The PLA would likely hit hard in the opening weeks of a regional war, but its ability to sustain a high-intensity fight against a peer over months is still the big question mark.

Why the opening phase favors the PLA (regionally)

• Massed missiles & ISR: China can generate large, coordinated strikes on nearby airbases, ports, and C4ISR to paralyze an opponent early—especially inside the First Island Chain. That’s what its doctrine and force design (Rocket Force + joint fires) emphasize. 

• Local logistics & civil-military fusion: For operations near home, Beijing can lean on extensive civilian transport, ports, and warehousing integrated with the Joint Logistic Support Force—helpful for tempo in the near seas. 

Where prolonged, high-end war gets hard

• Sustainment at scale: RAND and DoD assessments point to persistent gaps in realistic logistics training, maintenance systems, and the organizational “muscle memory” needed to keep joint forces supplied under fire over time. This is particularly acute as distances grow or attrition mounts. 

• Joint warfighting under stress: The PLA is still maturing true joint command, control, and cross-service integration—good progress on paper/doctrine, but unproven under prolonged combat conditions. 

• Corruption/purges hitting readiness: The recent purges—especially in the Rocket Force/defense industry—suggest quality-control and accountability issues that can ripple into munitions reliability, leadership cohesion, and morale. That’s a bad recipe in a long fight. 

What credible gaming and studies imply

• Amphibious invasion (e.g., Taiwan): CSIS’s repeated wargames show China can inflict heavy losses but tends to bog down and suffer catastrophic attrition once a determined coalition fights back—suggesting problems sustaining complex operations after the initial punch. (Wargames aren’t predictions, but they highlight sustainment and attrition risks.) 

• Blockade scenarios: New CSIS work on a prolonged blockade underscores that the longer a conflict runs, the more China faces counter-pressure (submarines, long-range strikes, economic disruption) and the more logistics/munitions and political risks grow on all sides. 

Likely performance by phase (against a peer)

1. Weeks 1–3: Strong offensive salvo capacity; real chance to degrade regional bases/airpower and sea lines; initiative likely favors Beijing near its coastline. 

2. Weeks 4–8: Attrition bites. Coalition submarine warfare, dispersed airpower, and long-range fires start eroding Chinese surface forces and logistics nodes; joint C2 is stress-tested. Munitions expenditure rates challenge resupply and quality assurance. 

3. Months 3+: Sustainment and leadership coherence become decisive. Purge-era turbulence and unproven expeditionary logistics raise risk of operational stall or the need to escalate (space/cyber/economic coercion, potentially nuclear signaling). 

• Near-term regional fight: The PLA is formidable at the start and could impose steep costs—especially within the First Island Chain.

• Prolonged, high-intensity war vs a peer: The edge likely tilts away from China over time as sustainment, joint proficiency, leadership cohesion, combat repair/maintenance, and munition quality control become the center of gravity. In short: strong first round, uncertain late rounds.

By John Uju-Ikeji