On the night of October 22, Russian forces launched a massive attack against Ukraine’s electrical power generation infrastructure in the Kyiv, Poltava, Zaporizhzhya, Odesa, Cherkasy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

The targets reportedly included:

1. TEP-4, TEP-5, and TEP-6 in Kyiv;

2. Kanivska Hydroelectric Power Plant in Cherkasy Oblast;

3. Kremenchuk Hydroelectric Power Plant in Poltava Oblast;

4. Dniprovska Hydroelectric Power Plant in Zaporizhia Oblast;

5. Kamenska Hydroelectric Power Plant in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Russia has conducted extensive strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure throughout the conflict, targeting thermal power plants, hydroelectric facilities, substations, and transmission lines. The attacks have significantly disrupted the national grid and caused widespread blackouts.

At the beginning of its military operations, Russian forces attempted nationwide grid disruptions using a combination of long-range kamikaze drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

The attacks were massive but sporadic because Russia’s inventory of drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles was limited.

The impact of these strikes was temporary. The damaged equipment was quickly replaced by Ukraine’s European allies.

As the military operations progressed, the West supplied a large number of advanced air defense systems, which further reduced the effectiveness of Russian attacks.

Adequate Attack Warning

Slow-moving Geran kamikaze drones, launched one or two at a time from well behind the frontline, are easy to track. The easily detected pre-launch movement of the bombers used to launch cruise missiles gives Ukraine a warning up to a day ahead of the attack.

The missiles are launched from well within Russian airspace and are immediately tracked, sometimes giving Ukrainian air defenses more than an hour to engage them.

Change In Tack

In the lead-up to winter 2025–2026, Russian forces have intensified their attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The strikes are more effective and targeted — using a much larger number of drones and missiles, and occurring more frequently.

The attacks now come in waves spread over many hours. Earlier, Russian forces attempted to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses; now the focus is on depleting and tiring them.

From March to August 2025 alone, Russia reportedly launched around 2,900 attacks on energy targets, with the intensity steadily escalating. In October, strike frequency is almost daily, and the attacks are spread across the entire breadth of Ukraine.

Production Ramp-up & Technology Upgrades

Production ramp-ups and technology upgrades of Geran kamikaze drones, missiles, and glide bombs over the past year and more have facilitated a dramatic increase in the ferocity of the strikes.

The attacks are now more regional and adaptive. Russian forces are using more lethal precision-guided munitions (PGMs), evading strengthened Ukrainian defenses and aggressively exploiting vulnerabilities.

During the attack on the night of October 22, for example, Russian forces did not use subsonic cruise missiles launched by strategic bombers. Instead, they used a large number of Iskander-M ballistic and low-flying Iskander-K cruise missiles, as well as the very difficult-to-intercept Kh-69 and Kinzhal cruise missiles from tactical aircraft.

The warning time available to Ukrainian forces would have been minimal.

Russian Geran drones now feature cameras and mesh networking, allowing real-time targeting adjustments that improve penetration and accuracy.

Russia now launches its Geran drones in large numbers from specially constructed and protected airbases near the frontline. These drones strike targets close to the frontline, minimizing reaction time for Ukrainian forces.

Instead of striking mostly at the power infrastructure in well-developed and defended western Ukraine, Russia is now also attacking less-defended regions — particularly front-line areas within about 120 km of combat zones and northern border regions such as Chernihiv and Sumy.

Focusing On Gas Infrastructure

Since February 2025, Russian attacks have been particularly focused on gas production and storage assets to ensure Ukraine cannot meet peak heating and electricity demands during winter.

The drop in daily output was already 40% in February 2025, but attacks have continued, and about 50% of Ukraine’s gas infrastructure capacity has now been destroyed as of October.

Ukraine Now Heavily Reliant On Nuclear Power

As a result of the sustained Russian campaign against Ukraine’s electrical power and gas distribution infrastructure, Ukraine’s reliance on nuclear power has increased.

Before the start of the Russian Military Operations in February 2022, nuclear power accounted for approximately 55% of Ukraine’s total electricity generation — about 86.2 TWh from nuclear out of a total of 158 TWh.

In 2023, the share rose to around 62%, with nuclear generating about 50–53 TWh amid a sharp drop in total generation to roughly 80–85 TWh.

Relentless Russian attacks have now reduced Ukraine’s conventional (thermal, coal, and hydroelectric) electrical power generation capability to half of what it was before the start of hostilities.

Consequently, the share of nuclear power has risen to over 70%, even though of the four nuclear power plants operating earlier, only three remain operational.

The Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant — the largest in Europe, which contributed about 40% of Ukraine’s nuclear capacity, is now under Russian control and offline.

According to Reuters, Russian attacks on Ukraine’s conventional power generation infrastructure have sometimes indirectly impacted Ukraine’s nuclear power generation by disrupting offsite power supplies to the operational nuclear reactors at Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, and South Ukraine.

However, Russia has refrained from directly attacking nuclear reactors — and for good reason.

Russian Inability To Completely De-Energize Ukraine

Attacks on nuclear reactors or their immediate critical infrastructure, such as reactor switchyards, entail a high risk of triggering a nuclear accident resulting in radiation release.

Nuclear power plants are used for base (continuous) load generation. They are slow to start up and ramp down, typically requiring hours to days.

They operate mostly at or near full power, meeting base-load electrical power demands. They are economical to run only when operated at high capacity.

Nuclear reactors are not optimized to handle spikes and downturns in power loads. Surges or “peaking” in power demand — such as those caused by hot summer afternoons or cold winter evenings — are best handled using power generated by gas turbines, diesel generators, and thermal or hydro power plants.

Modern nuclear power plants can handle power output variations better than vintage ones; they can ramp down to 50–60% power and back up within an hour or two. However, Ukraine operates only Soviet-era NPPs.

Forcing Shutdown

Instead of attacking the immediate infrastructure of an operating reactor, Russia could more safely attempt to force a reactor shutdown by destabilizing the grid load — for example, by targeting major power-consuming installations (such as industrial sites or urban centers reliant on nuclear-generated electricity).

However, there would be no guarantee that such attacks would culminate in a reactor shutdown. To some extent, the grid disruption could be handled by adjusting power output. In case of a severe disruption, surplus power could be exported.

Russia’s best option at this point is to keep striking Ukraine’s conventional electric power generation capability, inexorably degrading it to the extent that the grid’s ability to handle power surges and ramp-downs is compromised.

As the number of peaking power stations drops, it will become increasingly risky for Ukraine to operate its nuclear reactors, potentially forcing it to voluntarily shut them down.