With its proxies shattered and its people disillusioned, can Tehran restore its power in the region after the Twelve-Day War?

Iran has emerged from its Twelve-Day War with Israel weakened militarily, politically, and economically, according to Farid Mirbagheri, a senior fellow at Strategy International and longtime scholar of Iranian affairs. In the latest episode of the Divergences podcast, Mirbagheri paints a picture of a country under mounting internal and external strain, with little chance of restoring its previous position in the Middle East.

“The top echelon, the political leadership is divided amongst themselves,” Mirbagheri says. “Some want to take a very hard line, some want to be more compromising. But the people are more than ever disillusioned.” Years of economic mismanagement, compounded by sanctions and the costs of regional conflict, have left Iran with water shortages, electricity outages, and shrinking confidence in the government’s competence.

That disillusionment extends to Iran’s regional influence. Once proud of its ability to project power through allied groups, Tehran has seen its network of proxies diminish sharply. Hamas has been “shaken to its foundation,” Hezbollah’s corridor through Syria cut off with Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Iraqi militias struggling to hold ground, and the Houthis battered by Israeli and US strikes. “Iranian proxies basically have disappeared,” Mirbagheri notes, a blow that has sharply reduced Tehran’s leverage across the Middle East.

Internationally, Iran finds itself isolated. Hopes that Russia or China would back Tehran militarily have proven misplaced. Moscow’s cooperation has been limited to technology trades, while Beijing evacuated thousands of its nationals from Iran at the first sign of war. “The Twelve-Day War showed the limits of this partnership,” Mirbagheri says. “Iran needs China more than China needs Iran.”

The nuclear issue remains central. While Iranians might support a peaceful nuclear energy program, the Islamic Republic’s pursuit of an expansive nuclear policy has drained the treasury and deepened isolation. “It has cost hundreds of billions, if not trillions of dollars. It has led to nothing,” Mirbagheri argues. A different Iranian government in the future would have to make hard choices between pursuing a nuclear program and building ties with the West—and it may choose the West.

Despite hostility toward the ruling clerics, Iranians do not necessarily embrace Washington. Memories of US involvement in the 1953 coup still linger, albeit mostly among an older generation. Still, the Iranian diaspora in the United States (the largest in the world) remains a potential bridge.

In Mirbagheri’s view, the Islamic Republic may struggle to survive in its current form. Without “serious foundational reform,” he warns, Iran risks either implosion or collapse under renewed external pressure.