Will the ongoing restructuring of the Department of State under the Trump presidency further diminish the United States’ role in the world, ultimately benefiting China’s rising international stature? 

The answer is “yes”, if one goes by the ranking Democratic Senators; the American Foreign Service Association, a union that represents tens of thousands of former and current diplomats; and a section of the ruling Republicans and officials who have served under Trump during his first term and other  Republican Administrations.

However, for Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his senior officials, the restructuring was long overdue, as many of the offices being eliminated are either no longer relevant, duplicative, or doing things far beyond their original purpose.

Accordingly, on the morning of July 11, the State Department issued a Reduction in Force (RIF) to 1,106 civil servants and 250 foreign service officers stationed in the U.S., with plans to further reduce its workforce by up to 3,000 personnel. July 14 became their last working day, on which they were to return all official belongings.

Simultaneously, the Department is reportedly closing or merging scores of U.S.-based offices and rearranging its organizational chart shortly after. “It’s not a consequence of trying to get rid of people. But if you close the bureau, you don’t need those positions. Understand that some of these are positions that are being eliminated, not people,” Rubio has said.

Soon after taking over, Rubio had described his department as “bloated, bureaucratic, and unable to perform its essential diplomatic mission in this new era of great power competition”. He had said it was “beholden to radical political ideology”.

In fact, Rubio had intimated to the U.S. Congress in April his plan to restructure the State Department. On May 29, he had submitted a detailed reorganization plan to the latter. His plan aimed to close 132 of the Department of State’s 734 offices and cut its personnel by 15%.

In a press statement on the same day, Rubio has underlined that “The plan submitted to Congress was the result of thoughtful and deliberative work by senior Department leadership. We have taken into account feedback from lawmakers, bureaus, and long-serving employees. The reorganization plan will result in a more agile Department, better equipped to promote America’s interests and keep Americans safe across the world”.

However, all Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were upset, and they penned a letter to Rubio on July 11, denouncing the RIFs.

“During a time of increasingly complex and widespread challenges to U.S. national security, this administration should be strengthening our diplomatic corps—an irreplaceable instrument of U.S. power and leadership—not weakening it,” the senators wrote. “However, RIFs would severely undermine the Department’s ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy interests, putting our nation’s security, strength, and prosperity at risk.”

Ex-foreign service officers and labor unions have also sharply criticized the cuts. In a statement, the American Foreign Service Association has said that the layoffs are an indication to allies that the U.S. is retreating from the global arena.

“As allies look to the U.S. for reassurance and rivals test for weakness, the administration has chosen to sideline the very professionals best equipped to navigate this moment,” it said, adding that “Meanwhile, countries like China continue expanding their diplomatic reach and influence.”

According to Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), “There are active conflicts and humanitarian crises in Ukraine, Sudan, Gaza, Haiti, and Myanmar—to name a few. Now is the time to strengthen our diplomatic hand, not weaken it. From pursuing peaceful resolutions to out-competing China diplomatically and economically, we can’t afford to not have experienced diplomats at the table”.

Incidentally, many of the reductions-in-force affected offices that were slated for elimination or cuts, including those focused on refugees, human rights, and foreign assistance. The cuts included nearly all civil service officers in the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration office of admissions. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s entire global programs office, which handles foreign assistance, was also let go.

Under the new scheme, the Bureau of democracy, Human Rights, and Labor will be folded into a new office of Foreign Assistance and Human Rights.  Rubio, it may be noted, was a strong critic of the former arrangement, which, according to him, “provided a fertile environment for activists to redefine ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ and to pursue their projects at the taxpayer expense.”

Similarly, for him, the previous bureau of population, refugees, and migration “funneled millions of taxpayer dollars to international organizations and NGOs that facilitated mass migration around the world, including the invasion of our southern border.”

However, the restructuring will make China happier than even President Trump, critics say.

For them, some of the abolished offices would minimize diplomatic interactions with many countries with which China has been wooing lately.

Against the backdrop of President Trump’s aggressive tariff policy and China’s concerted efforts to woo countries in the region, the moves will hand the advantage to Beijing in the global contest for influence, so runs their argument.

Examples they cite are the following:

There will now be no office of Multilateral Affairs within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, which managed U.S. engagement with the  Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and coordinated the diplomatic response to China’s aggression in the South China Sea. Beijing has also been seeking to pick off U.S. partners in Southeast Asia one by one, enticing them with infrastructure projects.

There will also be no office of Security and Transnational Affairs in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, which handled hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign assistance programs and dealt with issues related to technology and security involving the “Quad” that included  Australia, India, and Japan to counter China’s assertiveness in the region.

Technologists and scientists who have been fired include experts in artificial intelligence and those who worked in the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, which handles U.S. engagement with partner countries to prevent China from prevailing in AI and 5G wireless technologies, as well as in global data policy.

Given these examples, Henrietta  Levin, former deputy China coordinator for global affairs at the Department of State in the Biden administration has lamented how “ from the perspective of competing with China in the Indo-Pacific, it is confounding to see the State Department eliminate teams responsible for some of the most critical elements of that competition, even as Rubio claims that China is his number one priority”.

In other words, the main contention of the critics is that cuts to the numerous Asian bureaus and offices are hindering the American presence in precisely the key battlegrounds of Sino-American competition for influence, with Southeast Asia being a prime example.

For them, the most effective way to counter China’s military and economic coercion in the region involves strengthening alliances and crafting strategic partnerships with the affected countries, but the Trump administration is cutting foreign aid and the diplomats who know how to engage in this critical region.

The American Academy of Diplomacy, which represents former ambassadors,  has  accused Rubio of gutting the department’s institutional knowledge and called the move “an act of vandalism.”

And Thomas Shannon, a former undersecretary of state in the previous Trump administration, has viewed the exercise as something “ that  isn’t just about trimming fat,” as in the process, “We’re removing a significant chunk of our civil service and foreign service employees and restructuring in ways that reflect a diminished global agenda.”

But are all these criticisms fair?

All told, if one studies the proposed organization chart carefully, offices may have been disbanded and manpower trimmed, but the facts remain that many of their functions overlapped, and some of them were outdated.

For instance, South China Sea issues were being handled by three different offices, including the Multilateral Affairs Office, within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP).

The Multilateral Affairs Office once handled foreign assistance to countries in the region. That responsibility will now move to the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau’s Office of Regional and Security Policy Affairs, which will also lead coordination on regional security issues and policy engagement with the Quad.

Reportedly, ASEAN functions will be transferred to the ASEAN mission office in Jakarta, Indonesia. Another office that handled maritime Southeast Asia issues will be merged into a new Office of Southeast Asian Affairs. That office will also be responsible for bilateral engagement on South China Sea issues with Southeast Asian states.

Incidentally, no important offices have been eliminated. All the regional bureaus (Africa, Europe, South and Central Asia, etc.) remain in place. Policy planning is still operational. A few specialist offices have been relocated to more logical and sensible locations. For example, the Bureau of Counterterrorism has been moved from political affairs to arms control and international security.

Viewed thus, reorganization can be said to be significant, but it does not look as radical as its critics project it to be.

It is worth noting that in May, a federal judge temporarily blocked the attempt to downsize. However, on July 8, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it could continue, similar to other RIFs, although it allowed plaintiffs some leeway to challenge plans of individual agencies in the future.

It is also noteworthy that the present Trump administration is not the first to moot the idea of restructuring the State Department.

The administration of George H.W. Bush had requested permission from Congress to reorganize the bureaucracy, better equipping it for the post-Cold War era. However, Congress did not agree.

President Bill Clinton, too, had tried, and Congress agreed to a few, not all, of his suggestions. During Trump’s first term, his Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, also proposed a “redesign” plan, which Congress subsequently watered down through its funding of certain projects, but not others.

Ultimately, the macro-restructuring plan of any federal office, along with its budgetary needs, must be approved by the U.S. Congress. It remains to be seen what will be Rubio’s fate.