America has heavily restricted Ukraine’s use of its long-range munitions. But a domestically produced glide bomb circumvents these restrictions, enabling Ukraine to strike deep inside Russian territory.

With the NATO conference underway, and the war between Israel, the United States, and Iran coming to a stasis point, Kyiv has once again come to America hat in hand to request further assistance. However, perhaps in anticipation of failure, the Ukrainians have continued innovating new systems built indigenously to complicate Russia’s overwhelming military advantages over Ukraine. 

The development of glide bombs have emerged in the ongoing Ukraine War as a critical factor shaping battlefield dynamics. The Russians have used glide bombs with lethal impacts across the battlefield. So, the Ukrainians are perfecting their own glide bomb, colloquially referred to as the “Ukrainian KAB"

All About Ukraine’s “KAB” Glide Bomb 

A Ukrainian KAB glide bomb holds significant strategic implications for the war. First, it enhances Ukraine’s ability to conduct standoff strikes, allowing for its air force to target Russian positions, airfields, and infrastructure from safer distances. This capability is particularly vital given Russia’s extended glide bomb ranges, which now threaten cities like Kharkiv, Zaporizhzia, and Kramatorsk. By matching (or exceeding) the 44-mile range of Russian glide bombs.

Ukraine intends to use their KAB glide bomb to disrupt Russian logistics and command centers—potentially forcing Russian aircraft to operate even further from the frontline.

Ukraine’s KAB reduces the country’s reliance on Western munitions, which are often subject to supply constraints and political restrictions. This is especially true in the face of the recent Israel-Iran conflict, which diverted key arms away from the Ukraine front against Russia and into the Middle East. Because of these limitations, American policies must, in turn, limit the use of their equipment by Ukraine to conserve them. ATACMS and JDAM-ER weapons used for deep strikes inside Russia are heavily regulated by the Americans out of the need to conserve these systems.

But a domestically produced glide bomb circumvents these restrictions, enabling Ukraine to strike strategic targets within Russian territory—such as the Kushchyovskaya airbase, which was hit by Ukrainian drones in 2024 to destroy Russian KAB kits. This authority strengthens Ukraine’s operational flexibility and resilience. 

The KAB complements Ukraine’s recent advancements in electronic warfare (EW) particularly the Lima Jammer, which has disrupted Russian glide bombs by interfering with their GLONASS satellite navigation. Reports indicate that Ukrainian jammers have reduced Russian glide bomb accuracy, requiring the Kremlin to use up to 16 bombs to hit a single target—and even causing some to stray into Russian territory! By combining EW with its own glide bombs, Ukraine can create a synergistic effect: jamming Russian bombs to protect its forces, while deploying KABs to strike Russian positions, leveling the aerial playing field. 

The KAB Bomb Isn’t a Silver Bullet for Ukraine

Regardless of its promise, Ukraine’s KAB faces notable challenges. For one thing, Kyiv is struggling with funding and production capacity. Medoid, the firm producing the glide bomb for Ukraine, has launched a fundraising campaign to scale the development and mass production, as the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s certification process and financial support remain pending. Producing 100 bombs per day requires significant investment in manufacturing infrastructure, which may strain Ukraine’s already war-stressed economy. Moreover, while the KAB’s $25,000 cost is competitive, sustaining high output without external aid could be difficult, especially given Ukraine’s reliance on Western financial support.

Operationally, the KAB’s effectiveness relies upon Ukraine’s ability to protect its aircraft and integrate the system into its air force. Russian air defenses, including the S-400, pose a threat to Ukrainian Su-24s and other platforms, necessitating robust electronic countermeasures and tactical innovations. Ukraine’s air force believes that the arrival of F-16 warplanes into their arsenal, equipped with advanced sensors and long-range AMRAAM missiles, could enhance the KAB’s deployment by providing air cover and targeting data via NATO’s Link 16 system.

All this is moot, though, because the Russian EW capability is sophisticated enough to jam the KAB’s GPS guidance. While the system likely incorporates an inertial navigation system (INS) as a backup, similar to the JDAM-ER and Hammer, Russian jammers have consistently proven effective against Ukrainian drones and munitions.

It is obvious that Kyiv cannot solely rely upon Western military aid to sustain its war effort, and its attempts to do more in its own defense are admirable. But the truth is that the war has already gone on for so long, and drained Ukraine so much, that whatever innovations the Ukrainians create from here on will almost certainly be insufficient to overcome the inherent advantages the Russians now enjoy over Ukraine. One way or another, the war will end—and soon.