This is a deeply consequential question that goes to the heart of the African Union's (AU) purpose and its greatest institutional failures. The AU continues to primarily frame the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) crisis as a "regional issue" that demands "African solutions" largely because this framing:

1. Protects the principle of peer sovereignty and shields powerful member states (like Rwanda and Uganda) from direct sanctions or punitive action.

2. Manages expectations by maintaining a lower diplomatic profile, thereby avoiding the enormous financial and logistical commitments required for a decisive intervention.

3. Reflects a genuine lack of capacity and cohesion to execute large-scale, offensive peace enforcement operations against well-funded, state-backed non-state actors.

The reality is that the AU's current approach—relying heavily on fragmented regional processes (Luanda, Nairobi), condemnations of all armed groups, and calls for dialogue—is structurally designed to delay a reckoning with the full, catastrophic scale of the crisis, which many observers do consider to rival historic genocides in terms of the number of excess deaths and sustained atrocities.

Sovereignty and the Club of Incumbents

The greatest political hurdle for the AU is its unwavering commitment to the principle of state sovereignty, enshrined in its Constitutive Act.

1. The Fear of Setting Precedents

While the AU operates under the principle of "non-indifference" (allowing intervention in cases of genocide and war crimes), the organization has consistently chosen the path of non-interference in practice.

• Protecting Peers: Direct, public, and aggressive condemnation of a member state for supporting proxy militias (which UN experts have repeatedly documented) is viewed by many African leaders as a dangerous precedent. If Rwanda can be forcefully condemned and sanctioned today, their own regime or military actions could be targeted tomorrow. The AU functions as a "club of incumbents," prioritizing the stability of its member governments over the security of the DRC's citizens.

• The Conflict is Regionalized, Not Classified as Genocide: The crisis is often described as a series of complex proxy wars, ethnic conflicts, and economic battles. Though the death toll is comparable to genocides, the lack of a clear, unified, continent-wide classification of the violence as "genocide" or "crimes against humanity" (which would trigger the non-indifference clause) gives the AU diplomatic room to maneuver and maintain the "regional issue" framing.

2. The Dominance of Mediation Over Enforcement

The AU's official communiqués consistently focus on "dialogue," "reconciliation," and the "Luanda and Nairobi processes" as the primary solution. (Source 1.2, 1.3)

• This diplomatic focus avoids the high cost and political risk of military confrontation. By continuously requesting that Rwanda and the DRC return to the negotiating table, the AU can claim leadership in the crisis without actually having to enforce a cessation of hostilities on the ground.

• This approach is favored because it is the only tool the AU truly controls. It can convene meetings, but it cannot compel powerful member states to stop their illegal activities.

Capacity, Cohesion, and Financial Dependence

The AU's institutional weaknesses make a full-scale "genocide-level" intervention virtually impossible, regardless of political will.

3. Financial and Logistical Shortfalls

A meaningful intervention to stabilize a country the size of the DRC and defeat over 120 armed groups (including state-backed groups like M23) would require a commitment on the scale of tens of billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of troops.

• External Dependence: The AU is chronically reliant on external funding (from the UN, EU, and other partners) for its peacekeeping operations. (Source 3.6) Its own Peace Fund is insufficient to finance a decisive force. This dependence limits the AU's agency, making it vulnerable to the priorities of its foreign donors, who often prioritize resource stability over peace enforcement.

• Fragmented Military Efforts: The rotation of regional forces (EACRF followed by SAMIDRC) demonstrates the lack of a coherent, centralized AU strategy. (Source 3.5) Instead of a single, unified AU force, the mission is ceded to Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which often have conflicting political agendas and insufficient resources (Source 1.6, 3.5). The result is a series of slow, under-resourced, and politically constrained deployments that ultimately fail to deter the well-equipped rebel groups.

4. Economic Conflict of Interest

The AU cannot effectively condemn African-backed militias because powerful, resource-rich African states are complicit in the conflict minerals economy.

• For leaders in the region, the incentive structure is clear: war pays. As long as the illicit cross-border trade in cobalt, gold, and coltan remains profitable, the political and economic pressure to maintain the status quo outweighs the moral pressure to end the humanitarian disaster. The AU, representing the collective interest of its members, struggles to sanction the behavior that provides wealth and regional security for some of its most influential members.

How Long Will the Pretence Last?

The AU will likely continue to frame the DRC crisis as a "regional issue" for the foreseeable future, or at least until one of two things happens:

1. A decisive military shift: If the conflict spills over uncontrollably, threatening the stability of another major economic power or critical trade route (like the copper/cobalt corridor), a collective African military intervention with an offensive mandate may become a necessity rather than a choice.

2. Mandatory External Accountability: If the UN Security Council (or a coalition of global powers) decides to impose unprecedented, targeted, and enforceable sanctions on the specific African state leaders and military structures accused of financing and arming the militias. This would force the AU's hand by making peer support too costly to maintain.

Until then, the AU's rhetorical strategy will remain one of managing the crisis through diplomacy and limited regional deployments, while implicitly rejecting the "genocide" narrative to avoid the political and financial imperative of a true continental intervention. The AU is currently prioritizing institutional and sovereign stability over the lives of millions in the DRC.