External Financial Support Networks-

Despite their robust internal revenue generation, West African terror groups also leverage external financial support, adapting their methods to evade detection:

• Funding from ISIS Core: ISIS-WA/Al-Furqan Office receives direct funding from ISIS Core, based in Iraq and Syria. ISIS Core maintains significant financial reserves (nearly $10 million) and employs international fundraising and recruitment networks to sustain its global insurgency. Regional ISIS offices in Africa collectively hold approximately $2 million in reserves, and ISIS senior leadership encourages them to generate their own revenue to supplement these funds.

• International Donations and Virtual Assets: ISIS branches in Africa, including ISIS-WA, receive funding from wealthy donors and business owners. A notable trend observed since January 2024 is the significant increase in ISIS's use of virtual assets (cryptocurrencies) for organizational transfers and donations from international supporters. ISIS senior leaders view converting fiat currency into virtual assets as a way to protect dwindling reserves and transfer funds from Iraq and Syria to other branches. Some ISIS branches have shifted away from cash transfers, which carry risks of couriers being caught, to virtual assets, which they perceive as more secure. This increasing reliance on virtual assets by ISIS signifies a critical evolution in terror financing, moving beyond traditional banking systems. This highlights the global interconnectedness of terror finance, where funding from a central ISIS entity or international donors can reach West African affiliates anonymously and efficiently, demanding a more technologically advanced counter-financing approach.

• Al-Qaeda Affiliates (e.g., JNIM, AQIM): Al-Qaeda affiliates in West Africa, such as JNIM, may benefit from foreign donations. Al-Qaeda's broader financing model relies on a core group of financial facilitators who raise money from a diverse range of donors, particularly in Gulf countries, with Saudi Arabia being a significant source. Funds are sourced from both witting and unwitting donors, mosques, sympathetic imams, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or charities. The hawala system, an informal value transfer network, is extensively utilized for anonymous money transfers due to its cash-based nature and lack of formal records. Additionally, precious metals and gemstones are used as easily transferable assets that can be converted to cash in various markets across the region.

Table 2: Primary Funding Mechanisms by Terror Group in West Africa

Table 3: Major Illicit Financial Flows and Support Channels

Arms Trafficking and Logistical Support-

The operational capacity of terror groups in West Africa is heavily dependent on their access to weaponry, which flows through complex and often illicit supply chains:

• Primary Sources of Weapons: A significant portion of firearms in the Sahel originates from the diversion of weapons from national armed forces. This occurs through various means, including capture on the battlefield, theft from armories, and purchase from corrupt elements within the military. Additionally, legacy firearms from previous conflicts, such as the 1990 Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger, and the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflicts, continue to circulate within the region. Libya has emerged as a crucial source, with weapons pilfered from the 2011 conflict and newly manufactured arms entering the black market since 2019. Artisanal production of weapons also contributes to the supply.

• Key Illicit Arms Trade Routes and Methods: Weapons enter the Sahel through a combination of legal transfers, black markets, and "gray markets" where state actors may be involved in illicit diversions. Niger serves as a primary transit country for arms flowing from Libya, utilizing millennia-old trans-Sahelian trade routes that extend into Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. Traffickers exploit lesser-known routes, porous borders, and areas with limited state presence to evade security forces. Coastal West Africa also acts as a source, with arms converging at cities along the Senegal River, forming major trafficking hubs. The control of transportation routes by militant groups is crucial for successful arms trafficking, enabling them to tax and protect their goods.

• Nexus with Other Organized Criminal Activities: Arms trafficking is deeply intertwined with other transnational organized crimes, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, and general banditry. Terrorist groups are frequently the main criminal actors involved in arms trafficking in the region. This symbiotic relationship between terrorism and organized crime is a critical aspect of their operational model. It means that "sponsorship" is not merely about direct funding but also about the creation and exploitation of criminal ecosystems that mutually benefit both terrorist groups and various criminal networks. Consequently, counter-terrorism efforts must be integrated with broader anti-crime and anti-corruption strategies, as disrupting one network can significantly impact the other.

Table 4: Sources and Routes of Illicit Arms in West Africa-

IV. Vulnerabilities Exploited: Socio-Economic and Humanitarian Context-

The enduring presence and expansion of Islamic terror groups in West Africa are inextricably linked to the exploitation of profound socio-economic and humanitarian vulnerabilities. These factors, while not direct "sponsors," create a permissive environment that facilitates recruitment, sustains operations, and entrenches the groups within local communities.

Deep Dive into How Weak Governance, Corruption, and Lack of Public Services Create Fertile Ground-

Jihadist groups in West Africa strategically capitalize on years of minimal state presence, the declining provision of government services, and what is often perceived as the "empty talk of 'Western-style' governance". In these neglected areas, groups like ISGS and JNIM actively present themselves as a viable alternative to the state, stepping in to provide essential goods and services to local constituents. By doing so, they implement their own social and economic structures, effectively cementing their territorial influence and strategic advantage.

This approach creates a "legitimacy vacuum" that these groups skillfully fill. When citizens witness their governments failing to provide basic security, justice, education, or healthcare, their faith in state institutions erodes, making them more susceptible to alternative—and often radical—ideologies offered by extremist groups. This is a profound dynamic because it frames recruitment and local support as a form of "sponsorship" driven by state failure, rather than solely by ideological indoctrination. It underscores that effective counter-terrorism must involve robust state-building, consistent service provision, and genuine efforts to address the root causes of grievances, thereby denying terrorists this crucial form of "social sponsorship" and undermining their claims to legitimacy.

The Exacerbating Role of Humanitarian Crises, Food Insecurity, and Mass Displacement-

The region's severe humanitarian crises are not merely collateral damage of terrorism but are actively exploited by these groups, creating a vicious cycle of instability. Terrorism and humanitarian crises profoundly threaten the stability and development of West Africa. The exponential rise in terrorism over the last decade has reversed significant development gains, a situation further exacerbated by unconstitutional changes of government.

Violent attacks increasingly target civilians, leading to massive population displacements. For example, Burkina Faso alone saw an estimated 2.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) by March 2023, with 5.9 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2025. Food insecurity is significantly aggravated by the ongoing violence, leading to severe malnutrition and risks of famine, as access to agricultural fields and markets becomes challenging. While climate change does not directly cause terrorism, it acts as a powerful catalyst for localized conflicts driven by disrupted agricultural production patterns and resource scarcity, which extremist groups then exploit for their own ends.

This dynamic illustrates a self-perpetuating mechanism of terror: the devastating impact of terrorist actions on civilian populations and their livelihoods becomes a direct source of the groups' resilience and growth. By creating and exploiting these crises, terror groups gain access to vulnerable populations for recruitment and control. Therefore, counter-terrorism efforts must integrate humanitarian and development aid to break this cycle, recognizing that these are not separate issues but interconnected challenges.

Impact of Terrorism on Critical Sectors like Education and Healthcare-

The deliberate targeting and disruption of essential public services by terror groups have profound long-term consequences, effectively undermining the future capacity of the state and society:

• Education: The right to education is severely violated in conflict-affected communities, with nearly two million children in West and Central Africa being deprived of schooling due to violence and insecurity around their schools. Schools are often targeted as symbols of the state and Western education, leading to closures, abductions and killings of teachers, and the torching and looting of facilities. This creates a pervasive sense of fear, forcing children to stay home and significantly increasing their risk of recruitment by armed groups. By denying access to education, terror groups not only destabilize the present but also contribute to the creation of a disenfranchised generation susceptible to radicalization, effectively "sponsoring" future recruits through systemic deprivation.

• Healthcare: Pre-existing, often subpar, healthcare systems in low- and middle-income countries are severely aggravated by terrorism. This leads to increased inaccessibility of basic logistics, inadequate infrastructure, worsening financial shortages, and critical personnel shortages. Healthcare workers often abandon affected regions due to safety concerns, resulting in major disruptions to medical services, including surgical care. The inability to provide basic healthcare services exacerbates the already dire consequences of terrorism, further eroding public trust in state capacity. The deliberate targeting of these vital sectors by terror groups is a strategy to undermine state legitimacy and control populations through deprivation and fear.

V. Challenges in Countering Terrorist Financing and Sponsorship-

Despite international and regional efforts, significant challenges persist in effectively countering the financing and sponsorship of Islamic terror groups in West Africa. These challenges stem from a combination of systemic weaknesses, fragmented responses, and the adaptive nature of the terrorist networks themselves.

Assessment of Regional and International AML/CFT Efforts and their Limitations-

West African nations face considerable hurdles in establishing and implementing robust anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) frameworks. The region struggles with regulating financial products and sectors effectively. A critical limitation is the weak capacity of reporting institutions in West Africa to identify suspicious transactions related to terrorism financing. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies, regulatory bodies, security and intelligence services, and the judiciary often lack the necessary capacity and resources to effectively address the complex challenge of terrorism financing.<