Recently, Taiwan conducted an election among three parties: the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Nationalist or Kuomintang Party (KMT), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). Lai Ching-te, of the DPP, won the presidency. China lobbied hard against Lai, the Vice President and a Harvard-educated medical doctor, close to the United States (herein U.S.), advocating the status quo and democracy, which means a de facto independence from China. What effect will this victory have on the future of Taiwan?

The other major player was Hou Yu-in, of the KMT, who advocated closer relations with China. The third player was Ko Wen-je of the TPP, who also has been described as “China friendly.”

Lai received 40 percent of the vote, Hou 33 percent, and Ko 26 percent. Thus, even though the independence-oriented Lai won the presidency, 59 percent of the vote was “China-friendly.” Also, Lai’s party lost its majority in the legislature. His “agenda will be hamstrung by the DPP losing its majority in the legislature. The Kuomintang’s ability to block Lai will make him look fragile to Beijing…”

Lai, in his post-election comments, emphasized democracy saying the election was “writing a new chapter in our democracy. We have shown the world how much we cherish our democracy…Taiwan will continue to walk side by side with democracies from around the world. … The Taiwanese people have successfully resisted efforts from external forces (i.e., China) to influence this election.” These words by Lai were provocative regarding an authoritarian China and tracked nicely with U.S. foreign policy as being a democratic versus an authoritarian approach to world order. Lai was challenging China.

We cannot let the tail wag the dog in the relationships among Taiwan, the U.S., and China. A vote in Taiwan cannot determine the future of Taiwan in international law and geopolitics. The U.S. recognizes China’s sovereignty over Taiwan in the One-China policy. This is based on sound history. China’s claim goes back to at least the 17th Century. The U.S. created a fiction, after the Communist Party took over authority in Beijing in 1949, that the Republic of China in Taiwan was the government of all of China, and as being the representative of said China in the UN. Moreover, once President Carter recognized the regime in Beijing as the government of China in 1979, with Taiwan as part of it as a result of the Shanghai Communique by of 1972, the U.S. tried to have it both ways by passing the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, whereby it arranged to provide Taiwan with military weapons to defend itself. In fact, U.S. policy toward a Chinese attack is known as “strategic ambiguity,” a threat that leaves something to chance. The Taiwanese worry about the effects of 1979.

From a geopolitical perspective, Taiwan is a mere 100 miles off China’s coast. As we move to a multipolar world, with China as a great power, the U.S. will have no business operating right off of China’s coast, as China should not operate in Cuba off the U.S. coast. Regional balance of power may well be the formula for peace in the coming multipolar world order.

Taiwan is an attractive polity. According to Nicholas Kristof, who lived in Taiwan in the 1980s studying the Chinese language, and who has visited frequently, Taiwan is today “a thriving democracy with a free press and excellent quality of life…a first-rate national health system, legalized same-sex marriage and greatly expanded opportunities for women and girls, longer life expectancy than the United States, minimal homelessness, safe from crime … with some of the best food in the world.”

A democratic vote in Taiwan will not determine its future. Diplomacy, hopefully not war, taking account of international law and multipolar power politics, will. This is reality. The U.S. cannot control Taiwan’s future, and we do not need to risk a nuclear war to try.