Effectively prioritizing China is only possible if US allies commit to taking a greater share of the defense burden. 

No matter how many times the United States announces a strategic “pivot” to China and Asia, away from the Middle East and Europe, events elsewhere tend to get in the way. The Ukraine War, Hamas in Gaza, Iran’s nuclear program, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Assad in Syria, and the Houthis in the Red Sea have, like so many sticks, jammed the spokes of American strategy as it tried to shift toward the Pacific.

A deeper challenge complicating a pivot anywhere is the ongoing revolution in military technology that confronts the Pentagon. Nothing better illustrates that reality than what the Yemeni Houthis have done in the Red Sea. For over a year, the militants have obstructed the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a major maritime traffic lane. Repeated, asymmetric Houthi drone and missile attacks from land have forced a rerouting of international commerce around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. Despite its best efforts, the US Navy—the world’s most powerful maritime force—has been unable to control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and ensure the security of international trade.

The same kind of blow happened to Russia’s Black Sea fleet when it was forced to withdraw from the range of Ukraine’s coastal land-based missiles and drones. Ukraine, with no real navy of its own, was able to clear a sea corridor along its Black Sea coastline for commercial maritime traffic to pass under a protective umbrella of missiles and drones.

Relatively low-cost, land-based mobile missiles and drones can now contest, even possibly control waters extending hundreds, potentially even thousands of miles out from land. These asymmetric technologies have important implications for the role of surface warships in future naval warfare. Simply shifting increasingly limited US naval assets and air power toward China and Asia may not be as effective a move as it might have been in the past. 

Expensive combatant surface ships are not the only platforms becoming more vulnerable to drone and missile attacks from land. Forward operating bases (FOBs), which provide logistical support to these vessels, are threatened too. US operating bases and ports in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Guam all fall comfortably within range of thousands of land-based PLA rockets and drones. 

These US bases would likely not be safe harbors in any conflict with China. Moreover, the US military has not taken steps to harden them against the possibility of such attacks. A conventional war with China near its own coast would hand more advantages and options to the Chinese PLA than it would to a logistically stretched US military, operating thousands of miles from the American mainland.

Another complicating factor for any Pacific pivot is that China has over 600 nuclear weapons. An open conventional war between two nuclear powers is unprecedented, raising unique and complex questions of deterrence and potential escalation danger. Were US forces to launch direct attacks against coastal ports and targets on the Chinese mainland to help defend Taiwan, the PLA could launch retaliatory strikes against US FOBs, including those located in Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and possibly South Korea. 

Depending on how hard US conventional forces hit targets on the Chinese mainland, or on how hard the PLA struck back in response, nuclear escalation could follow. The United States must remain clear-eyed about China and the risks and challenges of getting into any military conflict with Beijing over Taiwan. Washington has no defense treaty with Taipei, nor is there a clearly worded congressional mandate calling for its defense if attacked.

Rather than sending additional, pressed, and limited US military resources to the Pacific, the better answer may be to concentrate more on helping Pacific allies, particularly in the First Island Chain, to supply them with the anti-ship and air defense capabilities needed for a regional “porcupine” strategy. The US Marine Corps and Army are already developing land-based, anti-ship warfare weapons with their NMESIS and HIMAR systems. The Army recently demonstrated the potential of HIMARS in the Philippines. DOD should prioritize working with allies and friendly countries in the First Island Chain to support such modern weapons capabilities. 

Unfortunately, pressures on the US military today go beyond China, Ukraine, or the Middle East. Now, even the defense of the American homeland has become an urgent issue. Concerns over drones and new generations of hypersonic missiles have led to the realization that North American defense must be completely reimagined under a new kind of “Iron” or “Golden Dome” defense concept. Equally urgent is the Pentagon’s modernization of its aging US nuclear forces, a project whose cost alone is projected to be nearly $1 trillion over the next nine years. 

The good news is that US allies are starting to take on a greater share of their fair share of the load. Slammed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—and more intense diplomatic pressure from Washington—NATO European allies have finally upped their defense budget commitments. They are beginning to take over major responsibility for equipping Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. Four European allies have even committed to paying the United States $1 billion to supply weapons to Ukraine. Taking on that kind of leadership makes sense. Russian ambitions pose a far greater threat to 500 million prosperous allies in Europe than to the United States on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

Another step that should be taken is for European navies to assume greater responsibility for addressing challenges outside their own region, such as Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. Collectively, NATO Europe’s navies outsize those of the entire US Navy in terms of ship numbers if not tonnage. Safe passage through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is more important for Western Europe, both commercially and strategically, than for the United States. 

Over the course of one month, the United States spent over $1 billion in an attempt to contain the Houthis. Some European allies have supported the Navy campaign, but on a more limited basis under Operation ASPIDES. It is time for Western Europe’s capable navies to be prepared to take over those kinds of lead roles in the future. The United States should not have to tie down as many as two carrier battle groups in the Red Sea to keep open a waterway of more strategic significance to Europe than the United States. With demands for pivots to Asia, the still looming specter of Iran, and the development of the Golden Dome, it makes no sense for the United States to be the main player in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Washington cannot, however, turn isolationist. It will have to remain globally engaged as the world’s leading democracy and power to promote stability. The Pentagon must nonetheless give itself time to reorganize its military and the defense industrial base to integrate and adapt new technologies and doctrines that are better configured for modern global threats. 

The Cold War and post-Cold War eras of American military dominance are now behind us. Our allies need to accept this fact and share more military burdens and responsibilities with the United States. The Pentagon’s military culture, one built on eight decades of US preeminence, must also accept that and evolve. It cannot be expected to play the same Spartan role in the future as it has for alliances since World War II. More than pivoting to any region, rebalancing military burdens among capable allies and friends must be Washington’s driving strategic priority.