Supply chain and raw material uncertainty as well as a declining workforce are at the root of America’s defense industrial base woes.

America’s ability to defend itself and deter conflict rests not only on the sophistication of its weapons systems, but on the capacity to produce and sustain them. For decades, the United States held a commanding lead in both military technology and the industrial might behind it. That edge is now eroding—not because of technological stagnation, but because of brittle supply chains, aging infrastructure, and growing dependence on foreign—sometimes adversarial—sources for critical materials and components. 

The US defense industrial base—the layered network of manufacturers, foundries, suppliers, and skilled workers that builds our military—needs major improvements. Raw material costs are rising. Many contractors rely on sole-source suppliers. And nearly all are constrained by labor shortages and limited surge capacity. These weaknesses are emerging at a time of rising global tension, particularly amid intensifying strategic competition with China.

From a foreign policy and trade perspective, this trend is troubling. For too long, national security planning has underestimated the impact of economic leverage, production capacity, and supply chain control on shaping geopolitical power. As the boundaries between commerce and conflict continue to blur, industrial resilience must be understood as a core element of US strategy.

Successive US administrations prioritized efficiency in supply chains over redundancy, partly based on the assumption that global economic interdependence would outlast the political rivalry. However, China has methodically positioned itself to exploit strategic chokepoints, controlling over 70 percent of global rare earth processing and leading in the production of gallium, tungsten, and neodymium.

These and other inputs are essential to the systems that underpin US military power—advanced radars, missiles, guidance systems, communications gear, and propulsion platforms. In 2024, Beijing imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium, citing national security concerns in response to US semiconductor policies. The move disrupted global markets and signaled China’s willingness to weaponize access to critical materials.

Meanwhile, US defense production is operating under visible strain. Government assessments and independent analyses have flagged serious risks. The sector remains overly reliant on foreign inputs. A quarter of the aerospace and defense workforce has reached or is beyond retirement age. Lower-tier supply chains remain fragile. The loss of a single supplier can halt the assembly of complex systems. Moreover, procurement practices are built on just-in-time logistics models that cannot absorb geopolitical or economic shocks.

These issues are playing out across multiple domains. In 2024, the commercial aircraft backlog alone exceeded 14,000 units—amounting to multiple years of output at the current pace. Similar bottlenecks are emerging in missile systems, satellite components, and shipbuilding.

Consider, for example, the production of military aircraft engines—among the most advanced and strategically important technologies the US produces. These engines require thousands of precision-engineered components, including parts made from exotic alloys and ceramic coatings. Manufacturing tolerances are extreme, and many of the materials involved are imported or sourced from a single supplier.

However, production has been increasingly strained by global supply chain issues. For example, Russia’s war in Ukraine has disrupted titanium supplies, which are vital for aerospace manufacturing, particularly engine production. Labor shortages are also hitting hard, with US factories struggling to find skilled workers to replace retiring technicians, delaying engine production and repairs. These bottlenecks, compounded by reliance on foreign suppliers for key components, create risks that could sideline aircraft in a crisis.

The first Trump administration brought renewed focus to the risks of relying on adversaries for critical inputs and championed reshoring as a national imperative. That shift began to realign the national security conversation toward industrial resilience.

But more targeted action is needed. In many sectors, especially propulsion, munitions, and lower-tier component manufacturing, there is no backup. If one plant goes offline or a key supplier folds, certain system deliveries can simply halt, and for critical components like F-135 engines for the F-35 and other advanced propulsion systems for our military aircraft, that signifies a real crisis.

To reverse this fragility, the United States should pursue a focused, long-term strategy that, among other deliverables, expands domestic production of rare earth elements, critical minerals, and other strategic inputs. This plan should include incentivizing vertical integration where appropriate, strengthening lower-tier suppliers (especially small and mid-sized firms that often lack capital or contract certainty to invest in resilience); rebuilding the workforce pipeline through sustained investment in vocational education, apprenticeships, and regional partnerships with manufacturing centers; reforming procurement policies to reward redundancy, supply chain security, and US sourcing not just cost efficiency or delivery speed; and conducting deep supply chain mapping to identify single points of failure and prioritize areas where redundancy or surge capacity is lacking.

For military aircraft engine production, such steps would help secure access to critical materials, build labor capacity, and stabilize the base of small precision manufacturers that provide many turbine, blade, and component parts. Improved supply chain visibility and smarter procurement would also allow engine producers to plan for contingencies, rather than react to a crisis.

The US defense industrial base has too often been treated as a backend logistical function—important but peripheral to the core of strategic planning. That mindset no longer holds. The ability to sustain, scale, and adapt military production in the face of unpredictable global tensions will define the limits of American power in the coming decades.

Strategic competition with China is not only about ships, planes, and missiles—it is also about who can produce, replenish, and endure. In such a contest, industrial strength is national strength.

America still has the capital, technical knowledge, and human talent to revitalize its defense manufacturing foundation. But time and margins are narrowing. The next crisis may not wait for us to rebuild. The time to act is now.