Ceasefire creates a significant and well-documented risk that Hamas will use the halt in fighting to regroup, rearm, and rebuild its military capacity. For Hamas, a ceasefire, or hudna, is often viewed as a tactical pause to be exploited, not a permanent cessation of hostilities.

This dynamic is one of the most contentious issues surrounding any negotiated end to the fighting.

The Strategic Value of a Pause for Hamas

From Hamas’s perspective, a ceasefire is an operational necessity after a major conflict. It offers a crucial window for the organization to recover from the immense damage inflicted by military operations and prepare for the next round of confrontation.

1. Regrouping Personnel and Command

The immediate benefit of a ceasefire is the ability to consolidate and re-establish military structure.

• Rest and Recuperation: Extended military operations cause inevitable casualties, exhaustion, and logistical strain on fighters. A pause allows commanders to rest forces, address injuries, and integrate new recruits. Reports have suggested that despite major losses, groups like Hamas have maintained a substantial fighting force and have even been actively recruiting minors to replace casualties.

• Re-establishing Command and Control: During intense combat, Hamas's subterranean and decentralized command structure is constantly under pressure. A ceasefire allows the surviving political and military leadership to re-establish secure communication lines, conduct internal reviews, and restore command-and-control over remaining units.

• Filling the Ranks: A large-scale prisoner exchange—often a condition of a ceasefire—is an immense boon to the group. The release of hundreds or thousands of Palestinian security prisoners, including high-level members serving life sentences, injects experienced fighters and seasoned leaders back into the organization, providing a dramatic morale and operational boost.

2. Rearming and Resupplying

The primary security concern for Israel and international monitors is the exploitation of humanitarian aid and reconstruction materials for military purposes.

• Smuggling and Procurement: A ceasefire eases the pressure on smuggling routes, particularly along the Egypt-Gaza border (the Philadelphi Corridor). While Israel typically tightens inspection, the sheer volume of humanitarian aid trucks permitted to enter Gaza under a ceasefire agreement creates more opportunities for the illicit transfer of weapons, rocket components, and dual-use materials.

• Diverting Dual-Use Materials: Hamas has historically utilized materials intended for civilian infrastructure—known as dual-use goods—to manufacture weaponry.

  • Cement and Construction Materials: Cement and gravel meant for rebuilding homes and hospitals have been diverted to repair and expand the "Metro"—Hamas's vast network of subterranean combat tunnels.

  • Pipes and Metals: Metal pipes intended for water or sewage systems have been used to construct rocket casings and engines.

• Local Production: The pause in fighting gives Hamas's internal manufacturing capability a chance to resume operations, including the production of rockets, mortars, and drones from salvaged and smuggled components, shielded from military strikes.

3. Rebuilding Military Infrastructure

The time offered by a ceasefire is essential for repairing the physical infrastructure of the military wing.

• Tunnel Repair: The tunnel network is the backbone of Hamas's military operation. It provides cover for leaders, transit for fighters, and storage for weapons. Repairing tunnels damaged by military operations is a top priority, ensuring the group can sustain future fighting and maintain its strategic depth.

• Replenishing Rocket Launchers: Fixed and mobile rocket launchers, many of which are destroyed during a conflict, can be replaced or relocated. This is critical for maintaining the ability to strike deep into Israel and preserve a key element of the group's deterrence capability.

The Monitoring Challenge and Lessons from the Past

The inherent difficulty in monitoring a non-state actor like Hamas, which operates extensively underground and within dense urban areas, makes preventing rearmament an enormous challenge.

Difficulty of Verification

• The Subterranean Layer: Military rebuilding activities, especially tunnel work and weapons manufacturing, occur underground, making them almost impossible to detect and verify from the surface.

• Dual-Use Complications: It is nearly impossible to distinguish between materials legitimately destined for civilian reconstruction (e.g., cement for a school) and those diverted for military use (e.g., cement for a tunnel). This forces international monitors to either restrict critical aid and fuel, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis, or accept the risk of diversion.

• Lack of Access: International monitoring mechanisms, if they exist at all, rely on the cooperation of the local governing authority. As the governing authority, Hamas controls access and can easily obstruct effective, intrusive inspections.

Historical Precedent

The fear that Hamas uses ceasefires to rebuild is not hypothetical; it is based on the cyclical nature of conflict in Gaza:

• Post-2008, 2012, and 2014 Conflicts: Following major conflicts in 2008–2009 (Operation Cast Lead), 2012 (Operation Pillar of Defense), and 2014 (Operation Protective Edge), Hamas demonstrated an ability to quickly reconstitute its military capabilities. Each subsequent conflict saw the group deploy more advanced and longer-range rockets, improved anti-tank weaponry, and a more extensive tunnel network.

• The 2021 Ceasefire: The 2021 ceasefire was no exception, with Hamas continuing its efforts to build up its force and weapons stockpiles in the years leading up to the major attack in 2023.

Mitigating the Risk in Future Agreements

To prevent a ceasefire from being merely a tactical pause for rearmament, any future agreement must be structurally different and tied to a major political and security paradigm shift.

1. Robust Monitoring and Verification

Any ceasefire must be paired with an unprecedented, intrusive, and verifiable mechanism for monitoring the entry and use of materials in Gaza. This could include:

• International Task Force: Establishing a multinational military or civilian task force with a mandate to supervise border crossings (especially the Philadelphi Corridor) and conduct on-site verification of reconstruction projects.

• Technological Surveillance: Implementing advanced underground detection technologies and continuous overhead surveillance (drones, satellites) to monitor for unauthorized construction or tunnel activity.

2. Alternative Governance

The most effective way to prevent Hamas from diverting resources is to remove it from control over the civil administration.

• Transfer of Control: A key phase of any peace deal must involve the transfer of civilian and border control away from Hamas to a neutral, technocratic, or reformed Palestinian Authority entity, backed by regional Arab partners. This deprives Hamas of its ability to tax aid, divert materials, and control border access points.

3. Linking Reconstruction to Disarmament

The flow of massive international reconstruction aid (needed to rebuild a destroyed Gaza) must be directly and permanently conditional on the complete and verifiable demilitarization of Hamas. If the group fails to disarm or is caught rebuilding its capacity, the aid taps are immediately closed.

In essence, while a ceasefire is a necessary first step to end the humanitarian disaster, it is also a high-stakes gamble on future security. The risk that Hamas will use the break to prepare for the next round of violence is extremely high, and only a comprehensive, externally guaranteed framework that tackles the governance and demilitarization questions can effectively mitigate this danger.