The question of whether China’s “development model” — when applied into Africa through infrastructure, investment, trade and skills cooperation — has produced more jobless graduates than empowered entrepreneurs merits serious reflection.

In short: Yes, in many cases the model has tilted toward producing graduates who remain under-employed and fewer robust, locally-owned entrepreneurial ecosystems. But the picture is uneven, multi-layered, and context-specific. Below I unpack both sides of the argument, examine key mechanisms, highlight evidence, explore the degree to which the model fosters entrepreneurship (or not), and then conclude with implications for Africa.

What is meant by China’s “development model” in Africa-

When we refer to China’s development model in Africa, we mean a bundle of practices and policy-themes: large infrastructure investment, manufacturing/industrial parks, trade-driven growth, technology transfer in theory, “south-south” cooperation rhetoric, and state-led coordination of investment and export-oriented manufacturing. In Africa this has manifested through Belt & Road linked projects, Chinese companies investing in mining, construction, manufacturing, and co-development programmes (scholarships, vocational training, agricultural demonstration centres). For example, the African Centre for Technology Studies documents how Chinese firms operate in sub-Saharan Africa and the skills constraints they face. 

Under this model, the expectation from African partners is: you get infrastructure + industrial investment + skills/training + jobs → stronger local industries, local entrepreneurs and growth.

But the implementation has revealed significant gaps — especially when it comes to graduates finding employment and entrepreneurs emerging at scale.

Evidence of increasing jobless graduates-

Graduate unemployment in China & the export of model-

First, it’s worth noting that even in China, the domestic environment is challenging for graduates. In recent years the youth unemployment rate (ages 16-24) excluding students rose above 17.8% in July 2025.  This suggests that China’s own transition from industrial growth to higher-skills economy is under strain and that its “graduates to jobs” pipeline is not flawless.

Skills training in Africa under Chinese cooperation—but weak absorption-

In Africa, China’s involvement includes support for skills development: for example via programmes that tie into the Partnership for Skills in Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology (PASET) and other vocational/technical initiatives.  The article states Chinese firms “often resort to importing skilled labour … in addition to qualified professionals such as engineers and architects” due to local constraints. That implies that even when local training is done, job absorption is limited.

Tension between training and opportunity-

– In Africa, many university graduates face weak employment markets. Even when trained, they may not find meaningful employment, especially in sectors where local industry is weak, or value-chains are missing.
– And the Chinese-Africa model often emphasises jobs in infrastructure, construction, extractive or low-skilled manufacturing by Chinese firms, rather than broad ecosystem support for local entrepreneurship.
– For example, while some media filings claim Chinese enterprises in Africa created 1.1 million jobs in three years.  But job creation doesn’t necessarily equal entrepreneurial empowerment or graduate employment across the economy.

Where jobless graduates arise-

• There are reports of job-seeker fairs for Chinese-invested enterprises in South Africa where many young graduates attend looking for jobs. 

• The skills/education pipeline in many African countries lags behind what labor markets require. The World Bank noted that Africa’s tertiary (post-secondary) enrollment is under 10% in many places and share of STEM graduates is about 22% vs China’s ~40%. 
  Thus, many graduates emerge into weak labour markets, and the structural job opportunities promised by infrastructure/industrial investment may not materialise at scale fast enough.

Evidence of limited entrepreneurial empowerment

The “jobs” model vs “entrepreneurship” model-

The Chinese model emphasises employment generation via large firms, infrastructure projects, state-led manufacturing zones, rather than grass-roots entrepreneurship, small and medium enterprise (SME) incubation, domestic value-chain entrepreneurial growth. That difference matters: entrepreneurs require access to capital, local networks, local supplier linkages, marketing/distribution capacity and enabling environments — many of which are weak.

Local linkages and capacity capture remain weak-

Scholars note that Chinese firms frequently rely on imported labour, bring in equipment and materials, and have weaker local procurement and supplier development.  When local firms cannot supply inputs or take over operations, the entrepreneurial ecosystem remains shallow. Without strong local supplier networks, domestic entrepreneurs struggle to scale.

While infrastructure/assembly may create jobs, it doesn’t automatically create entrepreneurs-

Jobs created by large Chinese-led manufacturing or infrastructure projects may indeed absorb labour, but they don’t always catalyze entrepreneurs. The transition from employed to self-employed or founder often needs different support (finance, mentoring, networks). If the model remains “foreign firm builds, local labour works, wages paid” without strong entrepreneurship programmes, the number of empowered local business owners may remain small.

The paradox: many training programmes, limited follow-through-

China offers scholarships and training programmes for African students (such as the “African Talents Program” mentioned in a 2018 report) that promise to build cadres of professionals.  But the question is: do those graduates return, get jobs, start ventures, or remain under-employed? There is limited publicly available robust data, but anecdotal evidence suggests many return to limited opportunity.

Why the model tilts toward jobless graduates and fewer entrepreneurs-

Several structural and policy reasons help explain why the outcome is often skewed:

1) Skills mismatch and static education systems-

• Many African universities still deliver degrees that don’t match current market needs (technical, digital, managerial) at sufficient scale. Without strong local industry demand, graduates struggle to find work. The World Bank commentary emphasises this gap. 

• Chinese firms themselves report that in many African countries “skills shortages … even in low-skill jobs” are a challenge.  So even when infrastructure investment exists, local labour may not meet the expectations, delaying hiring and strengthening reliance on imported labour.

2) Infrastructure/industry build-out leads but entrepreneurial ecosystem lags-

China often builds physical infrastructure or manufacturing zones, but the creation of a vibrant SME ecosystem, domestic entrepreneurship support, supply chain depth, venture capital, and local managerial capacity is far slower. Without those, graduates may find jobs but have limited scope to found their own firms.
There is an opportunity cost: time taken to build big-ticket infrastructure may overshadow support for domestic entrepreneurs.

3) Foreign-led investment vs local ownership

When large Chinese firms dominate manufacturing or mining, they may deploy expatriate managers, bring in equipment, keep profits partly offshore, and import certain inputs. That leaves fewer opportunities for local business owners to plug in, fewer spin-off firms, and fewer local entrepreneurs creating value upstream or downstream of the investment. Without strong local ownership or joint-venture requirements, entrepreneurship remains under-developed.

4) Employment over entrepreneurship as measure of success

Many Chinese-Africa programmes proudly point to job creation numbers (1.1 million jobs, etc) as metrics of success. But job creation is different from entrepreneurship. Hence, the focus may skew toward “get more employees into factories” rather than “build local business owners and entrepreneurs”. If governments emphasise the former, policy may under-invest in the latter.

5) Market structure, import competition and value-chain capture

Graduates and potential entrepreneurs face competition from cheap imports (including Chinese goods) and weak local manufacturing support — which hinders the emergence of domestic small to medium sized manufacturing enterprises. If local startup manufacturers cannot compete on cost with large foreign suppliers, then entrepreneurship in manufacturing stalls. Rather than starting their own firms, many graduates remain job-seekers.

Counter-evidence: where the model has enabled jobs and some entrepreneurship

It is not entirely bleak — there are cases where China’s engagement has genuinely created jobs and some entrepreneurial opportunities:

• As mentioned, the 1.1 million jobs figure for Africa from Chinese enterprises over recent years is significant. 

• These jobs are in sectors like rail, infrastructure, agriculture, ICT, manufacturing, giving youth employment and skills.

• Chinese-supported vocational training programmes, agricultural demonstration centres and capacity development initiatives (under the African Talents Program, etc) show that skills development is happening. 

• Some African entrepreneurs and SMEs have benefited from Chinese investment spill-overs (for example local firms supplying Chinese factories or co-operating in zones). Though less documented, these indicate there is potential for entrepreneurship growth.

Thus, the model has created opportunities, but the scale and balance — jobless graduates vs empowered entrepreneurs — still seems tilted toward the former in many African states.

How big is the imbalance?

Quantifying exactly how many graduates remain jobless vs how many entrepreneurs are empowered via the China-Africa model is extremely difficult — data are scarce, national statistics vary, and causality is hard to attribute. But what we can assert:

• Youth/university unemployment in many African countries remains high.

• The pace of local entrepreneurship scaling (especially in light manufacturing, services linked to manufacturing) remains slow compared to the number of graduates entering the labour market.

• While Chinese-Africa involvement emphasises job creation, the number of local founders or scaling SMEs remains lower than optimal given the number of graduates.

• Skills programmes under Chinese cooperation are meaningful, but not always tightly integrated into local market or entrepreneurial ecosystems.

Given these, it is fair to say more graduates are likely remaining under-employed or in low-growth jobs rather than being rapidly converted into local business founders or innovators.

Implications for Africa’s development

The skew toward jobless graduates over entrepreneurs has several implications:

1. Wasted human capital: When graduates cannot find meaningful jobs or start their own businesses, economies lose out on innovation, productivity, and value-added growth.

2. Under-utilised infrastructure: When infrastructure or manufacturing zones built with Chinese help don’t lead to local business creation, those assets may under-perform and become less sustainable.

3. Dependency on foreign firms: If local entrepreneurs are weak, economies remain reliant on foreign firms (including Chinese) for jobs, investment and technology, rather than building indigenous capabilities.

4. Social and political risk: Large numbers of unemployed or under-employed graduates increase risk of social frustration, migration pressures, brain-drain and political instability.

5. Missed multiplier effect: Entrepreneurs generate more than jobs — they create supply-chains, innovation, exports, diversification. If they’re not emerging, economies miss that multiplying effect.

What needs to change so the model empowers entrepreneurs as much as it creates jobs

To shift the balance toward entrepreneurs, African states (in partnership with China and other investors) should consider:

• Embed entrepreneurship support in investment deals: Chinese infrastructure or manufacturing investment should include clauses for local supplier development, incubation of local SMEs, technology transfer, joint ventures with local entrepreneurs.

• Vocational + entrepreneurial training: Not just job-ready skills, but training for business creation, management, marketing, access to finance for graduates who want to start firms.

• Access to capital & finance for SMEs: Graduates who want to found firms need micro/SME financing, venture support, risk-capital, linkages to supply-chains of foreign investors.

• Encourage local ownership, local manufacturing zones: Zones should not only host foreign factories but also integrate local manufacturing and services firms, giving graduates/founders space to participate.

• Promote localisation of value-chains: Rather than importing most of the inputs and labour, foreign investment should generate local production of components, encourage local procurement, and enable domestic entrepreneurs to supply to the big firms.

• Monitor graduate employment outcomes: Governments should track how many graduates find employment or start firms and adjust policies accordingly — ensuring that large infrastructure or investment projects actually link to human development outcomes.

• Link higher education to local market needs: Universities and technical colleges need to align curricula with growing sectors, entrepreneurship, digital economy, so graduates are job- or business-ready.

• Use regional markets & digital platforms: Entrepreneurship isn’t just manufacturing; digital platforms, regional trade under African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can open markets for African entrepreneurs trained and enabled through Chinese-Africa investment.

Concluding assessment-

So, has China’s “development model” in Africa created more jobless graduates than empowered entrepreneurs? My assessment: yes, in many cases and many countries, the balance presently leans that way. Graduates are being produced in growing numbers; infrastructure and investment are increasing; jobs are being created — but the transition to broad-based entrepreneurship and local business creation is lagging behind.

That does not nullify the gains — many jobs are being created, many infrastructures built, many skills transferred. But if the goal is local empowerment, entrepreneurship, industrial upgrading, then the current model needs adjustment to ensure that graduates don’t end up as job-seekers but rather as job-creators.

For African policy-makers, the challenge is to ensure that Chinese-inspired investment doesn’t simply add employment but also fosters the ecosystems that turn graduates into entrepreneurial actors, thus building sustainable and locally-owned growth. If that shift happens, the model may evolve into one that truly empowers rather than just employs.