Xi Jinping will not attend the Brics summit in Rio de Janeiro next week, Chinese officials have said, marking his first absence at the high table of the world’s leading emerging economies.

Beijing has informed host Brazil of Mr Xi’s absence, citing a scheduling conflict, the South China Morning Post reported on Tuesday.

The 17th annual Brics summit is scheduled for 6-7 July.

China will likely send premier Li Qiang to the summit instead. He similarly attended the G20 summit in India in 2023 in Mr Xi’s stead.

Brics was founded as Bric by Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2009 and South Africa joined the following year. The bloc has since admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and the UAE as full members and invited Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan as “partner countries”.

Chinese officials noted that Mr Xi had already met with Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva twice in less than a year, seemingly suggesting this made his presence at the upcoming summit less urgent. They met at the G20 summit in the South American country last November and then at the China-Celac forum in Beijing this past May, the SCMP reported.

The report speculated that the Brazilian president’s invitation for a state dinner to Indian prime minister Narendra Modi could have sparked Mr Xi’s withdrawal as it could have made the Chinese leader appear as a “supporting actor”.

The Chinese president has never missed a Brics summit since taking office and has participated in every edition since 2013.

For two years during the Covid pandemic, he participated in the summit virtually.

In response to reports about Mr Xi skipping the summit, the Brazilian foreign ministry said it “will not comment on internal deliberations of foreign delegations”.

The last-minute pull out, however, has reportedly left Brazil upset.

The Brazilian president had travelled to Beijing last month in “a gesture of goodwill” and in “expectation that the Chinese president would reciprocate” by attending the Rio summit, an anonymous source told the SCMP.

While refusing to officially confirm its leader’s absence, Beijing pledged its diplomatic support to Brazil’s presidency of the talks.

“Information about participation in the summit will be shared at the appropriate time,” foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told Brazilian newspaper Folha.

He added that China sought to “promote deeper cooperation” among Brics members.

“In a volatile and turbulent world, Brics nations maintain their strategic resolve and work together for global peace, stability and development,” Mr Guo said.

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BRICS’ New Map Is Taking Shape

As the BRICS group prepares for its July 2025 summit in Brazil, a new map of global alignment is emerging—one driven not by military alliances or ideology, but by a push for new partnerships in pursuit of multilateralism, trade and development. Over the past two years, BRICS has significantly expanded its list of members and partners as countries pursue new economic opportunities, political influence and greater resilience amid the increasing use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool and stalled global institutional reforms. Now, with Washington further retreating from key international institutions and U.S. tariffs unsettling global markets, BRICS has moved into the global spotlight, positioning itself as the new champion of multilateralism.

From its outset, BRICS has stood on two pillars: the determination to chart an independent course and the drive to invest in new international institutions. Frustrated by stalled reforms at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund promised in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the group committed to creating its own financial frameworks. Since 2014, when it launched the New Development Bank and the West imposed sanctions on Russia, BRICS has rapidly expanded its institutional capacity and policy coordination. Despite internal differences, it remains united in rejecting external economic coercion and advancing currency diversification to enhance its members’ economic sovereignty.

BRICS already committed to deeper financial cooperation at the bloc’s 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia, creating a cross-border settlement system and strengthening banking and financial markets infrastructure. The 2024 summit also tasked BRICS finance officials with considering and reporting on the use of local currencies, payment instruments and settlement platforms. These efforts, coupled with deeper engagement with BRICS+ countries and realignment of supply chains, further help reduce reliance on the dollar.

This agenda has gained renewed attention since U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent threat to impose 100 percent tariffs on the BRICS countries if they seek to further advance de-dollarization. In response, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva reaffirmed the group’s commitment to developing independent payment platforms. Yet, as Brazilian Central Bank director Nilton David cautioned, BRICS currently lacks the asset base to challenge the dollar, and it may take a decade to build the necessary market capacity to do so.

Similar momentum is also shaping BRICS’ trade agenda. The Trump administration’s retreat from global agreements, especially on trade, has galvanized BRICS to fill the void. In May 2025, BRICS trade ministers adopted a declaration calling for strengthening the multilateral trading system, while also raising concerns about trade-distorting measures and outlining three shared priorities: World Trade Organization, or WTO, reform; renewal of the BRICS 2030 Economic Partnership Strategy; and development of the digital economy. This policy acceleration builds on BRICS’ membership expansions, which strategically brought in key trade partners to deepen trade within and beyond the bloc, and the 2024 launch of an informal consultative framework that created a platform for coordinating BRICS positions within the WTO.

Disaggregating the BRICS Wave

Beyond trade coordination, BRICS is expanding its geopolitical reach by building a broader coalition of like-minded states. In global governance, scale confers influence, but impact depends on mobilizing a critical mass of states to reshape global norms and institutions. In 2023, a report titled “Russia’s Policy Towards World Majority” and released under the auspices of Russia’s Foreign Ministry positioned BRICS as the nucleus of a new multilateral architecture that could marginalize the West. Brazil’s rotating presidency of the bloc this year has softened that narrative, portraying BRICS as “a political and diplomatic coordination forum for countries from the Global South.”

To get a sense of how broad that forum is now, we analyzed official and media sources to offer a snapshot of the BRICS’ rapidly shifting landscape of global engagement. As the map below shows, the group now includes 10 confirmed members, comprising BRICS’ longstanding five core states—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—plus five new ones that formally joined in 2024 and 2025: Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates.

In addition, it has one unconfirmed member, namely Saudi Arabia, and 10 partner states: Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Turkey has also been invited to join as a partner.

(Interactive version here.)

To explain the map’s labeling, “Applied” refers to states that have publicly announced their applications for membership. Others may have applied privately, but the exact number remains unclear. According to a New Indian Express report in October 2024, 34 countries had approached BRICS about joining. After the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, a Russian official cited over two dozen interested states.

States where government officials have expressed interest in joining, consistently engaged with the grouping or plan to do so are defined as “Officials interested.” Those labeled “Debating” have seen nongovernmental discussions about membership or limited official involvement with the bloc’s activities.

As the map reveals, interest spans much of the Global South, though interest in Latin America has been comparatively lower, prompting Brazil to seek to involve Colombia, Uruguay and Chile in BRICS+ discussions.

Gray zones on the map include states that have withdrawn from the grouping, such as Argentina, or had their applications rejected, like Venezuela. Others, like Algeria, were not admitted as full BRICS members but joined the New Development Bank, remaining within the broader BRICS orbit.

Most countries in the gray zone, however, belong to the “global West”—predominantly those that sanctioned Russia, which effectively disqualified them from joining under current BRICS criteria. Yet interest persists even among Western states, some of which are now feeling the impact of rising U.S. tariffs and multilateral retrenchment. French President Emmanuel Macron has previously sought dialogue with BRICS, and a former Canadian politician has proposed joining as a counterbalance to U.S. trade measures.

Whether BRICS can reconcile internal rivalries, deliver tangible benefits in its expanded format or pursue further enlargement remains to be seen. Recent strains include the group’s failure to issue a joint communiqué after the April 2025 foreign ministers’ meeting in Rio de Janeiro, where disagreements over United Nations Security Council reform prompted Brazil, as chair, to issue a summary statement instead. To prospective candidates, the accession process appears arbitrary: Algeria was passed over despite actively campaigning for membership. The economic benefits of membership are also unclear, as market access, technology-sharing and links to the New Development Bank remain poorly defined. And while BRICS’ development narrative resonates, concerns about China’s dominance of the grouping persist. That said, China has taken steps to broaden its appeal, including its recent pledge to grant zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries—a clear effort to deepen trade ties with the Global South.

At the same time, recent U.S. trade and diplomatic pressures are prompting even Washington’s traditionally close partners to diversify their economic ties and explore deeper engagement with BRICS-led institutions. Colombia’s decision to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative in May and its acceptance into the New Development Bank in June, which followed tensions with Trump over deportation flights in early 2025, signal a major strategic realignment.

Balancing Multilateralism and Economic Sovereignty

With its rotating presidency, Brazil is now seeking to seize this moment to consolidate consensus within the group around a sustainable development agenda. As Celso Amorim, Lula’s chief adviser and a former foreign minister, put it, “BRICS is the new name for development.” As such, the Brazilian presidency’s core priorities—global health, trade, investment and finance, AI governance, climate change, security architecture and institutional development—reflect both areas of need and opportunities for internal coordination.

Externally, BRICS will be tested on its ability to use its new WTO consultation mechanisms to shape the future of the global trading system, influence climate diplomacy and contribute to the post-2030 Sustainable Development Goals agenda. Internally, the bloc’s members seek to assert greater control over their own food and monetary systems, through initiatives like the BRICS Grain Exchange and BRICS Pay, to build resilience outside Western institutions.

Multilateral leadership, however, does not guarantee effective responses to international crises. On Ukraine and Gaza, BRICS has failed to articulate a unified position or offer credible security alternatives. On climate, Brazil’s green diplomacy and new land restoration and biodiversity initiatives are encouraging. Yet broader climate cooperation within the grouping is still at a formative stage. If BRICS aspires to serve as a platform for the Global South, it must go further by setting measurable joint goals, taking the lead in tracking and scaling up climate finance, and delivering a credible plan to operationalize and fund the Loss and Damage mechanism.

As the U.S. retreats from global leadership and Brazil advances a sustainable development agenda, BRICS is emerging as a pragmatic platform for countries seeking greater autonomy in a fragmented world. It may not yet offer immediate solutions or robust institutional guarantees, but the strategic calculus for those watching it develop from the outside is shifting. While uncertainties persist about BRICS’ role in the global order, including concerns about some of its leading advocates and institutional practices, the greater risk could lie in being left behind in a system where multilateral options are rapidly narrowing.

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Putin will not go to BRICS summit in Brazil due to ICC arrest warrant, Kremlin aide says

Russian President Vladimir Putin will not travel to next week's BRICS summit in Brazil because of an outstanding arrest warrant issued against him by the International Criminal Court (ICC), Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov said on Wednesday.

The ICC issued the warrant in 2023, just over a year after Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine, accusing Putin of the war crime of deporting hundreds of children from Ukraine.

Russia denies allegations of war crimes and the Kremlin, which did not sign the ICC's founding treaty, has dismissed the warrant as null and void.

But it means that Putin needs to weigh the risk he might be arrested if he travels to another country that is a signatory to the ICC treaty.

In 2023 he decided against travelling to one such country, South Africa, for a BRICS summit. But last year he was given a red carpet welcome in Mongolia, even though it is an ICC member state.

Ushakov said Putin would take part via video link in the July 6-7 BRICS summit in Brazil.

"This is due to certain difficulties, in the context of the ICC requirement. In that context, the Brazilian government could not take a clear position that would allow our president to participate in this meeting," Ushakov said.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will travel to the summit to represent Russia. According to media reports, Chinese President Xi Jinping will skip the summit.