China is preparing for a short, decisive war, and it would likely falter in a drawn-out conflict.

Its military doctrine, force structure, and technological investments are all geared toward achieving a quick victory in a regional conflict before a peer adversary can mount an effective defense or intervention.

The "Short, Sharp War" Doctrine 

The core of China's military strategy, particularly regarding Taiwan, is to achieve its objectives swiftly, creating a fait accompli that would make a prolonged international conflict or intervention too costly for other nations. This doctrine is a direct reversal of Mao Zedong's historical strategy of "protracted war," which relied on drawing an enemy deep into Chinese territory and winning through attrition. Modern Chinese doctrine, known as "local wars under high-technology conditions," focuses on a rapid application of overwhelming force. This strategy is reflected in several key areas of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) modernization:

• Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD): The PLA has invested heavily in a vast arsenal of long-range precision-guided munitions, including hypersonic and anti-ship ballistic missiles. These systems are designed to deter or destroy an adversary's forces—particularly aircraft carriers and other high-value assets—before they can enter the combat zone, thereby eliminating the possibility of a prolonged engagement.

• Joint Operations: Recent military reforms have created new Joint Theater Commands to ensure that the Air Force, Navy, Army, and Rocket Force can coordinate and strike in a unified, concentrated manner. This is essential for a fast-paced campaign that relies on synchronized attacks across all domains to overwhelm an opponent's defenses.

Vulnerability in a Prolonged Conflict

While this "short, sharp" approach is well-suited for a regional campaign, it exposes significant vulnerabilities if a conflict were to be drawn out. The PLA is not well-equipped for a war of attrition.

• Logistical Challenges: The PLA's logistics and maintenance capabilities, particularly for an amphibious or expeditionary operation, are untested. A sustained, high-intensity conflict would require an immense and uninterrupted flow of fuel, ammunition, and parts across a contested ocean. Any disruption to this supply chain could be catastrophic for the PLA's operational tempo and sustainability.

• Lack of Combat Experience: The PLA has not been in a major conflict since 1979. This lack of combat experience means its forces are entirely untested in a sustained, high-stress environment. The ability to make rapid decisions, adapt to unforeseen circumstances, and absorb significant casualties are muscles that can only be developed in combat.

• Dependence on Speed: The success of China's strategy is predicated on a fast victory. If an adversary could weather the initial barrage and extend the conflict, China's logistical and human capital weaknesses would become increasingly pronounced. The PLA's current structure and doctrine are built to land a knockout blow, not to win a long, grueling fight.