Europe’s push for “green energy partnerships” with Asian countries is a complex, two-sided strategic endeavor that is driven by both a genuine climate agenda and an urgent geopolitical imperative for resource security, which carries the undeniable risk of becoming a new form of resource extraction.

The primary motivation for Europe's new partnership model, codified under the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and the Global Gateway strategy, is to “de-risk” its supply chains away from an over-reliance on a single supplier (primarily China) for the critical minerals and clean technologies needed for its own European Green Deal.¹

This necessity—securing the essential building blocks for Europe's net-zero transition—inevitably places resource acquisition at the forefront of the strategy, often overshadowing pure climate cooperation.

The Dual Imperative: Climate vs. Resource Security

Europe's engagement with resource-rich Asian countries cannot be neatly categorized as purely altruistic or purely extractive; it operates on two interconnected, often conflicting, levels.

1. The Genuine Climate Agenda 

European partnerships in Asia, such as the EU-Japan Green Alliance and the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) with countries like Indonesia and Vietnam, align with a clear climate agenda:²

• Decarbonization of Global Emissions: The Asia-Pacific region accounts for approximately half of global greenhouse gas emissions.³ Cooperation with major emitters like China, India, and ASEAN nations is non-negotiable for the success of the Paris Agreement. Partnerships like JETPs commit billions to help Asian countries transition away from coal and accelerate the deployment of renewables, directly serving global climate goals.⁴

• Regulatory Alignment and Standards: The EU seeks to export its high environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards embedded in the European Green Deal.⁵ This means promoting sustainable mining practices, reducing environmental impacts, and improving labor standards in partner countries—aims that genuinely support sustainable development.⁶

• Technology Transfer: Partnerships focus on co-development and investment in green technologies like hydrogen, grid optimization, and carbon markets (e.g., Emission Trading Systems), facilitating a cleaner energy transition within Asia itself.⁷

2. The Resource Security Imperative (The Risk of Extraction) 

Despite the "green" label, the driving force behind the Critical Raw Materials Partnerships with Asian countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and the Philippines is securing access to the materials that underpin Europe’s economic and industrial future.⁸

The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) explicitly frames this need by setting targets to:

• Increase domestic EU extraction (10%), processing (40%), and recycling (25%) of strategic raw materials by 2030.⁹

• Cap dependence on any single third country for a strategic raw material at no more than 65%.¹⁰

To meet the 65% import cap, the EU must forge a new network of reliable suppliers. This focus shifts the dynamic toward resource acquisition under the guise of green cooperation, raising fears of neo-colonial resource extraction among partner countries.

The Core Concern: The Value Chain Dilemma

The central point of tension is the value chain. If Europe's partnerships primarily result in Asian countries exporting unprocessed raw materials while the high-value, high-skill stages of refining, processing, and battery/magnet manufacturing remain confined to Europe (or China), the relationship will be viewed as extractive.

• Indonesia's Example (Nickel): Indonesia, a global leader in nickel reserves (essential for EV batteries), has increasingly banned the export of unprocessed ores, demanding that foreign companies build domestic processing and refining facilities.¹¹ This move, aimed at capturing more value and generating local jobs, directly conflicts with the resource-dependent model favored by historical resource extraction. European partnerships must successfully navigate this demand for local value creation (e.g., co-investing in refining capacity) to be seen as genuine partnerships and not merely a race for ore.

• Financing for Processing: While the EU's Global Gateway initiative is designed to mobilize funding for clean and secure infrastructure, including value-chain projects, the volume of European investment often struggles to compete with the sheer scale and speed of Chinese investment in Asian mining and processing facilities. If European financing prioritizes the quick extraction of raw materials over the costly construction of local refineries, the "extraction" narrative will be reinforced.

How the EU Attempts to Mitigate the Extraction Narrative

European elites are keenly aware of the geopolitical optics and have structured their new policy framework to address the criticisms of one-sided resource deals:

1. Mandatory Sustainability Standards: The CRMA and related due diligence regulations require European companies to map and audit their supply chains for ESG compliance.¹² This legally mandates that partners adhere to standards related to human rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption.¹³ For Asian partners, this is positioned as a path to access the premium, high-standard European market.

2. Focus on Local Value-Addition: The EU officially promotes the goal of helping partner countries move up the value chain, meaning European investment is supposed to prioritize projects that include local processing and refining facilities, not just the mine shaft.¹⁴ This is a crucial metric for evaluating the long-term success of the partnerships.

3. Recycling and Circularity: By committing to dramatically increase its own recycling rate (25% by 2030), Europe is signaling a long-term strategy to reduce its reliance on primary resources from all sources, including Asia.¹⁵ This shifts the focus from an endless demand for extraction to a circular economy model.

In conclusion, Europe’s green energy partnerships in Asia embody a strategic ambiguity. They represent a necessary effort to secure the materials needed for the global climate fight, but this urgency for resource security places them in a position where the dominant outcome could easily be a modern iteration of resource extraction. The difference between a genuine climate agenda and a new form of resource extraction will ultimately hinge on a single factor: the success of the EU in building local processing capacity and adhering to its sustainability promises, ensuring that Asian partners receive value-added investment and not just payment for ore. If Asia remains merely a supplier of dirt, the partnerships will have failed the test of equity and legitimacy.