Focus on South-Sudan:- Can the 2018 peace deal serve as a permanent foundation, or is it just another fragile truce?
The 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has been central to peace efforts, but its potential as a permanent foundation is highly contested. Here’s a detailed assessment:
1. Strengths of the 2018 Peace Deal-
Inclusive on paper: Unlike earlier deals, it included multiple factions (SPLM-IO, opposition groups, other armed movements).
Power-sharing framework: Allocated government positions to rival leaders, creating incentives to avoid open warfare.
Security arrangements: Proposed integration of forces into a unified national army and reform of the police.
International backing: IGAD, UN, AU, and key donors support the deal with political, technical, and financial assistance.
Transitional government timeline: Provided a roadmap for elections, legislative reform, and national governance institutions.
2. Weaknesses & Fragility-
Elite-centric focus: The deal primarily addresses faction leaders, leaving out civil society, youth, women, and local communities, who bear the brunt of conflict.
Slow implementation: Security sector reform, cantonment of forces, and integration into a unified army are delayed or stalled.
Factionalism within parties: SPLM-IO and other groups remain internally divided; loyalty to leaders often supersedes commitment to the state.
Ethnicized politics: Positions and security arrangements often reinforce ethnic patronage, deepening divisions rather than fostering national unity.
Weak enforcement mechanisms: There is no credible mechanism to punish spoilers; violations often go unchecked.
3. Comparative Lessons-
Mozambique (1992 peace agreement): Integration of armed opposition into politics worked because it included long-term reconciliation, institutional reform, and community-level peacebuilding.
Burundi (1993–2005 agreements): Power-sharing initially reduced violence but entrenched ethnic quotas that later became rigid and politicized.
Sierra Leone (1999 Lome Agreement): Ceasefire and power-sharing reduced immediate conflict but failed to address structural causes; only with DDR programs and international oversight did stability emerge.
Implication for South Sudan: Power-sharing alone is necessary but not sufficient; structural reforms and inclusion are critical.
4. Key Indicators for Durability-
Implementation of security integration: Unified national army and police.
Functioning government institutions: Ministries, courts, and local governance operating without factional obstruction.
Justice and accountability mechanisms: Hybrid court or transitional justice to deter impunity.
Economic reforms: Revenue-sharing, diversification, and service delivery to reduce grievances.
Civil society and grassroots engagement: Peace embedded at local and communal levels, not only among elites.
5. Conclusion-
The 2018 deal can serve as a foundation if:
Delays in army integration, local governance, and transitional justice are resolved.
Power-sharing evolves into institutionalized, not personalist, governance.
Citizens feel tangible benefits: schools, roads, healthcare, markets.
Otherwise, the deal risks being another fragile truce, where elites exchange positions but ordinary South Sudanese continue to experience insecurity, poverty, and marginalization — increasing the likelihood of renewed conflict.
The 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has been central to peace efforts, but its potential as a permanent foundation is highly contested. Here’s a detailed assessment:
1. Strengths of the 2018 Peace Deal-
Inclusive on paper: Unlike earlier deals, it included multiple factions (SPLM-IO, opposition groups, other armed movements).
Power-sharing framework: Allocated government positions to rival leaders, creating incentives to avoid open warfare.
Security arrangements: Proposed integration of forces into a unified national army and reform of the police.
International backing: IGAD, UN, AU, and key donors support the deal with political, technical, and financial assistance.
Transitional government timeline: Provided a roadmap for elections, legislative reform, and national governance institutions.
2. Weaknesses & Fragility-
Elite-centric focus: The deal primarily addresses faction leaders, leaving out civil society, youth, women, and local communities, who bear the brunt of conflict.
Slow implementation: Security sector reform, cantonment of forces, and integration into a unified army are delayed or stalled.
Factionalism within parties: SPLM-IO and other groups remain internally divided; loyalty to leaders often supersedes commitment to the state.
Ethnicized politics: Positions and security arrangements often reinforce ethnic patronage, deepening divisions rather than fostering national unity.
Weak enforcement mechanisms: There is no credible mechanism to punish spoilers; violations often go unchecked.
3. Comparative Lessons-
Mozambique (1992 peace agreement): Integration of armed opposition into politics worked because it included long-term reconciliation, institutional reform, and community-level peacebuilding.
Burundi (1993–2005 agreements): Power-sharing initially reduced violence but entrenched ethnic quotas that later became rigid and politicized.
Sierra Leone (1999 Lome Agreement): Ceasefire and power-sharing reduced immediate conflict but failed to address structural causes; only with DDR programs and international oversight did stability emerge.
Implication for South Sudan: Power-sharing alone is necessary but not sufficient; structural reforms and inclusion are critical.
4. Key Indicators for Durability-
Implementation of security integration: Unified national army and police.
Functioning government institutions: Ministries, courts, and local governance operating without factional obstruction.
Justice and accountability mechanisms: Hybrid court or transitional justice to deter impunity.
Economic reforms: Revenue-sharing, diversification, and service delivery to reduce grievances.
Civil society and grassroots engagement: Peace embedded at local and communal levels, not only among elites.
5. Conclusion-
The 2018 deal can serve as a foundation if:
Delays in army integration, local governance, and transitional justice are resolved.
Power-sharing evolves into institutionalized, not personalist, governance.
Citizens feel tangible benefits: schools, roads, healthcare, markets.
Otherwise, the deal risks being another fragile truce, where elites exchange positions but ordinary South Sudanese continue to experience insecurity, poverty, and marginalization — increasing the likelihood of renewed conflict.
Focus on South-Sudan:- Can the 2018 peace deal serve as a permanent foundation, or is it just another fragile truce?
The 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has been central to peace efforts, but its potential as a permanent foundation is highly contested. Here’s a detailed assessment:
1. Strengths of the 2018 Peace Deal-
Inclusive on paper: Unlike earlier deals, it included multiple factions (SPLM-IO, opposition groups, other armed movements).
Power-sharing framework: Allocated government positions to rival leaders, creating incentives to avoid open warfare.
Security arrangements: Proposed integration of forces into a unified national army and reform of the police.
International backing: IGAD, UN, AU, and key donors support the deal with political, technical, and financial assistance.
Transitional government timeline: Provided a roadmap for elections, legislative reform, and national governance institutions.
2. Weaknesses & Fragility-
Elite-centric focus: The deal primarily addresses faction leaders, leaving out civil society, youth, women, and local communities, who bear the brunt of conflict.
Slow implementation: Security sector reform, cantonment of forces, and integration into a unified army are delayed or stalled.
Factionalism within parties: SPLM-IO and other groups remain internally divided; loyalty to leaders often supersedes commitment to the state.
Ethnicized politics: Positions and security arrangements often reinforce ethnic patronage, deepening divisions rather than fostering national unity.
Weak enforcement mechanisms: There is no credible mechanism to punish spoilers; violations often go unchecked.
3. Comparative Lessons-
Mozambique (1992 peace agreement): Integration of armed opposition into politics worked because it included long-term reconciliation, institutional reform, and community-level peacebuilding.
Burundi (1993–2005 agreements): Power-sharing initially reduced violence but entrenched ethnic quotas that later became rigid and politicized.
Sierra Leone (1999 Lome Agreement): Ceasefire and power-sharing reduced immediate conflict but failed to address structural causes; only with DDR programs and international oversight did stability emerge.
Implication for South Sudan: Power-sharing alone is necessary but not sufficient; structural reforms and inclusion are critical.
4. Key Indicators for Durability-
Implementation of security integration: Unified national army and police.
Functioning government institutions: Ministries, courts, and local governance operating without factional obstruction.
Justice and accountability mechanisms: Hybrid court or transitional justice to deter impunity.
Economic reforms: Revenue-sharing, diversification, and service delivery to reduce grievances.
Civil society and grassroots engagement: Peace embedded at local and communal levels, not only among elites.
5. Conclusion-
The 2018 deal can serve as a foundation if:
Delays in army integration, local governance, and transitional justice are resolved.
Power-sharing evolves into institutionalized, not personalist, governance.
Citizens feel tangible benefits: schools, roads, healthcare, markets.
Otherwise, the deal risks being another fragile truce, where elites exchange positions but ordinary South Sudanese continue to experience insecurity, poverty, and marginalization — increasing the likelihood of renewed conflict.
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