The proliferation of Islamic terror groups in West Africa presents a multifaceted and escalating threat to regional and international security. This report details the complex web of sponsorship and funding mechanisms that sustain groups such as ISIS–West Africa (ISIS-WA/ISWAP), Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). While direct state sponsorship, as defined by the United States Department of State, is not evident within West Africa, a critical form of enablement arises from permissive state environments characterized by weak governance, corruption, and ungoverned territories. These conditions allow terror groups to organize, plan, raise funds, and operate with relative impunity.

The financial resilience of these groups stems from a "hybrid economy" that combines local illicit activities—including kidnapping for ransom, extortion, taxation of communities, cattle rustling, and trafficking in drugs, arms, and cultural property—with external financial support. Notably, there is an increasing reliance on virtual assets for international transfers and donations. Material and logistical support, particularly arms trafficking, is fueled by diverted military stocks, legacy weapons from past conflicts, and flows from unstable regions like Libya, often facilitated by porous borders and corrupt officials.

Beyond direct support, the exploitation of deep-seated socio-economic vulnerabilities, humanitarian crises, and the disruption of essential services like education and healthcare serve as de facto forms of sponsorship, eroding state legitimacy and creating a fertile ground for recruitment. The evolving geopolitical landscape, marked by a shift from Western to non-traditional military partnerships, further complicates counter-terrorism efforts, potentially creating avenues for proxy conflicts. Countering these networks necessitates a comprehensive, adaptive approach that integrates robust financial intelligence, targeted sanctions, enhanced regional cooperation, and long-term strategies to address underlying governance and socio-economic challenges.

I. Introduction: The Evolving Threat Landscape in West Africa-

West Africa and the Sahel region have become a global hotspot for extremist groups, experiencing a significant and escalating threat from various Islamic terror organizations. The 2025 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) highlights the severity of this crisis, with the Sahel accounting for 19 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide and a staggering 51 percent of global terrorism-related deaths in 2024, an increase from 48 percent in 2023. Five of the ten countries most affected by terrorism globally are located within the Sahel. This pervasive insecurity has progressively spread southward, raising alarms about potential spillover into previously stable coastal states like Benin and Togo, which have seen a rise in attacks.

Overview of Prominent Islamic Terror Groups-

The primary actors driving this instability include several highly lethal and adaptive groups, each with distinct origins and operational profiles, yet often collaborating or competing for influence and resources:

• ISIS–West Africa (ISIS-WA/ISWAP): This formidable group emerged in 2015 when Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS, adopting the name ISIS–West Africa. It stands as one of ISIS's largest and most lethal branches, exerting control over broad swathes of territory and causing widespread displacement and thousands of casualties in Nigeria and neighboring countries. The group's overarching objective is to establish an ISIS caliphate in the region. ISIS-WA actively collaborates with ISIS-Sahel and engages in conflict with former Boko Haram members who splintered from the group. Its operational area primarily encompasses northeastern Nigeria, with activities extending throughout the Lake Chad region, bordering Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. With an estimated 4,000 to 7,000 fighters, ISIS-WA employs tactics such as ambushes, military-style assaults, roadside bombs, kidnappings, and targeted killings, utilizing small arms, vehicle-mounted weapons, RPGs, mines, and IEDs. Their targets predominantly include regional military forces, civilian defense groups, government personnel and infrastructure, foreign aid workers (for kidnapping), and Christians. The U.S. State Department designated ISIS-WA as a foreign terrorist organization in February 2018.

• Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM): As a significant al-Qaida affiliate, JNIM was formed in March 2017 through the merger of several prominent jihadist groups in Mali, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and Ansar Dine. Since its formation, JNIM has intensified violence across the Sahel, notably gaining control over territory in northern and central Mali. The group has also pushed southward, posing a direct threat to the security of West Africa's relatively stable coastal states. JNIM has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including those in Benin and Togo, with a notable increase in fatalities in Togo in 2024.

• Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS): This group surfaced in Burkina Faso in September 2016, marking its emergence with a major attack on a border post near Markoye. ISGS has contributed significantly to the intensification of violence in the Sahel. However, due to ongoing clashes with JNIM that began in 2020, ISGS has largely been confined to northern Burkina Faso and western Niger.

• Boko Haram: While the original Boko Haram group saw a splinter faction remain active until 2021, its leader was ultimately killed by ISWAP, which subsequently absorbed its territory and members. Historically, Boko Haram was responsible for a dramatic increase in terrorist attacks in Nigeria, with 136 attacks in 2011 (up from 31 in 2010) and 364 attacks killing 1,132 people in 2012.

• Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): AQIM maintains operational bases in several West African countries and has established tactical alliances with other regional terrorist groups, including Boko Haram, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), and Ansar Eddine. These alliances often involve AQIM providing crucial training and logistical support to its partners.

Contextual Factors Contributing to the Rise of Terrorism-

The escalating terrorist threat in West Africa is not merely a consequence of the groups' operational capabilities but is deeply rooted in a confluence of systemic vulnerabilities and socio-economic challenges within the region:

• Weak Governance: Extremist groups adeptly exploit the pervasive weak governance, corruption, democratic backsliding, legitimacy deficits, and human rights violations that plague many West African states. State power often remains concentrated in southern, urban centers, leaving vast rural and northern areas underdeveloped, neglected, and ripe for exploitation by these groups. This absence of effective state control functions as a de facto form of enablement, allowing terrorist organizations to thrive. When governments fail to provide basic security, justice, and services, a vacuum is created that these groups eagerly fill, establishing their own forms of "governance" and "protection". This systemic failure of state institutions is a critical factor, as it permits terrorist groups to operate in relative security and expand their influence.

• Economic Hardship and Social Divisions: Poor economic conditions, including widespread poverty and high unemployment, coupled with existing social divisions, are consistently exploited by terror groups to attract new members. The promise of financial gain or a sense of belonging can be compelling in environments where legitimate opportunities are scarce.

• Intercommunal Tensions: Extremist groups skillfully manipulate and exacerbate pre-existing intercommunal tensions, particularly those arising from resource scarcity and land use disputes. By fueling these conflicts, they expand their influence and further destabilize local communities, often positioning themselves as protectors of one group against another.

• Humanitarian Crises: Acute humanitarian crises, marked by mass displacement, food insecurity, and widespread poverty, significantly exacerbate the threat of violent extremism. These dire conditions are exploited by groups for recruitment and to assert control over vulnerable populations. The resulting instability creates a vicious cycle where terrorism causes humanitarian crises, which in turn generate more vulnerabilities that terror groups exploit, thereby fueling their resilience and growth.

Table 1: Key Islamic Terror Groups in West Africa: Operational Scope and Affiliations

II. State-Level Influence and Permissive Environments-

The concept of "sponsorship" for Islamic terror groups in West Africa extends beyond formal, overt state support, encompassing a complex interplay of state weaknesses, alleged complicity, and shifting geopolitical dynamics that inadvertently or directly facilitate terrorist operations.

Analysis of Officially Designated "State Sponsors of Terrorism"-

The United States Department of State maintains a specific designation for "State Sponsors of Terrorism," applied to countries that have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism". As of 2025, this list includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria. It is important to note that no West African countries are currently on this official list. This distinction is crucial because it highlights that the primary form of state-related facilitation in West Africa is not typically direct, overt governmental sponsorship, but rather a more nuanced and often indirect enablement. The absence of a formal designation does not negate the significant role that state-related factors play in the region's terrorism landscape.

Discussion of "Terrorist Safe Havens" and Ungoverned Territories-

A more prevalent and impactful form of state-level influence in West Africa manifests through the existence of "terrorist safe havens" and extensive ungoverned territories. Poorly governed regions across the Trans-Sahara, notably in Mali, Somalia, and Libya, are explicitly identified as areas where terrorist groups find sanctuary. These permissive environments are critical for terrorist operations, allowing groups to "organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security".

In Libya, for instance, porous borders and fragmented security forces contribute to vast ungoverned spaces that terrorist groups exploit. The 2011 conflict in Libya had a profound and lasting impact on regional security, leading to a significant proliferation of weapons that flooded into the Sahel, further arming extremist groups. The consistent mention of "weak governance," "limited state presence," and "ungoverned areas" across various analyses underscores a fundamental point: the absence of effective state control functions as a de facto form of sponsorship. This is not active provision of support, but rather a passive enablement that allows terrorist groups to establish bases, consolidate power, and expand their activities without significant governmental impediment. This systemic failure of state institutions creates a fertile ground for terrorist operations and fosters a degree of self-sufficiency for these groups, making the "governance vacuum" a critical enabler of terrorism in the region.

Examination of Alleged Support from Corrupt Officials-

Beyond the broad issue of ungoverned spaces, there are concerning allegations of more direct, albeit covert, support from within state structures. Reports indicate the "alleged provision of support by certain West African politicians and public officials to terrorist and likeminded groups". Furthermore, connections between illicit trafficking networks and institutional, political, and security authorities at various levels of the Nigerien government are said to facilitate the movement of illegal arms.

This points to a more insidious form of state-related enablement: internal complicity or corruption within the state apparatus. If elements within West African governments are providing direct support or facilitating illicit activities that benefit terror groups, it profoundly undermines national and international counter-terrorism efforts. This internal vulnerability suggests that the problem is not solely about external threats or general state weakness, but also about the exploitation of internal systemic flaws by these groups. Such complicity makes counter-terrorism efforts significantly more complex, requiring not only external assistance but also deep-seated internal reforms to address corruption and strengthen the integrity of state institutions.

The Impact of Shifting Geopolitical Alliances and Non-Traditional Military Partnerships-

A significant and evolving trend shaping regional dynamics is the growing political divergence between some Sahelian countries and traditional Western powers, coupled with an increasing reliance on non-traditional military partnerships. This includes the engagement of mercenary groups, most notably the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group). This shift is exemplified by requests from countries like Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal for the withdrawal of French military forces in late 2024, signaling a pivotal change in a region where France historically maintained a substantial military presence.

Russia's expanding influence in the region and its deepening ties with military juntas are a growing concern for the United States and European Council members. Russia has actively increased its military cooperation with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—deploying Africa Corps personnel and delivering significant military assets, including armored vehicles, tanks, and weapon systems, to Mali. This strategic pivot is partly influenced by global events; the collapse of Assad's government in Syria in December 2024 disrupted Russia's logistical operations, prompting a shift of military assets from Syria to other regions, including eastern Libya, and a reinforcement of its partnership with Mali's junta.

The West African theater is increasingly becoming a ground for proxy conflicts between global powers. Reports of Ukraine's intelligence agency playing a role in an ambush targeting Malian forces and Russia's Wagner Group, reportedly involving Tuareg rebels and JNIM militants, highlight this dynamic. This situation indicates that the region's instability is not solely an internal issue or a simple counter-terrorism challenge; it is being influenced and potentially exacerbated by broader geopolitical rivalries. Terrorist groups, in this context, may inadvertently or intentionally become instruments or beneficiaries of these larger power struggles, receiving indirect support or exploiting the resulting chaos and increased arms flows. This significantly complicates counter-terrorism strategies, as addressing terrorism now requires navigating intricate international relations and carefully avoiding actions that could inadvertently fuel these proxy conflicts.

III. Non-State Funding Mechanisms and Illicit Financial Flows-

The financial sustenance of Islamic terror groups in West Africa is derived from a sophisticated and diversified network of revenue generation, operating both internally within the region and through external channels. This "hybrid economy" allows these groups to maintain resilience and adapt to counter-terrorism efforts.

Internal Revenue Generation-

Terrorist groups in West Africa have become adept at generating substantial revenue from local illicit activities, deeply embedding themselves within the region's informal and criminal economies:

• Extortion and Taxation: ISIS-WA, particularly through its Al-Furqan Office, generates significant revenue by extorting local populations and demanding ransom for kidnappings. The group is known to commit violent acts against those who refuse to comply with their demands. Similarly, ISIS-Sahel collects money through Islamic almsgiving (zakat) and from the spoils of war. JNIM also relies heavily on extortion, targeting transit routes under its control and communities engaged in artisanal mining. The group also collects zakat, which it sometimes redistributes to those in need, a practice appreciated by the poor. Jihadist groups frequently impose taxes on farmers, livestock herders, and workers in other economic sectors, such as mining.

• Kidnapping for Ransom: This remains a major and highly profitable source of revenue for groups like ISIS-WA/Al-Furqan Office and JNIM. Westerners are frequently targeted, as their countries are often known to pay ransoms for their release.

• Exploitation of Local Economies and Illicit Trade: Boko Haram, for instance, funds its activities through trade in goods such as dried fish. Cattle rustling has been identified as a unique and highly profitable terrorist financing risk specific to the West and Central African region. The pervasive weak economies and the proliferation of extremist groups have led to an increase in illicit activities and the growth of criminal organizations, creating a fertile ground for terrorist financing.

• Trafficking of Cultural Property: A concerning development is the increasing link between terrorism and the illicit trafficking of cultural property. Evidence suggests connections between terrorist and organized crime groups in the illegal extraction and trade of antiquities in the Sahel. This illicit trade is used by terrorist groups to launder money, fund other criminal activities, and even bolster their propaganda by exploiting cultural heritage. It is considered the third most significant illicit activity globally, after drug and arms trafficking.

The detailed examination of these internal funding mechanisms reveals that these groups operate a sophisticated "hybrid economy." They are not solely dependent on external benefactors but are deeply integrated into local illicit activities, exploiting existing vulnerabilities and even providing a semblance of "governance" or "protection" in areas where state presence is minimal or absent. This means that disrupting their financial networks requires comprehensive strategies that go beyond traditional financial interdiction, focusing on dismantling local criminal enterprises and addressing the systemic conditions that allow such economies to flourish. The groups' ability to become self-sustaining through these means makes them more resilient and challenging to dislodge through purely external counter-terrorism financing methods.