US and Israeli strategy is not well-served by consistent “mowing the lawn” operations.

The announcement on October 8 by President Trump of a deal to implement a ceasefire in Gaza and return all remaining Israeli hostages represents a major accomplishment. As with the previous ceasefire, which started in January 2025, this one has only seen the first phase agreed upon, the release of hostages and partial Israeli withdrawal, with many of the more difficult issues left to be worked out later. Unlike the previous ceasefire, however, which ended when Prime Minister Netanyahu chose to go back on the offensive, this agreement will see all of the Israeli hostages returned up front, with none continuing to be held by Hamas to preserve their leverage. 

While some will attribute this mainly to Hamas’ much weaker position given Israel’s recent military successes, it also apparently involved President Trump putting American prestige on the line to offer assurances that the war was really coming to a definitive end this time. The text of the framework agreement also contained two broad but immensely important assurances: “No one will be forced to leave Gaza…” and “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza.”

This agreement also clearly benefited from US pressure on the parties, including greatly enhanced pressure on Israel. That came in the wake of Netanyahu’s poorly thought-out strike against Hamas leaders in Doha, which angered Trump and undermined trust in the United States as a security partner on the part of the Gulf Arabs. The assurances offered in the framework agreement walked back several things Trump had suggested previously about the Palestinians potentially emigrating from Gaza—music to the ears of the extreme Right in Jerusalem.

Some of Netanyahu’s coalition partners on the hard Right are opposed to the deal and will vote against it in the cabinet. Yet, they are not expected to immediately bring down Netanyahu’s government. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich made his views clear in a post on X today. As translated by Google Translate, he said he feels “tremendous responsibility to ensure this is not, God forbid, a deal of ‘hostages in exchange for stopping the war…’” and that Israel will continue to pursue the war aim of “true eradication of Hamas.” Israeli right-wing TV personality Amit Segal, often seen as a mouthpiece for Netanyahu, pointed out on Channel 12 on October 9 that “There’s no Phase Two. That’s clear to everyone, right? Phase Two may occur someday, but it’s unrelated to what has been signed. The deal signed now is a hostage release deal. It doesn’t imply anything about the future.” 

That characterization appears to contradict the text of the 20-point framework agreement, which contains broad assurances about the future—specifically, no occupation, annexation, or population transfer. The perception on the hard right seems to be that Israel could continue the war in some manner. Segal cites Lebanon as a model.

With the apparent gap in expectations between Trump and some on the Israeli Right, the president would be well-advised to convey both reassurances and some uncomfortable truths in his possible speech to the Knesset early next week in Jerusalem. While reassuring Israelis of America’s commitment to Israel’s security, Trump should mention the assurances he offered the Palestinians above, in the context of two enduring principles: the Arab population West of the Jordan River is not going to leave the area, and while finding a political solution will take time, they should not be denied political rights in perpetuity.

Especially in an era when so many Israelis have been speaking of “voluntary emigration” of Palestinians as if that were a realistic option, President Trump needs to convey firmly that this is completely unacceptable to the United States. The United States has other interests in the region beyond the close relationship with Israel and should not need to apologize for that. Those US interests are compatible with continuing US support for Israel’s security. Still, they are not compatible with the dreams of the extreme Right in Israel about unilateral annexation and population transfer, which would undermine our broader position in the region. 

As someone who is not afraid of iconoclasm, President Trump is the right leader to do this. He has sometimes cut through the overly cautious Washington groupthink and gotten things done when others could not. This was best exemplified when he lifted sanctions on Syria to give the new government a chance to succeed, rather than imposing “benchmarks” Syria probably would not meet as preconditions. Israelis understand that President Trump has their back, and those who find these observations to be a betrayal, rather than merely inconvenient facts, are an ideologically rigid minority.

President Trump also spoke on October 8, rather tantalizingly, of Iran’s support for the agreement. He suggested that Iran is “actually going to be a part of the whole peace situation.” That is counterintuitive, to say the least, but it is quite plausible that Iran would avoid opposing a Gaza ceasefire. There is no reason to think that Iran is ready to give up its enrichment program, but it would make sense for the United States to re-engage with it in negotiations. What would not make sense is allowing Israel, with US arms and occasional direct military support, “mowing the lawn” periodically everywhere from Gaza (as Amit Segal’s analogy suggested) to Lebanon to Iran to Yemen, while leaving the underlying issues unresolved.