The European elites are positioning themselves in Asia's high-tech race not as a dominant, self-sufficient technological power, but as a crucial, high-value-added partner and regulator focused on establishing "technological sovereignty" and "de-risking" from a heavy dependence on either the US or China. Their strategy is fundamentally a "third way" approach that leverages Europe's strengths in upstream technology (equipment and research), industrial applications (automotive, manufacturing), and normative setting (AI regulation, green standards) to secure its economic interests in the world's most dynamic region.

This strategy is anchored in the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Global Gateway initiative, which prioritize digital and green connectivity.

1. Semiconductors: Leveraging Upstream Dominance and Securing Manufacturing

Europe's strategy in the global semiconductor race, which is critically centered in Asia (Taiwan, South Korea), is two-pronged:

A. Protecting Upstream Monopoly

Europe maintains a market-leading or monopolistic position in the highly specialized upstream segments of the semiconductor supply chain:

• Manufacturing Equipment: The Netherlands-based ASML is the sole producer of Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, which are essential for manufacturing the world’s most advanced microchips (5nm and below). This equipment gives Europe immense, indispensable geopolitical leverage over Asian fabs, including Taiwan's TSMC and South Korea's Samsung.

• Specialized Materials: European companies are key suppliers of certain chemicals, sensors, and components necessary for fabrication.

B. "De-Risking" and The EU Chips Act

The EU is acutely aware of its 8–10% share of global chip production capacity and its vulnerability to Asian manufacturing, a dependence laid bare during the COVID-19-related shortages. To counter this:

• The European Chips Act: This initiative aims to double the EU's global market share to 20% by 2030. While ambitious, the immediate priority is securing production of mature chips (for European industries like automotive and industrial automation) and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) from Asian partners.

• Attracting Asian Fabs: The EU has successfully attracted major investments from leading Asian players, most notably TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) and Intel (which is seen as bridging US and European interests), to build new fabrication plants ("fabs") in Germany. This is explicitly designed to onshore critical capacity and diversify its supply base away from the high-risk region around the Taiwan Strait.

2. Artificial Intelligence (AI): Normative Power and Edge Computing

In the core AI race, Europe is squeezed between the venture capital and computing power of the US and the scale-driven, top-down approach of China. Europe is positioning itself on governance, ethical standards, and industrial applications rather than solely on large-scale foundation model development.

A. The AI Act as an Exportable Standard 

The most significant European contribution is its normative power. The EU AI Act, the world’s first comprehensive legislation on AI, establishes a risk-based regulatory framework.

• Global Standard Setting: European leaders are actively promoting the AI Act as a "Brussels Effect"—the global adoption of EU regulations due to the size of its market. By engaging with Asian partners like Japan, South Korea, and Singapore through digital partnership agreements, the EU seeks to align global standards with its human-centric, values-driven approach to AI, pushing back against the surveillance and data practices of certain competitors.

• Cybersecurity and Data Flows: Digital trade agreements focus on establishing rules for cross-border data flows while ensuring high standards of cybersecurity and data protection, leveraging the established regulatory precedent of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

B. Focusing on Edge AI and Industrial Applications

European industry's strength lies in its "hidden champions"—specialized companies in automotive, robotics, and industrial automation. Their AI focus is on Edge AI (processing data directly on devices like cars or factory robots) rather than massive cloud computing, a niche where they can compete effectively with US/Chinese cloud giants. This specialization is mirrored in R&D cooperation with Asian partners, particularly in advanced manufacturing hubs.

3. 5G and Digital Connectivity: Diversification and Global Gateway

Europe has strong indigenous players in the 5G and telecommunications equipment sector, namely Ericsson (Sweden) and Nokia (Finland).

A. Pushing a Diversified Vendor Strategy

Europe is actively lobbying its Asian partners, particularly members of ASEAN, to adopt a diversified 5G vendor strategy that utilizes European companies instead of relying solely on lower-cost Chinese vendors like Huawei.

• 5G Toolbox: The EU's "5G Toolbox" risk mitigation framework recommends that member states and partners secure their networks and phase out high-risk vendors, a clear political signal that benefits Ericsson and Nokia in the global competition.

• Commercial and Geopolitical Influence: The EU exerts influence by providing financing and technical assistance through its Global Gateway initiative, which explicitly funds green and digital infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. This initiative acts as a values-driven alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative, helping countries like Singapore and Vietnam, which have strong ties to European firms, secure their digital backbone.

B. Lagging Rollout and Standard Setting

Despite having key equipment manufacturers and the main technical standards organization (ETSI/3GPP) located in Europe, the EU itself has lagged behind key Asian economies (China, South Korea) in the speed and density of its own 5G rollout. European elites are compensating for the slower pace of domestic deployment by prioritizing the setting of 6G standards and investing in the next generation of connectivity technologies in partnership with countries like Japan and South Korea.

4. Green Energy: Exporting the European Green Deal 

The European Union is positioning itself as the global standard-setter for the green transition, exporting its policy frameworks and corporate expertise to Asia's burgeoning clean energy market. This is seen as a major economic opportunity for European firms and a strategic lever for the EU's geopolitical influence.

A. The Green Transition and Industrial Investment

• Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETP): The EU, alongside other developed nations, co-chairs JETPs with Asian partners like Indonesia and Vietnam. These multi-billion-dollar partnerships commit technical assistance and financing to help these countries transition away from coal, creating massive demand for European expertise in smart grids, renewable energy generation (wind and solar), and energy efficiency.

• Securing Critical Raw Materials: The EU is engaging with resource-rich Asian nations, such as Indonesia (for nickel and cobalt, vital for EV batteries), to secure the necessary raw materials for its own green transition. This engagement, however, is framed with demands for sustainable mining practices and responsible supply chains, aligning with European regulatory values.

B. Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)

A critical, and controversial, tool is the CBAM, which will place a carbon price on certain imports into the EU. While officially a climate policy, it functions as a powerful trade and diplomatic lever that compels Asian manufacturers to adopt cleaner production methods to remain competitive in the EU market. This effectively exports the EU's carbon standards, forcing a realignment of Asian industrial policy that benefits European green technology providers.

Summary of the Elite Positioning

European elites have adopted a cohesive and strategic posture in Asia's high-tech race that accepts current manufacturing realities but seeks to control the most critical choke points and future standards:

The core of the European strategy is to parlay its regulatory and technological leadership in niche, high-leverage areas into strategic and economic influence across the high-growth Asian market, rather than attempting to out-compete the US and China across the entire technological stack.