South Sudan’s experience shows the double-edged nature of power-sharing.

In theory, it’s a tool to stabilize fragile postwar societies; in practice, in South Sudan, it has often entrenched divisions rather than resolved them.

Here’s a breakdown:

1. Stabilizing Aspects

• Ceasefire Mechanism: Power-sharing deals (2015 & 2018 peace agreements) created immediate pauses in all-out conflict by bringing rival elites (Kiir, Machar, and others) into a single government.

• Inclusive Symbolism: Having SPLM, SPLM-IO, and other groups in the transitional government prevented total political exclusion, which could have sparked renewed war.

• Space for Civil Society: Temporary stability under the unity government allowed some civil society and humanitarian activity to continue, preventing state collapse.

2. Entrenching Division

• Elite Bargains, Not National Consensus: Power-sharing in South Sudan has been elite-centric—designed to divide ministries, governorships, and resources among Kiir, Machar, and allies, while ordinary citizens remain excluded.

• Ethnicization of State Institutions: Instead of fostering integration, power-sharing reinforced ethnic patronage—each faction used its ministries and security units to advance its own ethnic base (e.g., SPLM aligned with Dinka, SPLM-IO with Nuer).

• Government Paralysis: Rival factions inside the same cabinet often obstruct one another, leading to policy deadlock. Ministries become “zones of control,” not cooperative institutions.

• Spoiler Incentives: Because peace agreements reward armed groups with positions, new factions have incentives to form militias to “earn” their place at the table—fueling endless cycles of rebellion.

3. Comparative Lessons

• Burundi (Arusha Agreement): Ethnic quotas and power-sharing initially stabilized the state, but over time became rigid, locking politics into ethnic blocs and limiting reform.

• Zimbabwe (2009 GNU): Unity government between ZANU-PF and MDC briefly reduced violence but entrenched Mugabe’s control and fragmented the opposition.

• Mozambique (1992): More successful—power-sharing allowed RENAMO to transform into a legitimate opposition party rather than a permanent armed spoiler.

4. South Sudan’s Outcome So Far

• Power-sharing has prevented outright state collapse but also frozen politics around Kiir and Machar.

• Governance remains factionalized, corruption-ridden, and nonfunctional.

• Citizens see little service delivery or reform, so legitimacy is eroded.

• Instead of transitioning toward pluralism, South Sudan is stuck in a cycle of elite bargaining → fragile peace → renewed violence → new bargain.

Conclusion:
In South Sudan, power-sharing has acted more as a band-aid than a cure. It stabilizes temporarily but entrenches ethnic divisions, personalizes politics, and rewards armed rebellion. Without reforms that expand inclusion to non-armed actors (civil society, traditional authorities, women, youth), power-sharing risks becoming a permanent conflict-management trap rather than a pathway to lasting peace.