China could exploit Europe's energy and manufacturing vulnerabilities in a similar way to Russia, but the nature of the dependency and the methods of coercion would be different.

While Europe was dependent on Russia for a core, fungible commodity (natural gas), its reliance on China is in critical components and technology for the green transition and modern manufacturing. This creates a different, but equally significant, form of leverage.

A Shift from Gas to Green Tech 

Russia's leverage over Europe was based on its near-monopoly of natural gas supply through pipelines. The dependency was simple: if Russia turned off the tap, European industries would shut down and households would be left without heat. This direct leverage was a powerful tool for political coercion.

China's leverage is more insidious and complex. Instead of controlling a primary fuel source, China dominates the entire supply chain for the technologies that are crucial for Europe's future. Europe's reliance on China is in the very building blocks of its green transition and manufacturing sectors, including:

• Solar Panels: Over 95% of Europe's solar panels are imported from China. Beijing has achieved this dominance through massive state investment and subsidies, allowing it to produce solar panels at a fraction of the cost of European manufacturers.

• Electric Vehicle (EV) Batteries: China controls over 80% of the world's battery cell manufacturing capacity and an even larger share of the materials needed for their production, such as lithium, graphite, and cobalt. European automakers are increasingly reliant on Chinese-made batteries to meet their ambitious EV production targets.

• Rare Earth Elements: These are critical for a wide range of high-tech and military applications, from wind turbines and EVs to fighter jets and consumer electronics. China holds a near-monopoly on the processing and refining of rare earth elements, controlling over 90% of the global supply.

• Legacy Chips: China controls about 30% of the global market for legacy chips (those not used in high-end computing), and is expected to meet most of Europe’s growing demand for them. This creates a new strategic dependency that undermines Europe's de-risking efforts.

This dependency means that any disruption to the flow of these goods from China could stall Europe's green transition, halt manufacturing lines, and severely impact its economic and strategic autonomy.

Mechanisms of Chinese Coercion 

Unlike Russia's simple "on/off" switch for gas, China's methods of coercion would likely be more subtle and economic, but still highly effective.

• Export Restrictions: China has a history of restricting the export of critical materials to exert political pressure. In 2010, it temporarily cut off rare earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute. It has also unofficially restricted trade with Lithuania and Australia. It could easily do the same with Europe, creating a major crisis for European manufacturers that depend on these materials.

• Price Manipulation: China's state-backed companies could deliberately raise the prices of key components or materials, putting a strain on European manufacturers' bottom lines and making them less competitive.

• Cybersecurity Threats: The dominance of Chinese tech firms like Huawei in Europe's 5G networks presents a risk of cyberattacks or data espionage, which could cripple Europe's critical communications infrastructure.

These actions would not be about freezing a population but about de-industrializing Europe, hindering its ability to meet its climate goals and undermining its economic and technological competitiveness.

Europe's Response and Remaining Vulnerabilities 

Europe has recognized the risks and has started to address them. The EU has implemented a "de-risking" strategy, aiming to reduce its critical dependencies on China. Initiatives like the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Net-Zero Industry Act are designed to boost domestic production and diversify supply chains.

However, a number of factors make this a difficult and slow process:

• Cost and Scale: European production of solar panels, batteries, and other green technologies is significantly more expensive than in China. Building out the necessary manufacturing capacity to match Chinese scale would require massive, long-term investment.

• Sustained Demand: Europe’s aggressive climate targets require a massive, rapid deployment of green technologies, and for now, China is the only country that can meet that demand at the required speed and cost.

• Internal EU Divisions: As with Russia, EU member states have different priorities and levels of dependence on China, making it difficult to forge a unified and decisive policy.

In conclusion, while China may not be able to weaponize its leverage in the same way Russia did with gas, its control over the supply chains for green energy and high-tech manufacturing gives it a powerful and more sophisticated form of leverage. This dependency leaves Europe vulnerable to economic coercion and poses a significant threat to its long-term strategic autonomy and industrial future.