Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan meets with Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

The abrupt fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad following the lightning offensive of rebel forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, may very well put regional reconciliations across the Middle East over the past four years to the ultimate test.

This is particularly true for the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, member states and Turkey, whose stances on Syria had diverged, if to varying degrees. They will continue to do so in the aftermath of Assad’s ouster, as HTS seeks to consolidate control over the country and efforts toward reconstruction begin.

As the peaceful protests against Assad in 2011 evolved into a brutal civil war, the conflict also became a fierce geopolitical struggle between Turkey and the GCC on one hand, and Iran on the other. But divergence between Ankara and some of the Gulf states in terms of preferred partners on the ground turned Syria into an object of regional power struggles. These were exacerbated by tensions between the two sides over the Saudi and Emirati-led blockade of Qatar—a partner of Turkey’s—in 2017.

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The intensity of the fighting in Syria significantly declined in March 2020 following the Astana Process among Turkey, Russia and Iran. That agreement froze the conflict, while preserving the territorial control over Idlib province in northern Syria by rebels under Turkey’s protection. Since then, efforts toward rapprochement between Ankara, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia gained momentum, particularly with the end of the Gulf crisis in 2021.

Now, the events in Syria may test whether these regional powers can continue to compartmentalize their geopolitical differences, or if instead their diverging interests jeopardize their rapprochements.

The GCC’s three geopolitical heavyweights—the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar— have all displayed stark divisions in their responses to the developments in Damascus.

Abu Dhabi appears to be the most concerned among them, having tacitly supported Assad and spearheading efforts to return the Syrian dictator to the Arab fold in recent years. In fact, the UAE backed Russia’s military intervention in support of Assad in 2015—breaking ranks with Turkey and the GCC at the time—after having previously supported non-Islamist rebels to counterbalance factions like the Muslim Brotherhood and Ahrar al-Sham, without the aim of toppling Assad. And in December 2018, the UAE became the first Arab nation to engage diplomatically with Syria since its suspension from the Arab League in 2011.

In the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed, expressed fears over an HTS-led rebel government, cautioning against nonstate actors exploiting the current vacuum of power in Damascus. He also warned of the potential for “chaos” and “extremism” to take root in Syria.

The UAE’s traditional hostility toward Islamist movements—a major driver of previous tensions with Qatar and Turkey—makes the prospect of an HTS government in Syria alarming. And Abu Dhabi’s preference for authoritarian leaders makes it wary of the popular support for Assad’s removal in Syria and among the millions of refugees from the war, out of fear that it could spur anti-authoritarian calls elsewhere in the region. Crucially, though, the HTS-led takeover has put paid to the UAE’s gamble on support for Assad as a way to ensure future influence in Damascus, leaving Abu Dhabi with limited leverage in the country.

While all the regional actors may share the goal of stabilizing Syria, their differences over Syria’s long-term trajectory are evident, reflecting their long-standing divergence in approaches on regional affairs.

Saudi Arabia shared the UAE’s fear of an Islamist government in Syria and followed Abu Dhabi’s lead in normalizing with Assad. But it has taken a more measured approach to the recent developments in Damascus, emphasizing dialogue and an inclusive political future for Syria. Notably, Riyadh has confirmed having established communication with all regional stakeholders, especially Turkey, underscoring the Saudis’ desire to minimize regional fallout and prioritize cooperation. 

Meanwhile, Qatar has shown willingness to proactively engage with the HTS-led government and act as a backchannel between the new authorities in Damascus and Turkey, Russia, Iran and the West, reportedly communicating directly with interim Prime Minister Mohamed al-Bashir to do so. Should Qatar continue to play this role, it will further boost its regional diplomatic credentials, already on display in its mediation of talks between Israel and Hamas since Oct. 7, 2023. But these ties, combined with Doha’s financial resources, will also put Qatar in a stronger position to shape the direction of the post-Assad transition. Indeed, Qatar announced it would reopen its embassy in Damascus for the first time since Assad loyalists attacked it in July 2011, showing how its backing of the Syrian opposition has paid off in influence in post-Assad Syria.

Qatar’s close relations with Turkey may also allow both sides to the coordinate their interests. Like Doha, Ankara opposed Assad’s rule, due to his violent suppression of initially peaceful opposition movements and his subsequent atrocities—including the use of chemical weapons—during the war. Turkey’s backing of the formerly Idlib-based Syrian National Army, or SNA, which also played a role in overthrowing Assad, has now increased its leverage over future developments in Damascus.

Meanwhile, elements of the SNA, with Turkish backing, are currently pursuing a military campaign in northeast Syria against the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF. Ankara sees the SDF—a Syrian Kurdish militia—as an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, a Turkish Kurdish insurgency and proscribed terrorist group Turkey has been fighting for decades.

At the same time, Turkey, which has been eager to see the millions of Syrian refugees it currently hosts to return home, wants to avoid another refugee surge toward its borders. So it has greater incentives to support efforts to stabilize Syria.

While all the regional actors may share that goal, their differences over Syria’s long-term trajectory are evident, reflecting their long-standing divergence in approaches on regional affairs.  

In addition to Syria and the 2017 Gulf crisis, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one hand and Turkey on the other also found themselves on opposite sides of other regional conflicts, including in Libya and the Horn of Africa. In fact, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi viewed Assad as a counterweight in Syria to the influence Turkey wielded through the rebel factions under its protection in Idlib and the northeast.

At least in the near term, any divergences on Syria will likely do little to disrupt the recent thaw in ties. Since the Al Ula summit of January 2021, all regional actors have sought to bury their differences and prioritize cooperation. And since their rivalry subsided, Ankara and the Gulf states have also upgraded their economic ties, including pursuing a Turkish-GCC free trade agreement, which could potentially create one of the world’s largest free trade areas, with a combined value of $2.4 trillion. Additionally, Ankara’s drone sales to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait highlight all sides’ efforts to strengthen security ties in an increasingly multipolar world. Combined, this suggests that the long-term trajectory of their relations, which they would be highly reluctant to disrupt, could create incentives for cooperating over Syria.

As for Iran, none of the Gulf states wanted to be at the forefront of countering Tehran due to their efforts to de-escalate tensions since 2023 and desire to avoid being drawn into a regional war between Iran and Israel. But they—and Turkey—may be quietly pleased with the degradation of Tehran’s clients in Lebanon and now Syria. Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah—including killing its leader, Hassan Nasrallah in September—coupled with Assad’s downfall has effectively weakened Iran’s regional foothold.

As a result, Saudi Arabia may see an opportunity to reassert its influence in the Levant, particularly in Lebanon, from which Riyadh had recently distanced itself due to Hezbollah’s leverage over the government in Beirut.

Saudi Arabia has also found common ground with Qatar and Turkey in condemning Israel’s seizure of a buffer zone in Syrian territory beyond the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights as well as its attacks on Syrian military assets and weapons depots. And the Gulf states slammed Israel’s plans to double its population in the Golan Heights as an act of “sabotage” against Syria’s sovereignty and stability. Israel is evidently concerned over the Assad regime’s weapons falling into the hands of an Islamist-led government on its doorstep, but Riyadh, Doha and Ankara have warned about the danger of destabilizing Syria at a moment of transition.

Ultimately, Gulf states may hope Turkey’s influence, backed by Western-led incentives, can lead HTS and Syria’s transitional government to moderate. HTS has so far hit all the right notes to win Washington’s approval, promising minority protections and promising to limit al-Bashir’s tenure as prime minister through March 2025. But what comes after that, and whether a new constitution will be drafted in the meantime, remain uncertain.

If the Middle East’s erstwhile rivals take the lead in cooperating to work toward a stable Syria, that could play a crucial role in unifying the country. Yet, if broader efforts to support Syria’s stability falter, or if the post-Assad landscape takes a turn for the worse, regional countries might once again resort to supporting competing Syrian actors that align with their goals, with the potential for friction between them.

For now, though, there is still hope that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Turkey can continue to work together, with the support and backing of the U.S. and other Western nations, to help shape a stable and unified future for Syria.

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