Washington has started to pivot money toward “wars of attrition and autonomy,” but big chunks of the portfolio—and the industrial base needed to build it—are still stuck in 20th-century gears.

Where the money is getting smarter

• More magazines, not just more ships/planes. DoD is locking in multiyear buys for key missiles (JASSM/LRASM, AMRAAM, SM-6, Tomahawk) and just let billions in new contracts to surge inventories—exactly what Ukraine/Red Sea lessons demand. 

• Cheap, attritable autonomy. The Replicator push (≈$1B in FY24–25) is fielding thousands of small air/surface drones plus counter-UAS tools; a joint counter-drone task force is now up to accelerate c-UAS across the services. (Yes, execution is bumpy, but the direction is right.) 

• Paired crewed–uncrewed airpower. The Air Force is moving out on Collaborative Combat Aircraft, and it has awarded the manned NGAD platform—tying exquisite platforms to swarms that carry sensors and weapons. 

• Space for the fight. The Space Development Agency’s proliferated LEO network (Transport + Tracking) is shifting missile warning/comm’s to resilient, mass-produced satellites; Tranche-1 launches run through 2025 with Tranche-2/3 in the pipe. 

Where it’s still stuck

• Navy shipbuilding is a bottleneck. The Constellation-class frigate is ~3 years late; Columbia SSBN and Virginia-class SSNs face delays, and the sub industrial base is short of the 2–2.33 boats/year the Navy says it needs (and AUKUS assumes). 

• The fighter fleet’s sustainment drag. F-35 software (TR-3) setbacks and middling mission-capable rates keep eating readiness dollars even as deliveries resume under payment withholds. That crowds out money for munitions and experimentation. 

• Hypersonics growing pains. The Air Force killed ARRW and is refocusing on cruise-based options; timelines slipped across multiple programs, slowing the deterrence signal. 

• Unmanned at sea isn’t turnkey. The Navy’s large-scale maritime drone push is important but has had messy tests and leadership churn—execution risk remains high. 

• CRs and politics. Even when toplines look big (≈$850B request for FY2025), continuing resolutions reshuffle priorities and delay programs; Congress’ own analysts flag the mismatch between ambition and industrial capacity. 

Bottom line

• Is the U.S. investing wisely? Directionally, yes: more money is flowing to magazine depth, autonomy at scale, resilient space, and counter-drone defenses—the currency of tomorrow’s fights.

• What keeps dominance at risk? Throughput. If shipyards can’t deliver submarines/frigates on time, if fighter sustainment keeps squeezing readiness, and if unmanned programs can’t move from demo to durable production, the U.S. will have great concepts but shallow inventories.

What would “wise” look like, concretely

1. Lock multiyear + economic-order-quantity buys for munitions through the late-2020s and push suppliers to max rate (not year-to-year). 

2. Treat counter-UAS like air defense in the 1980s: common sensors, cheap interceptors, and electronic attack at echelon, with rapid test-and-insert cycles. 

3. Protect SDA’s proliferated LEO from churn; keep two-year “tranches” on clock. 

4. Prioritize submarine/shipyard fixes (workforce, suppliers, dry docks) over new hull starts until cadence improves. 

5. Ring-fence experimentation money in the POM so Replicator/CCA survive annual turbulence—and tie fielding to production lines, not one-off demos. 

So: the U.S. has learned many of the right lessons and is funding them. The question isn’t intent; it’s industrial capacity and execution speed. That’s where tomorrow’s wars will be won—or budgeted away.

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How does the American military balance high-tech warfare with boots-on-the-ground readiness?

U.S. military’s toughest challenges today is walking the tightrope between investing in next-gen, tech-heavy warfare and maintaining the people, training, and kit needed for gritty ground fights that don’t vanish just because drones and satellites exist.

1. The Tech Edge (where money and imagination are flowing)

• Space & cyber as warfighting domains. The U.S. is pushing proliferated satellite constellations (for missile warning, comms, navigation) and cyber commands for offensive/defensive ops—assuming peer wars will start in space and networks.

• Autonomy & AI. Programs like the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft and the Pentagon’s Replicator aim for thousands of drones working alongside or instead of crewed systems.

• Precision, long-range fires. Hypersonic and advanced cruise missiles, combined with ISR from space and drones, are meant to counter China/Russia’s anti-access strategies.

2. The Boots-on-the-Ground Backbone

• Enduring demand for infantry. Ukraine, Gaza, and counter-ISIS show that holding terrain, clearing cities, and protecting populations still require soldiers and marines, no matter how good the tech.

• Readiness challenges. The U.S. Army missed recruiting goals in recent years (tens of thousands short), though 2025 saw a modest rebound through new incentives and outreach.

• Training for both high-end and low-end fights. Exercises like Defender Europe and Pacific Pathways drill large-scale combined arms against peers, while the Army also runs counterinsurgency/urban warfare centers (Fort Irwin, JRTC) for irregular scenarios.

• Logistics & sustainment. Infantry readiness hinges on basics: ammo, fuel, medical evacuation, and supply chains. The Pentagon has been racing to ramp up artillery shell production (from ~20k/month in 2022 toward 100k/month by 2025), but bottlenecks persist.

3. The Balancing Act

• Doctrine shift: The U.S. calls this the “multi-domain operations” approach—linking satellites, cyber, drones, long-range fires, armor, and infantry into a single networked fight.

• Budget trade-offs: Billions go to “exquisite” systems (like stealth bombers, nuclear modernization, Aegis destroyers), but Pentagon planners are now also carving funds for cheap, plentiful systems (drones, interceptors, artillery shells) because recent wars showed the danger of shallow stockpiles.

• People + machines synergy: Planners see tech as a force multiplier, not a replacement. For example, small infantry units are now being paired with organic drones, counter-drone jammers, and AI-assisted targeting—so “boots” remain central, but with better tools.

Bottom Line

The U.S. military isn’t choosing between Silicon Valley warfare and boots in muddy fields—it’s trying to weld them together. The bet is that future wars will be decided by who can network high-tech systems fastest while still putting disciplined, well-trained troops on the ground to seize and hold terrain.

Right now, the risk is that high-end programs (stealth bombers, carriers, hypersonics) eat budgetary oxygen, while manpower, training, and basic munitions production lag. If that balance tilts too far, America could win the first “tech exchange” in a conflict but struggle to sustain a long ground campaign.

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U.S. Military Balance: High-Tech vs. Boots-on-the-Ground Readiness

Takeaway

• The U.S. is doubling down on high-tech to deter China/Russia in peer conflicts.

• But it’s also scrambling to shore up the basics—recruitment, munitions stockpiles, and sustainment—because recent wars show you still need boots to win and hold ground.

• The real balance lies in fusion: infantry units equipped with drones, AI targeting, and resilient logistics—not one side replacing the other.