China’s assertive behavior in Asia, particularly in the South China Sea, has become a defining challenge for regional and international institutions.

Despite clear violations of international maritime law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), organizations such as ASEAN and the United Nations have shown a marked reluctance to take decisive action against Beijing.

Understanding this hesitancy requires examining the complex interplay of geopolitics, economics, institutional limitations, and the sheer magnitude of China’s influence.

1. China’s Economic Leverage Over ASEAN Members

The most immediate reason ASEAN struggles to confront China is economic dependence. China is:

• The largest trading partner for nearly every ASEAN member state,

• A primary source of investment, loans, and infrastructure funding under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),

• A critical source of tourism and consumer goods.

This economic leverage allows Beijing to intimidate or influence ASEAN members indirectly. Even modest attempts at challenging Chinese maritime claims risk retaliation, such as:

• Trade restrictions (as seen with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia),

• Reduced Chinese tourism or investment,

• Diplomatic pressure to isolate dissenting voices.

ASEAN, which operates on a consensus basis, is particularly vulnerable. Any member seeking a stronger stance risks being overruled or pressured by China, making collective action nearly impossible. This creates a culture of caution, in which the organization prioritizes cohesion and economic stability over enforcing international law.

2. ASEAN’s Structural Limitations

ASEAN’s institutional design contributes to its cautious posture:

• Consensus-Based Decision Making: All ten member states must agree on statements or policies. Countries with strong economic or political ties to China, like Cambodia or Laos, often block or water down stronger language against Beijing.

• Non-Interference Principle: ASEAN emphasizes sovereignty and non-interference, even when disputes affect regional security. This principle limits the organization’s ability to take decisive action against a regional power.

• Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms: ASEAN can issue statements, mediate disputes, or coordinate meetings, but it lacks military or coercive tools to enforce compliance.

These structural constraints make ASEAN ill-equipped to challenge China directly, even when violations of maritime law are clear.

3. UN Reluctance: Political and Structural Factors

The United Nations faces its own set of challenges when addressing China’s violations:

A. China’s Position in the Security Council

China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) with veto power. Any resolution condemning Chinese actions or calling for enforcement measures can be blocked unilaterally. This effectively neutralizes the UN’s primary enforcement mechanism, leaving the organization with limited tools beyond diplomacy and reports.

B. Reliance on Chinese Cooperation

The UN relies on China for:

• Peacekeeping contributions and funding,

• Coordination in regional conflicts and humanitarian operations,

• Cooperation on global issues like climate change, pandemics, and economic development.

Open confrontation could jeopardize critical UN operations or the organization’s ability to function effectively in Asia. Many UN member states fear the diplomatic and operational consequences of antagonizing China.

C. Bureaucratic Caution and Consensus Politics

The UN functions through consensus-driven diplomacy, often prioritizing negotiation over confrontation. Member states are wary of creating precedent or tensions that could escalate into military conflict in the East or South China Seas. The result is a pattern of muted criticism, ambiguous statements, and calls for dialogue rather than direct enforcement.

4. Fear of Escalation

Both ASEAN and the UN are acutely aware that confronting China could trigger escalation:

• Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use military assets, coast guard vessels, and maritime militias to assert claims.

• Escalation could lead to regional naval standoffs or airspace conflicts, drawing ASEAN countries into direct confrontation.

• Both organizations prefer diplomacy and multilateral dialogue to avoid the risk of war, even if it means tolerating violations in the short term.

The fear of escalation creates a strategic paralysis, where the risk of action appears greater than the cost of inaction.

5. China’s Strategic Use of Legal Ambiguity

China deliberately exploits gaps in international law to shield itself from accountability:

• Beijing claims historical rights under the “nine-dash line,” a historical assertion rejected by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling.

• China reframes incidents as domestic maritime policing or civil matters, claiming activities fall within Chinese territory.

• The use of grey-zone tactics—such as civilian fishing fleets escorted by paramilitary vessels—creates plausible deniability and complicates enforcement.

This legal ambiguity makes confrontation politically and legally complex for both ASEAN and the UN. Challenging China requires not only political courage but also sophisticated legal and operational frameworks that are difficult to implement in real time.

6. Internal Divisions Among ASEAN Members

ASEAN’s inability to act decisively also stems from divergent national interests:

• The Philippines and Vietnam are among the most directly affected by Chinese maritime expansion.

• Cambodia and Laos maintain close economic and political ties with China and resist strong criticism.

• Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia balance economic pragmatism with strategic caution, often preferring quiet diplomacy.

These divisions dilute collective statements and reduce pressure on Beijing. Without unity, ASEAN’s influence on China remains minimal, reinforcing the perception of hesitancy or fear.

7. Strategic and Practical Implications

The reluctance of ASEAN and the UN to confront China has profound consequences:

1. Normalization of Chinese Expansion: Persistent violations without meaningful pushback embolden Beijing to continue asserting claims.

2. Erosion of International Norms: Ignoring UNCLOS rulings and Security Council authority weakens global law and order.

3. Shift in Regional Power Balance: Smaller Asian nations may feel compelled to rely on bilateral alliances or external powers (like the U.S., Japan, or Australia) for protection.

4. Long-Term Strategic Vulnerability: Failure to enforce maritime law sets a precedent, signaling that economic power and military strength outweigh legal norms in Asia.

        ++++++++++++++++++++++

ASEAN and the United Nations are reluctant—or even afraid—to confront China’s maritime law violations for several interrelated reasons:

• Economic dependence on China makes member states hesitant to risk retaliation.

• Structural and institutional limitations prevent decisive action.

• Political and strategic caution dominates, as escalation risks regional conflict.

• China’s legal ambiguity and selective use of history complicate enforcement.

• Internal divisions within ASEAN undermine collective resolve.

The result is a pattern of toleration, muted criticism, and incremental diplomacy, rather than direct enforcement. While such caution may preserve short-term stability, it encourages further Chinese assertiveness, weakens international legal norms, and leaves smaller Asian nations vulnerable.

Ultimately, the question is not whether ASEAN and the UN can confront China—they clearly have the tools and moral authority—but whether they are willing to risk the political, economic, and strategic consequences. In the current geopolitical landscape, fear, dependency, and institutional limitations continue to tip the balance in Beijing’s favor.