On May 2, 2025, a Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessel (USV) armed with R-73 air-to-air missiles shot down a Russian Su-30SM naval fighter jet approximately 50 km west of Novorossiysk—marking a first in aviation history.

The Su-30SM, a naval variant comparable to the Indian Air Force’s Su-30MKI, had reportedly taken off from Saki Air Base on Crimea’s western coast.

The pilots ejected safely and were later rescued by a civilian cargo vessel. Ukrainian USVs were seen surrounding the downed crew during their descent into the sea, but made no attempt to interfere with the rescue. This inaction was likely due to limited situational awareness on the part of the USV operators.

A video released by Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) shows the missile strike and subsequent destruction of the aircraft, with large fragments of wreckage plunging into the sea.

Past Incident

The May 2 incident wasn’t unprecedented. On December 31, 2024, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (HUR) reported that a Magura V5 naval drone, armed with R-73 air-to-air missiles, had shot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter near Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea—marking the first time a sea drone downed an aircraft in combat.

The latest shootdown has sparked criticism among military analysts, especially in Russia. Unsurprisingly, many have questioned why the Russian military failed to adapt its tactics following the December incident.

In the following analysis, we examine the conditions surrounding the Su-30SM’s downing and explore the broader challenges posed by missile-armed USVs.

Emerging Threat

Russia initially countered Ukrainian kamikaze and reconnaissance USVs (Unmanned Surface Vessels) using fighter jets and armed helicopters. Helicopters, with their agility and lower speeds, proved more lethal, but fighters, due to their speed, offered quicker response times.

To reduce the chances of interception, Ukraine—reportedly with British support—began arming USVs. Early trials used air defense guns, later evolving to include MLRS systems, AD missiles, and FPV drones.

By May 2024, Ukraine had equipped some USVs with R-60 and R-73 air-to-air missiles. These IR-guided missiles didn’t require precise aiming before launch, making them well-suited for sea-based platforms.

Integrating such missiles was no trivial feat. It required an improvised launcher on a gyro-stabilized mount to offset wave motion, coordinated with the USV’s autopilot, cruise control, and operator datalink.

That same month, a Ukrainian USV attempted—but failed—to shoot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter, marking the beginning of a dramatic shift in naval warfare.

Ukrainian Tactics

The location of the Su-30SM shootdown is particularly significant. Ukrainian USVs had skirted Crimea’s coastline and assembled near Russia’s Novorossiysk coast—deep inside contested waters and far from Ukrainian shores.

The tactics used to bring down the Russian fighter appear consistent with those employed during the December 2024 Mi-8 shootdown.

A flotilla of 20–30 USVs—each configured for a specific role, such as air defense (equipped with R-73 missiles), reconnaissance, or kamikaze strikes—quietly converged off the Russian coast. They likely loitered in wait, undetected, forming an ambush group.

Their ability to operate covertly close to Russian territory suggests real-time situational awareness, possibly enabled by Western aerial and satellite ISR platforms. Notably, the ambush was likely staged around 50 km from the coast, beyond the reach of Russia’s routine coastal patrols.

The operation likely unfolded with one or more reconnaissance USVs acting as bait, provoking a response from Russian defenses. As Russian fighters launched in pursuit, they flew into a pre-set kill zone, where USVs armed with heat-seeking R-73 missiles lay in wait.

Challenges Faced by Russia

The most effective counter to the growing Ukrainian USV threat would be sustained maritime patrols over the Black Sea, ideally using platforms like the IL-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft or a MALE drone such as the Orion.

However, the Russian Navy likely operates a limited number of IL-38s, and the Orion drone may lack the advanced sensors and endurance needed for wide-area maritime surveillance.

While there have been reports of Orion drones successfully engaging USVs in the past, their relatively slow speed limits their ability to reposition and respond rapidly to fast-moving threats.

Are Russian Fighter Pilots Incompetent

The shootdown of a Russian fighter by a Ukrainian USV is undoubtedly a landmark moment in military history, and Ukrainian forces deserve full credit for pulling it off. Yet from a technical standpoint, downing a fighter jet is not necessarily more difficult than shooting down a helicopter, for two key reasons.

First, during an anti-USV mission, a fighter aircraft is likely to operate at only slightly higher speeds than a helicopter, but with significantly reduced maneuverability.

At low altitude, high speed makes it difficult for the pilot to dive accurately and track a small, fast-moving sea target. In such missions, a fighter’s main advantage over a helicopter is its ability to reach the area of engagement more quickly.

Second, an R-73 missile launched from the surface has a better chance of achieving a strong infrared lock on an airborne target late in the evening, due to the absence of background thermal clutter like the sun or ground reflections. In air-to-air scenarios, such clutter can reduce missile lock-on reliability.

Despite repeated encounters, Russia has yet to field an effective solution to Ukraine’s kamikaze and missile-armed USVs — but to be fair, no country in the world has. The speed, low profile, and swarm tactics of these naval drones present a novel threat that existing naval doctrines and systems are not yet prepared to address.

It’s also important to note that the May 2 attack wasn’t a standalone USV strike. It was part of a coordinated, multi-domain saturation assault involving naval and aerial drones.

According to Rybar, some USVs carry onboard FPV drones. Meanwhile, the long-range aerial drones that struck Novorossiysk reportedly originated from the Odessa region—a further testament to Ukraine’s evolving operational sophistication.