That’s a major problem for Taiwanese defenders. 

Beyond the VLS, the Type 052D includes a 130mm H/PJ-38 naval gun for surface and land targets, a Type 730 or Type 1130 close-in weapon system (CIWS) for point defense, an HHQ-10 short-range SAM system, and two triple torpedo launchers. 

The Type 052D features a hangar for one helicopter, typically the Harbin Z-9C or Kamov Ka-28, with the stretched Type 052DL variant designed to accommodate the larger Z-20 helicopter—which is slated to come in a stealth variant, roughly equivalent to the stealth Black Hawk helicopter the US Navy SEALS used in the bin Laden Raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011.

Today, the PLAN operates around 25 Type 052D destroyers, including 13 standard variants and 12 Type 052DLs, with more under construction at the Dalian Jianghan-Changxing shipyards. 

The PLAN’s Plan

The rapid production rate—around 3.1 vessels per year compared to the US Navy’s 1.6 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers—underscores China’s commitment to building a navy that completely outmatches the US Navy numerically, and perhaps technically, in the Indo-Pacific. 

Indeed, looking at the numbers and the disposition of both the US Navy and its allied navies as it relates to the First Island Chain, the United States appears completely outmatched at this point. Any Chinese move against neighboring Taiwan would likely initiate with a sweeping naval blockade of the island; after a choking blockade over the course of many weeks or months, the Chinese would enact a massive invasion—doubtless involving severe ship-to-shore bombardment, aerial attacks of the kind that the US subjected Iraq to in 1991 and 2003, and an amphibious landing unlike anything seen since the Allied landings at Normandy.

China’s Type 052D would provide significant cover for those forces. 

The primary role the Type 052Ds would perform for the PLAN during such an invasion would be defending naval and amphibious assets. The HHQ-9 SAM, with a range of around 92 miles, can engage enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and potentially stealth targets, leveraging the aforementioned Type 346A AESA radar’s advanced tracking capabilities. 

The destroyer’s ability to detect and engage multiple aerial threats at once would be key in countering Taiwan’s air force, which include F-16V fighters and anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the Harpoon Block IC.

In order to deter any Taiwanese disruption of Chinese landing forces, the Type 052D would employ its CIWS and HHQ-10 short-range SAMs providing close-in defense against low-flying missiles and aircraft, while its networked data links allowed it to coordinate with other PLAN ships, such as the powerful Type 055 cruiser, to create a robust air defense umbrella. 

Anti-Ship Warfare to Counter Taiwanese and Allied Navies 

The Type 052D would pop off its YJ-18 ASCM, a supersonic missile with a reported range of 310 miles, poses a significant threat to Taiwan’s surface navy, which consists of older vessels like the Kee Lung-class destroyers and Cheng Kung-class frigates. In any hypothetical engagement, a single Type 052D or a squadron of these warships would overwhelm current Taiwanese naval defenses. 

The YJ-18’s high speed and sea-skimming profile make it difficult to intercept, even for Taiwan’s upgraded Harpoon missiles or NTU air defenses.

Beyond Taiwan’s navy, the Type 052D would also play a role in any anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operations to deter or engage US Navy forces, such as carrier strike groups led by the Nimitz- or Ford-class carriers. While Type 052D’s 64 VLS cells are fewer than the 96 on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, its ability to launch salvos of YJ-18s, supported by intelligence from PLAN satellites and UAVs, could challenge US air defenses. 

On the other hand, the Type 052D’s shorter cruising range compared to US destroyers may limit its endurance in a prolonged blue-water engagement far from Chinese bases. Yet, the likelihood that these warships would be deployed in any kind of blue water engagement is low. 

After all, Beijing understands the geography of its near abroad well, and it plans on using the relatively dense geography nearest to Chinese shores to its advantage. Any blue water American forces would be engaged with beyond visual horizon (BVR) A2/AD missiles and hypersonic weapons, negating the threat to the Type 052Ds.

Then there’s anti-submarine warfare mission sets the Type 052D could be tasked with. Submarines, particularly those of the US Navy, will pose a significant threat to Chinese invasion forces, as attack submarines like the Virginia- or Seawolf-class subs could target PLAN amphibious ships or blockading forces. With the Type 052D’s SJD-9 and SJD-311 sonars, CY-5 anti-submarine missiles, and (for the expanded Type 052DL destroyer) the Z-20 helicopter, make it an asset in detecting and neutralizing underwater threats.

In a Taiwan invasion scenario, the Type 052D would likely operate in concert with Type 054A frigates and Type 056A corvettes, which are equipped for ASW, to create a layered defense against submarines. 

Land-Attack Missions to Support Amphibious Operations 

Lastly, the Type 052D’s CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile enables it to conduct precision strikes on Taiwanese military infrastructure such as airfields, command centers, and coastal defenses in order to pave the way for amphibious landings. These long-range strikes could be used to degrade Taiwan’s ability to coordinate defenses and disrupt its air and naval operations. 

The Chinese have already matched the Americans when it comes to the Taiwan Strait scenario. Yes, the US will be able to fight back. With the help of Japan and Australia, they can do much to bloody the Chinese. That’s, of course, if Uncle Sam can figure out how to penetrate those significant A2/AD bubbles surrounding the area. If not, it’s a moot discussion, and Taiwan loses by default.

If America is serious about countering the China threat in the Taiwan Strait, it will need vastly more units of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), as well as hypersonic missiles fired from BVR before it thinks of doing anything else. 

The real question is, does the Pentagon understand this? Or is it still acting as though the year is 1996 and a US carrier or two can deter a Chinese run on Taiwan? Even more importantly, is America’s political system prepared for the kind of war that defending Taiwan would require? Does the American public believe that is a worthy campaign? And is America prepared to withstand the consequences of such a conflict—skyrocketing prices, loss of access to many consumer goods, and perhaps more direct retribution from Chinese operatives within the United States? These are all questions that must be answered—and soon.