The inability of the African Union (AU) to decisively stop the two rival generals—Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti' of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—from destroying Sudan is a complex failure rooted in a mix of structural limitations, a crippling lack of financial and military independence, and the paralyzing influence of external geopolitical interference.

While the AU and its regional partner, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have issued strong condemnations, adopted roadmaps, and attempted mediation, their efforts have failed to compel the generals to cease fighting. This failure highlights profound systemic weaknesses in the continent’s peace and security architecture, which are far greater than simply a lack of political will.

Here is a detailed analysis of why the African Union finds itself incapable of imposing peace in Sudan:

1. Structural and Institutional Weaknesses

The AU's foundational architecture, while ambitious on paper, lacks the enforcement muscle and unified decision-making capacity required for a conflict of Sudan's intensity.

A. Lack of Unified Leverage and Enforcement

The AU has a strong norm of "non-indifference" that permits intervention in cases of mass atrocities, unlike its predecessor. However, its primary tool for pressuring rogue leaders—the suspension of membership—was already applied to Sudan following the 2021 coup. This meant the AU had used its strongest diplomatic tool before the current war even began, leaving it with little leverage to escalate pressure.

Furthermore, the Peace and Security Council (PSC)—the AU’s standing decision-making body for conflict resolution—often struggles to achieve the unity necessary for robust action. Member states frequently have vested interests in a conflict or maintain a cautious adherence to the principle of state sovereignty, making them hesitant to endorse aggressive sanctions or military intervention against a fellow member state.

B. Fragmentation of Mediation Efforts

Instead of a single, unified African initiative, the Sudan crisis was met with a cacophony of competing mediation tracks. This included initiatives from the AU, IGAD (whose efforts were hampered by internal disputes, as the SAF rejected Kenya's leadership), and the parallel, often more influential, Jeddah talks led by Saudi Arabia and the US.

This proliferation provided the warring generals with a perfect opportunity for "forum-shopping"—they could attend talks to buy time, secure tactical ceasefires that they promptly violated, and then pivot to whichever diplomatic venue offered them the most favorable political or military terms. The AU's authority was significantly undermined by the existence of these external, high-profile tracks.

2. Crippling Resource and Capacity Deficiencies

The AU's capacity for effective, sustained intervention is fundamentally limited by its lack of financial and logistical independence.

A. Financial Dependency

The AU remains heavily dependent on external donors for funding its peace and security operations. Historically, African peacekeeping missions, such as the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur, were chronically under-resourced, forcing them to merge with UN missions to survive (e.g., UNAMID).

This reliance means:

• Slow Deployment: The AU cannot rapidly deploy robust monitoring or peace enforcement missions.

• Conditionality: External funding often comes with conditions or political agendas set by non-African donors, which can compromise the AU’s independence and decision-making on the ground.

• Lack of Credible Threat: The AU's lack of a fully operational, self-funded African Standby Force (ASF) means it cannot credibly threaten a large-scale peace enforcement operation—a crucial element for compelling two powerful, entrenched armies like the SAF and RSF to lay down arms.

B. Logistical and Military Gap

Stopping a full-scale civil war, especially one involving heavy armor and widespread urban fighting like in Khartoum, requires robust military logistics, satellite intelligence, air support, and thousands of well-equipped troops. No single African country, and certainly not the AU as an institution, has the independent capacity to sustain such a costly, high-intensity operation without massive external support.

3. Geopolitical Interference and Regional Division

The greatest external challenge to the AU's effectiveness is the direct and indirect involvement of powerful foreign states whose interests run counter to a swift, African-led peace.

A. External Lifelines to the Generals

The war is not purely an internal Sudanese conflict; it is heavily influenced by geopolitical rivalries involving Middle Eastern powers. Reports indicate that the RSF is supported by countries like the UAE, while the SAF receives support from others like Egypt and Iran.

These external backers provide weapons, financial aid, and political cover, which serve as a critical lifeline for both generals. As long as the SAF and RSF have patrons willing to resupply them, they have no incentive to negotiate seriously in any peace process, including the AU's. The flow of arms effectively neuters any diplomatic pressure the AU might try to exert.

B. Regional Disunity

Even among Sudan's neighbors, there is no unified front. Countries share borders with Sudan and bear the brunt of the refugee crisis, but their national interests are often divergent:

• Some neighbors have historical ties to the SAF.

• Others have economic or political sympathies with the RSF.

• The involvement of non-state actors and cross-border security concerns (e.g., with Chad, Ethiopia, and South Sudan) further complicate the situation.

This fundamental lack of regional cohesion within key blocs like IGAD paralyzes the AU’s ability to act as a unified regional leader, creating an environment where external actors can easily exploit the divisions.

 A Crisis of Capacity and Geopolitics

The African Union's inability to stop the two rival generals is not a simple failure of political will, but a symptom of profound and interconnected constraints. The crisis exposes the large gap between the AU's ambitious norms ("Silencing the Guns") and its practical capacity for peace enforcement and independent financing.

The AU has been outmaneuvered and overshadowed by powerful external actors with deep pockets, while being hobbled by its own internal financial and structural limitations.

Until the AU can secure truly independent, predictable funding, assert a unified regional mandate, and compel major global powers to stop fueling conflicts within its member states, its ability to stop determined warring factions from destroying an entire country will remain tragically limited.