This cuts right to the heart of the gap between China’s ambitions and its actual experience in warfighting.

Here’s the breakdown:

1. The Global Ambitions

• Beijing openly talks about building a “world-class military” by 2049, capable of safeguarding far-flung interests, protecting trade routes, and shaping international security norms.

• Bases like Djibouti, carrier development, and blue-water naval patrols show China wants global reach—not just regional dominance.

2. The Battle-Test Record

• Last war fought: China hasn’t fought a major conflict since 1979, when it invaded Vietnam—and performed poorly, suffering high casualties and exposing command/logistics flaws.

• Peacekeeping & HADR: The PLA has gained experience through UN peacekeeping, anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, and disaster relief. Useful, but far from high-intensity peer conflict.

• Exercises vs. combat: While PLA training is getting more realistic, it’s still heavily scripted. Unlike the U.S., Russia, or even India, China lacks the institutional “combat learning cycle” that comes from repeated deployments and live combat.

3. The Readiness Gap

• Hardware vs. experience: China’s missile forces, naval expansion, and cyber/space assets are modern and credible. But war is about friction, improvisation, and human performance under fire—areas the PLA has not proven itself.

• Joint operations: Command reforms aim at better Army–Navy–Air–Rocket Force integration, but these remain untested in a prolonged conflict.

• Leadership churn: The recent purges in the Rocket Force and other branches highlight corruption and shake confidence in wartime decision-making.

4. Likely Performance

• Near China’s borders: The PLA is already a serious, battle-ready threat—Taiwan, the South China Sea, and East China Sea are areas where it could fight effectively, at least initially.

• Global contests: Sustained expeditionary campaigns (Africa, Middle East, Indian Ocean) would strain its logistics, maintenance, and combat-tested leadership. In those scenarios, ambition currently outpaces proven ability.

China’s armed forces are not yet battle-tested enough to fully match their global ambitions. Regionally, the PLA has credible power to deter or fight, but globally it still relies more on symbolism, modernization optics, and deterrent signaling than on the hardened confidence of a military seasoned by war.

By John Uju-Ikeji