As far as defense spending commitments go, NATO countries can be divided into four groups.

For decades, European countries have relied on the United States for NATO’s defense. Now, the status quo may be shifting—marking the beginning of a defense policy realignment toward a strong and capable Europe, and away from an alliance that freerides on American security guarantees.

In June, following pressure from President Trump, NATO countries formally committed to spending 5 percent of GDP on defense by 2035: 3.5 percent on “core” defense spending and 1.5 percent on “non-core” defense spending on bolstering critical infrastructure and civil preparedness. 

Trump values Europe and wants to see it secure and prosperous. Recently, he has made several statements about his commitment to the future of Western civilization—a goal highlighted by his trip to the Vatican for Pope Francis’s funeral and his visit to Paris for the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral.

The United States needs to pivot to the Indo-Pacific. That means its European allies must shoulder the main responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense—but America remains committed to NATO and will provide certain strategic enablers.

Luckily, Europe isn’t an impoverished region incapable of defending itself—the EU’s nominal GDP was roughly nine times larger than Russia’s in 2024, even without accounting for Britain, Turkey, and other non-EU NATO allies’ resources. If the Europeans get serious about military spending, they should be more than capable of defending themselves.

Some NATO countries are already pulling their weight or have announced plans to meet the new deadline well ahead of time. Others have announced detailed plans to increase defense spending by the 2035 deadline. Some have more vague plans to follow through on their commitment, though they still plan to reach the new goal by 2035. In last place is Spain, which refused the new target altogether. NATO allies can be divided into the following four categories:

1) Countries that are enthusiastically ramping up their defense.

These countries, like Poland, the Baltics, the Nordics, and Germany, all plan to reach 3.5 percent of core defense spending well before 2035—and will likely meet the 5 percent number well before the 2035 deadline as well. In 2024, Poland’s defense spending was already 4.12 percent, and the Poles plan to reach 5 percent by 2026.

In the Baltics, Estonia’s defense spending was 3.43 percent in 2024, and it had already approved a four-year defense investment plan, enabling it to reach the 5 percent target in 2026. Meanwhile, Lithuania and Latvia have both already pledged to spend 5 percent by 2026. In his meeting with the Baltic states at the end of July, Secretary Hegseth praised them for their efforts.

For the Scandinavians, Sweden—NATO’s newest member—currently spends around 2.14 percent of GDP on defense and said this year it will target 3.5 percent by 2030. Norway, Denmark, and Finland will probably reach the 5 percent spending target sometime between 2030 and 2035. However, the other Scandinavian nations might follow Sweden’s lead and aim for 2030, as Denmark’s prime minister raised concerns that a 2032 deadline for 5 percent might be too late.

Germany, which had failed to reach the 2 percent mark from 2006 to 2023, finally achieved this goal in 2024, demonstrating a heightened commitment to European security and deserving significant praise as well.

This Zeitenwende (“turning point” or “sea change”)—as previous chancellor Olaf Scholz termed it—in German defense policy has been accelerated by newly elected Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who has committed Germany to achieving the 3.5 percent on core defense spending in 2029. These countries should be applauded for their strong commitments.

2) Countries that are increasing their defense spending and may be able to reach 5 percent by 2035.

France, which had been below 2 percent until relatively recently, announced on July 14 that it aims to increase military spending to $75 billion by 2027. Additionally, Emmanuel Macron announced $4 billion in supplementary defense spending.

This is a welcome development, but the additional $4 billion represents less than 0.2 percent of France’s GDP, and the $75 billion figure would place France’s defense spending at approximately 2.4 percent. For France, the 3.5 percent target is still a ways away, and there’s no reason yet to think they’ll reach it before 2035.

Greece, North Macedonia, Hungary, Czechia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Albania, and Montenegro all agreed to reach the 5 percent target by 2035. All of these countries were above 2 percent in 2024, so they’re reliable enough to expect them to hold firm on the 2035 promise—although hurdles remain in their way. These countries should be applauded and encouraged for their recent efforts.

3) Countries that say they will reach the 5 percent number by 2035 but whose paths to 5 percent are hazy.

Italy was well below the 2 percent threshold in 2024, and its foreign minister recently stated that they will almost certainly need a whole decade to reach the 5 percent goal. This statement occurred even as Italy made headlines for attempting to make a bridge with little to no national security applicability count as defense spending.

Belgium, Slovenia, Croatia, Portugal, Luxembourg, and Canada all agreed to spend 5 percent by 2035; however, they were all well below the 2 percent threshold in 2024 and have historically been unreliable defense spenders. Slovenian prime minister Robert Golob even announced plans for a NATO membership referendum in response to the new 5 percent requirement (though their parliament subsequently shut that down). In addition, Slovakia—despite being at 2 percent in 2024—hinted that it would not increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP.

To its credit, Canada has announced plans to hit 2 percent by next year and now seems intent on ending the decades-long underinvestment in the Canadian military.

Many of these countries also face serious financial and political constraints that will make the 3.5 percent target difficult to attain. So while one can commend these countries for agreeing to spend 5 percent, their path to reaching the goal is less clear.

4) The country that altogether refuses the new defense spending goal is Spain.

Spain deserves significant criticism for its long-standing shirking of the 2 percent minimum and its new refusal to acknowledge that more needs to be done to safeguard Europe.

In general, American conservatives’ approach to this issue should shift from finger-wagging to encouragement. That’s especially true given the positive results of the Hague Summit this year and the clearly positive direction of much of the NATO alliance.

If European NATO members follow through with their planned military investments and the United States works seriously to deter China in the Indo-Pacific, both will be far more capable of defending their sovereign interests and pursuing shared goals by the 2030s.