does it mean Moscow has no strategic agenda of its own.

Both statements can be true simultaneously:

Sahelian governments possess agency.

And:

Russia seeks influence.

The most important question is therefore not whether Russia is "good" or the West is "bad."

It is whether the emerging relationship increases the independent capacity of Sahelian states.

If Russian cooperation helps the AES develop armies capable of eventually defending themselves, industries that process their own minerals, technicians who control their own infrastructure and governments able to negotiate with multiple external partners, then Russia may genuinely contribute to greater strategic autonomy.

But if Russian forces become indispensable to regime survival, Russian technology becomes impossible to replace, strategic resources become tied to opaque external arrangements and political decisions increasingly depend on Moscow's support, then the Sahel will have reproduced the very dependency it claims to be escaping.

Only the patron will have changed.

That is the deeper lesson of the new Sahelian geopolitical order:

Sovereignty is not measured by which foreign flag leaves your territory. It is measured by how much freedom you retain after the next foreign flag arrives.

For Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, that may become the defining test of their partnership with Russia.

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