It didn’t take long for Moscow to repeat a long-held demand after talks with the US in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday.

“No Nato membership for Ukraine,” Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, said. “No foreign troops in Ukraine,” he later added.

But there was one concession Russia was willing – potentially even happy –to make: Ukraine joining the European Union.

Vladimir Putin may have invaded Ukraine to reverse its drift into the West’s orbit, but the Kremlin was still happy to state, with no apparent irony, that it was Ukraine’s “sovereign right” to join the EU.

“We are talking about integration and economic integration processes. And here, of course, no one can dictate anything to any country, and we are not going to do that,” the Kremlin said.

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This raises an important question: what’s in it for Russia? The answer may lie in Moscow’s broader objective – eventual reintegration with the West after years in isolation.

‘Disruptive force’

Europe, on the whole, has stood firm in its support for Ukraine.

Barring Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, most EU states have backed military and financial aid for Kyiv. But that doesn’t mean cracks haven’t begun to appear.

Polish farmers have staged periodic demonstrations over the past year, blocking border crossings to protest against what they see as unfair competition from Ukrainian agricultural imports.

Ukraine’s farming sector was crippled by Russia’s invasion, as many of its key export routes through the Black Sea were blocked, while vast areas of farmland were rendered unusable by the war.

To help Kyiv, the EU scrapped tariffs on Ukrainian goods transiting the bloc by road. But a side effect was the accumulation of Ukrainian grain in Poland, undercutting local farmers.

If peace is eventually reached and Ukraine – a major grain producer – joins the EU, it could drive prices down even further, sparking fresh protests in Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary.

Similar disruptions could hit other sectors, such as chemicals and energy.

The EU may also feel increased pressure to support Ukraine economically after the war – especially if Kyiv is forced to sign away $500 billion in rare earth resources to the US in exchange for military aid.

All of this would fuel internal EU tensions, potentially leading to fragmentation and infighting.

Mark Galeotti, director of the London-based think tank Mayak Intelligence and author of Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine, argues that Ukraine’s membership would make it a “very disruptive force” in the EU – something Russia is well aware of.

‘Back door into Europe’

The war is likely to end with some form of frozen conflict. Ukraine may even be forced to make territorial concessions to Russia.

Volodymyr Zelensky has previously acknowledged this possibility, suggesting that lost territories could be reclaimed through diplomacy at a later date.

Such an outcome could offer Russia an economic foothold in Europe, using annexed regions to re-establish trade ties with the EU via Ukraine.

“There is a sense, frankly, that once the war is over and a bit of time has passed, the existing legal and illegal trade between Russia and Ukraine will open up again, and Ukraine will be a back door into European markets,” Mr Galeotti told The Telegraph.

Emily Ferris, a senior Russia analyst at RUSI, suggested Moscow could use Ukraine’s potential EU membership to attract investment into annexed territories.

“It’s all very well annexing this territory, but they also have to finance it,” she told The Telegraph.

“If the annexed territories were to have some sort of trade relationship with Ukraine, legal or illegal, it would give them access to the EU. That could take the pressure off Russia.”

A model already exists: Transnistria, the breakaway Moldovan region aligned with Moscow.

Transnistria’s economy is integrated with the EU despite its ties to Russia, which subsidises the region largely through pension and gas subsidies. Over 80 per cent of the statelet’s exports go to EU member states and Moldova, allowing Moscow a back door into Europe.

A similar setup could emerge in occupied Ukrainian territories, with Russian companies trading via Ukraine, allowing Moscow to profit indirectly from EU market access.

A Trojan horse in the EU?

The third potential benefit for Russia is more speculative – but not implausible.

As Donald Trump pushes for a swift resolution to the war, elections in Ukraine have become a contentious issue.

Mr Trump has accused Mr Zelensky of acting like a “dictator” for not holding elections – despite it being illegal under the Ukrainian constitution to hold a vote during a period of martial law.

White House officials have reportedly floated a plan to implement a temporary ceasefire, hold an election, and then negotiate a final peace deal.

The idea has raised concerns that Russia would seek to manipulate the vote, installing a pro-Kremlin figure in Kyiv.

Indeed, Moscow reportedly planned to install Viktor Medvedchuk, the pro-Russian oligarch, as president after forcing Mr Zelensky to step down.

A Ukraine led by a Kremlin-friendly president – inside the EU – could be a powerful tool for Moscow, Ms Ferris argues.

“It’s not so far from reality to imagine, down the line, the population voting for a president who is advocating for a relationship with Russia,” she said.

This wouldn’t necessarily be a pro-Putin puppet, but rather a “moderate” leader who argues that, while Russia remains an adversary, Ukraine cannot ignore its largest neighbour.

Even the appearance of a vaguely Kremlin-friendly leader in Kyiv would be a coup for Moscow, given its past efforts to sow discord within the EU.

Mr Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister, is the clearest example.

In December 2023, Hungary vetoed a €50 billion EU aid package for Ukraine – just hours after the bloc had agreed to open accession talks with Kyiv.

Mr Fico, Slovakia’s prime minister, meanwhile, recently said Russia’s “serious security concerns” were a justification for launching its war against Ukraine.

Mr Orbán is no Russian puppet, but his alignment with Moscow has been enough to deepen tensions in Brussels.

Ukraine’s bid for EU membership could spark similar divisions long before it is even admitted.

“It puts a terrible dilemma at the feet of the EU,” Mr Galeotti says.

“If the Russians are saying, ‘We’ve got no objection’ – which they have said – then the ball is firmly in the Europeans’ court.”

That could lead to friction within the EU and resentment in Ukraine, especially if Kyiv is forced to endure years of accession hurdles, as has been the case with the Balkans.

“If that sentiment emerges, then that is actually going to be very dangerous for both Ukraine and Europe,” Mr Galeotti warned. “And Russia will have no trouble exploiting it.”

Ukraine joining the EU may not be Moscow’s preferred outcome.

But with Mr Zelensky pushing for membership, it is far less threatening than Ukraine in Nato – and could work to the Kremlin’s advantage.

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