The renewable energy projects currently being pursued by European elites in the Arab world are best characterized as a hybrid of genuine partnership potential and the clear risk of establishing new forms of dependency.

While both sides frame the cooperation as a "win-win" scenario, the structure, scale, and primary driver of these deals heavily favor Europe's immediate energy security imperative and the requirements of its domestic green transition.

The central debate revolves around whether these initiatives constitute true mutual development or simply "green colonialism" or "green extractivism."

1. The European Imperative: Security and De-Risking

The primary force driving Europe's rush into renewable energy deals in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is not simply climate action, but an urgent need for energy security in the wake of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

• Diversification and Decarbonization: The EU's strategy, particularly its REPowerEU plan, prioritizes both rapid decoupling from Russian fossil fuels and achieving the ambitious targets of the European Green Deal. Importing green hydrogen (GH2​) from resource-rich partners like Morocco, Egypt, and the Gulf states is seen as a key instrument to decarbonize hard-to-electrify sectors of the European economy.

• Cost-Competitive Sourcing: North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula offer the lowest global costs for renewable electricity (solar and wind) due to abundant non-arable land and high solar irradiance. For Europe, it is significantly cheaper to import GH2​ produced there than to produce it domestically, thereby boosting European industry's competitiveness.

• The Scale of European Demand: The targets for imported GH2​ (millions of tonnes by 2030) necessitate the construction of massive renewable energy and electrolysis facilities in the Arab world, a scale determined by the needs of the European market, not necessarily the local one.

In this context, the partnerships are fundamentally a means for Europe to externalize the socio-environmental costs of its energy transition, securing a stable, cheap, and "green" energy supply while mitigating its own resource and land constraints.

2. The Risk of New Dependencies (The "Green Extractivism" Critique)

Critics, including environmental groups and transnational activists, warn that the current model risks replicating the exploitative dynamics of the fossil fuel era, but with new resources: sun, wind, and crucially, water and land.

A. Resource Extraction and Sovereignty

• Water Scarcity: GH2​ production relies on electrolysis, which requires massive amounts of water. In water-stressed countries like Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia, diverting water for export-oriented GH2​ (often produced via desalination plants) can intensify local water scarcity for agriculture and communities, prioritizing European energy needs over local livelihoods.

• Land Grabs: Large-scale solar and wind farms require vast stretches of land, raising concerns about land acquisition—often in arid or semi-arid regions that may be ancestral lands—without adequate consultation or compensation for local and indigenous communities.

• Limited Local Value-Add: Many deals are structured to prioritize the export of the final energy product (GH2​ or green ammonia) with minimal value-addition in the host country. The Arab partners provide the raw inputs (sun, wind, land, and water/desalination) and often the low-skilled labor, while the high-value technology, financing, and engineering expertise remain predominantly European. This reinforces a classic extractive economic model.

B. The Peril of a "Commodity Trap"

Just as the MENA region became dependent on exporting volatile fossil fuels, the GH2​ model risks trapping them in a new green commodity export dependency.

• If the local energy consumption needs are not prioritized, the Arab partners remain reliant on external demand and pricing dictated by the consumer (Europe).

• Any future shift in European policy or technology—such as a breakthrough in domestic European production or a change in demand—could leave the Arab partners with stranded assets (massive, costly infrastructure projects) that do not benefit their domestic energy mix or industrial base.

The debate is not over the technology itself, but over the distributive and procedural justice of its implementation.

3. The Potential for Genuine Partnership

Despite the dependency risks, the energy transition presents a historic opportunity for the Arab world, one that could be genuinely transformative if the partnerships are restructured.

A. The Arab World’s Dual Ambition

Arab nations, particularly the Gulf monarchies and major North African states, have their own strategic reasons for embracing renewables that align with partnership:

• Economic Diversification: Countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing heavily in renewables and GH2​ to diversify their economies away from fossil fuel rentierism (the "last man standing" strategy) and ensure their continued relevance in a net-zero world. Oman has, for instance, signed major green hydrogen agreements with European entities.

• Freeing up Fossil Fuels for Export: Utilizing cheap domestic solar and wind power to meet local electricity demand frees up valuable oil and gas that can then be sold on the international market for higher profits. This is a powerful economic incentive for their domestic green transition.

• Industrialization: Some states, like Morocco and Egypt, are targeting the creation of a local green industrial ecosystem, including the manufacturing of electrolyzers, solar panels, and turbines, to create high-value jobs and knowledge transfer.

B. Opportunities for Mutual Benefit

The interconnected energy grid represents the most direct route to mutual benefit. Projects that integrate the electricity markets of North Africa and Europe, such as the proposed ELMED interconnector between Tunisia and Italy, can enhance energy security on both sides by allowing for the stable, cross-border trade of electricity and balancing the variable nature of renewable power.

Genuine partnership requires the EU to:

1. Prioritize Local Development: Ensure a mandatory portion of the green energy produced is used to meet the host country's domestic energy and industrial needs first.

2. Focus on Value Chains: Invest in local manufacturing (technology transfer) and skills development rather than just buying the final product.

3. Ensure Governance: Condition investments on transparent land acquisition procedures and robust consultation with local communities to address water and land rights issue.

Conclusion

The pursuit of renewable energy projects by European elites in the Arab world sits at a critical juncture. The promise of affordable, clean energy for Europe and economic diversification for the MENA region offers the potential for a genuine, symbiotic partnership. However, the asymmetrical power dynamics, the rush to secure EU supply post-Ukraine, and the extractive structure of many initial deals on land and water resources mean that without a fundamental shift toward prioritizing local value creation and resource justice, these ventures are likely to establish new, technologically advanced forms of energy dependency.

For a deeper dive into these complex dynamics, you may be interested in The EU's Green Hydrogen Strategy in Africa. EU's push for hydrogen from Africa and the resulting debates over "green colonialism."