The war with Israel last month decimated a senior echelon of Iran’s military leadership, crippled its air defenses, and exposed the vulnerability of its air force. Within days, Israel had established aerial superiority, paving the way for US air strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites.

But the war also tested the limits of Iran’s alliance with Russia, which offered little more than diplomatic support to Tehran during the 12-day conflict.

With faith in Moscow at a low point, Iran is now urgently seeking to rebuild its defenses -- and is turning to China for the advanced military hardware that Russia has failed to deliver. But as Tehran pivots toward Beijing, it faces fresh obstacles and skepticism, revealing both the limits of its options and the depth of its strategic isolation.

Russia: A Strategic Partner In Name Only

Despite a recently signed strategic partnership agreement and years of close cooperation, Russia’s support for Iran during this crisis has proven largely rhetorical.

As the reformist newspaper Shargh notes, “this alliance, at critical junctures, is based more on shifting interests than on steadfast commitments.”

While Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned the US strikes as “unjustified” and offered dialogue, he made no commitment to military assistance, with the Kremlin repeatedly insisting that the partnership deal has no provisions for military aid in times of war.

Ali Motahari, a former deputy speaker of Iran’s parliament, captured the growing sense of frustration in a post on X.

He noted that Russia has refused to sell the S-400 missile defense system to Iran, despite Tehran supplying Moscow with drones for its war in Ukraine, while providing such systems to Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The ex-lawmaker argued that Russia’s reluctance is due to concerns Iran could use the S-400 against Israeli aggression, exposing the superficiality of the so-called strategic partnership “that Putin touts.”

Iran’s attempts to purchase advanced Russian military equipment -- including Sukhoi-35 (Su-35) fighter jets and Mi-28 attack helicopters -- have also stalled.

According to Shargh, “except for some trainer jets, none of the promised equipment has been delivered,” with production issues in Russia and diplomatic pressure from Persian Gulf states, Israel, and the United States cited as key reasons.

This pattern of noncommitment has likely left Iranian officials and analysts openly questioning Russia’s reliability as an ally.

Chinese Reluctance And Realpolitik

With Russia distracted and unreliable, unconfirmed reports both in Iranian and Western media claim that Iran has turned to China in hopes of acquiring advanced military hardware, particularly the Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter jet.

Iran’s air force is severely outdated and ill-equipped to confront modern adversaries. Its fleet consists largely of aging US and Soviet-era aircraft acquired before the 1979 revolution, many of which are kept operational through cannibalized parts and domestic improvisation.

The J-10C is a 4.5-generation, single-engine fighter jet equipped with advanced avionics, AESA radar, and capable of deploying PL-15 long-range missiles. It is considered a credible, though not equal, challenger to Israel’s advanced F-35I fleet.

However, Chinese reluctance to supply Iran is pronounced, according to Andrea Ghiselli, a lecturer at the University of Exeter and head of research of the TOChina Hub's ChinaMed Project.

“Beijing is trying to stabilize the relations with Washington to buy some time to further increase its tech and economic self-sufficiency, Ghiselli told RFE/RL. “That's more important than rebuilding the Iranian Air Force.”

Experts also agree that China’s relations with Iran’s regional rivals contribute to its disinclination to beef up Iran’s military.

“China has acted as an economic or geoeconomic actor in the Middle East,” said Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

He told RFE/RL that China values its relationships with Iran’s Sunni Arab neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council -- Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates -- who are critical energy suppliers and trading partners but maintain cautious relations with Tehran.

Analysts widely agree that China’s most effective way to support Iran is through continued oil purchases, which provide Tehran with vital revenue under sanctions.

For Beijing, maintaining access to energy and avoiding regional destabilization outweigh any potential benefits from selling advanced weaponry to Iran, Ghiselli argued.

Iran's Strategic Isolation

The events of the past weeks have exposed the depth of Iran’s strategic isolation.

Both Moscow and Beijing have prioritized their own interests and relationships with Iran’s adversaries over any formal alliance commitments.

As Shargh concludes, Russia’s unwillingness to go beyond political statements has severely damaged its credibility as an ally, while China’s realpolitik ensures that any meaningful military support will remain out of reach.

Farzan Sabet, a managing researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told RFE/RL that Tehran “doesn’t have any good options” when it comes to foreign military partners.

Even if Tehran managed to purchase fighter jets from China, it would need a lot more than it can pay for to be able to maintain aerial superiority in future conflicts, at least in its own skies.

“These are very, very expensive,” Sabet said. “With Iran being under sanctions, it’s not clear to anybody who would have the money to pay for it.”

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How Iran’s air defense systems were defeated so quickly

Iranian Sevom Khordad medium range air defense missile system. Inset: Footage from Israeli Spike missile showing similar system before being destroyed.

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, a massive campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear program, air defenses, ballistic missile infrastructure, and senior military leaders and nuclear scientists. Within hours, Israel Defense Forces claimed that they had control of the skies from the western border of the country to Tehran. They didn’t accomplish this with airpower alone, but with covertly placed anti-tank missiles and small drones launched from inside Iran.

Months before any Israeli planes crossed into Iranian airspace, Mossad operatives were smuggling in explosives, drone parts, equipment to assemble the drones, and Spike Non-Line-Of-Sight (NLOS) missiles and launchers. Iranian state media even reported that they discovered a three-story building that was functioning as a drone factory in Shahr-e Rey, a suburb-like area near Tehran.

In the opening of Rising Lion, Israeli operators, safely outside Iran, launched those small drones concealed in trucks, trailers, and other vehicles, as well as Spike NLOS missiles at key air defense radars and missile batteries along with ballistic missiles and launchers. The delivery method strongly resembles Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web, which destroyed at least a dozen of Russia’s strategic bombers deep inside the country. In similar fashion, Israel is suspected to have used Iran’s cellular network against itself to control the drones and missiles. This one-two punch severely degraded Iran’s major air defenses as well as their ability to launch a counter-attack via ballistic missiles.

Minutes after the Spikes and drones hit their targets, more than 200 Israeli aircraft, including F-35I “Adirs”, F-15-I “Ra’ams”, and F-16I “Soufas”, all specialized versions of existing U.S. airframes designed for export to Israel, struck more than a hundred targets in Iran. The F-15I and F-16I are fourth-generation non-stealth aircraft that are more vulnerable to Iranian air defenses than the F-35, but were dropping Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) on the first night. To target the underground missile storage bunkers, Israel also had to use bunker busters like the GBU-72, which are carried by their F-15 variants. Because JDAMs and bunker busters are dropped from above the targets, putting them in range of air defenses near them, this implies Israel had near-complete control of Iranian skies almost immediately.

The success of the operation was evident in Iran’s initial response, called True Promise III, which was comparatively small when looking at previous Iranian strikes on Israel. During True Promise I, in April of 2024, Iran launched over 200 drones, rockets, and missiles toward Israel, according to Israeli media. This time around, just 100 drones got airborne, and no ballistic missiles took flight.

Despite claims from the Iranian government, no manned aircraft have been confirmed to have been shot down. Given how heavily defended Iranian airspace is, especially near their nuclear research facilities at Fordow and Natanz, it speaks volumes as to how compromised Iran’s air defenses really were and how successful the Spikes and drones were.

This operation also reinforces, just like Spider Web did, how vulnerable major systems are to small drones and even anti-tank missiles. While Iran was looking to the sky with their advanced and costly air defense systems, they were taken out from the ground using cheap drones and guided missiles that first entered service in 1981. As we’ve written about previously, the United States lacks the defenses against this kind of attack, both at home and abroad, and that gap in protection is becoming harder to ignore.

Check out our most recent video on Task & Purpose YouTube as we dive into how Iran lost control of its airspace during Israel’s attack last month.