China’s leadership did not welcome the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad late last year. Despite never having intervened militarily in Syria, as did Russia and Iran, China supported the Assad regime diplomatically and symbolically. Usually under the banner of defending Syria’s sovereignty, Beijing joined Moscow in using its veto at the United Nations Security Council 10 times to protect Assad’s government from Western-backed resolutions during the 13 years of the Syrian civil war. China also hosted Assad in Hangzhou in September 2023 as part of a visit that helped shore up his image as a leader who had escaped international isolation.

As a result, in today’s post-Assad Syria, China faces complicated dilemmas. But depending on how developments unfold and how the West ultimately approaches the new powers that be in Damascus, Beijing and the interim Syrian government led by the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, might successfully establish some form of partnership rooted in pragmatism and realpolitik thinking.

China and the Syrian Civil War

When the Arab Uprisings reached Syria in 2011, China opposed regime change in Damascus. This was not necessarily due to any love for the Assad regime per se, but more about Chinese conceptions of “authoritarian stability” and opposition to Western-backed revolutions purportedly in the name of “democracy” and “human rights.”

Chinese officials were suspicious of the West’s potential to gain from Assad’s ouster and worried about “color revolutions” in general. Cases of Western military intervention in Iraq and Libya, in particular, have informed Beijing’s view that such U.S.-led campaigns are messy and destabilizing, and often create problems as bad or worse than the targeted autocratic regimes they replaced. Additionally, Beijing was fearful of the potential for the winds of political change in the Arab world to reach China, at a time when an average of 500 anti-corruption demonstrations a day were taking place there.

Yet talk about China supporting Syria economically during the civil war was frequently exaggerated. Although Beijing and Damascus established a “strategic partnership” during Assad’s 2023 visit to Hangzhou—which itself came 21 months after Syria joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI—bilateral economic ties did not grow enough to come anywhere close to counterbalancing the harmful impact of the West’s stringent sanctions against Syria and the Assad regime. Despite the Syrian government’s hopes that China would invest heavily in the country’s reconstruction after the regime had gained what seemed like a decisive victory over the rebels in 2016-2017, Syria’s investment environment was too unstable for even the historically risk-tolerant Chinese. Given that bilateral trade stood at $541 million in 2022—down from $2 billion in 2011—Syria has clearly not been an attractive market to Chinese firms for many years. Nonetheless, China is a top source of imports for Syria, behind only Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, with the main Chinese exports to Syria being fabric, iron and tires.

The Xinjiang Factor

Throughout the Syrian civil war, Uyghurs from western China’s Xinjiang province traveled to Syria to join the ranks of the jihadist groups fighting the Assad regime. Estimates of how many they numbered vary from a few hundred to 5,000. One media outlet in Dubai put the figure as high as 20,000. The possibility of these violent extremists returning to China has terrified officials in Beijing, which was one more reason why China backed Assad in the conflict. While China has long used the threat of Uyghur militancy as a smokescreen for its oppression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, those fears are not necessarily unfounded with regard to Syria. As one Uyghur militant declared in 2017, “We didn’t care how the fighting went or who Assad was. We just wanted to learn how to use the weapons and then go back to China.”

As Beijing saw it, the fall of Assad always had the potential to create security dilemmas in relation to this issue of radicalized and battle-hardened Uyghurs. China may now perceive those threats as closer to materializing, epitomized by one masked Uyghur militant who, in a video that circulated on the day of Assad’s fall, declared, “We will chase the Chinese infidels away.”

As a result, Beijing is gravely concerned about the militant Uyghurs who remain in post-Assad Syria today, some of them in high-ranking positions. Of particular concern is the Turkestan Islamic Party, or TIP, an al-Qaida-affiliated jihadist organization long allied with HTS. Listed by the U.N. as a terrorist entity, TIP, which mainly comprises Uyghurs and Uzbeks, seeks to form an Islamist state in western China—including Xinjiang—and parts of Central Asia. Established in Pakistan in 1997, TIP moved its fighters to Idlib during the Syrian civil war, after Beijing intensified its pressure on authorities in Pakistan and Afghanistan to go after the group. Designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization until 2020, TIP took part in the HTS-led rebel advance that toppled Assad’s regime late last year. Even if TIP fighters are not able to return to China directly from Syria, their ability to travel to countries that border China alarms policymakers in Beijing.

In response to reports that the new authorities in Damascus are appointing TIP fighters to high-ranking roles within the reconstituted Syrian army, Chinese officials are making clear that the HTS-led government must “fulfil its counterterrorism obligations and to prevent any terrorist forces from using Syrian territory to threaten the security of other countries.” Establishing a healthy relationship with China will likely require HTS to strike a balance between showing gratitude to TIP fighters and assuaging Beijing’s security concerns. Ahmed al-Sharaa—the HTS chief and de facto Syrian leader formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—has previously expressed solidarity with the Uyghurs and their plight of “persecution” under Chinese rule, while also stating that “their struggle against China is not ours.”

Keeping Doors Open

Beijing will likely approach the overall situation carefully, refraining from impulsive decisions vis-à-vis the “New Syria” while possibly trying to use China’s leverage to incentivize the post-Assad government in Damascus to avoid tolerating Uyghur militant groups on Syrian soil. In practice, this could entail China using its veto power at the U.N. Security Council to defend Damascus from any possible action that Western governments might seek to take against HTS down the road, while offering to make major investments in Syria’s war-ravaged economy.

Not wanting post-Assad Syria to be a haven for international terrorist organizations that have their sights on China, officials in Beijing will probably find ways to make the most of the situation and try to work with whatever government emerges in Damascus. Although Syria’s role in the BRI never took off under Assad, China will maintain a long-term perspective on Damascus and see its future relationship with Syria in the context of this ambitious infrastructure development project in the years and decades to come, rather than focus exclusively on short-term prospects. Doing so will require “pragmatic engagement” with Syria’s new leadership.

Politically, China will seek to take advantage of any potential Western missteps in post-Assad Syria. Compared to the current refusal by the U.S. and European Union to de-list the HTS as a terrorist group while leaving in place their heaviest sanctions on Syria, China’s “non-interference” doctrine may appeal to the new Syrian government. With al-Sharaa proving himself to be above all else a pragmatist, the HTS leadership understands the importance of securing partnerships with both regional powers and permanent Security Council members in order to obtain greater legitimacy on the international stage, which is important to the twin challenges of state-building and reconstruction of Syria’s economy.

If Western governments refuse to grant such legitimacy to Syria’s Islamist rebels-turned-rulers, Beijing will likely seize on opportunities to leverage tensions between Damascus and the West in ways that serve China’s own interests. Under such circumstances, HTS-ruled Syria might maintain Damascus’ “Look East” policy from the Assad era, to China’s advantage.

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