China’s shipbuilding quantity is outpacing some aspects of its ability to guarantee long-term quality and combat survivability.

The PLAN is now enormous and technologically advanced in many ways, but there are real, documented gaps in damage-control practice, sustainment/maintenance, crew experience, and the long-term cost of operating a much larger blue-water navy.

Below I summarize the evidence and the practical implications.

1) The scale: unprecedented output, real capability

China has built hundreds of modern hulls quickly — destroyers, frigates, corvettes, subs and carriers — and today operates one of the largest navies by ship count (well over 350–370 vessels). That scale gives China presence, patrol endurance, and more units to absorbs losses or generate continuous operations. 

2) Where quantity clearly helps (peacetime & gray-zone competition)

More hulls mean more persistent patrols, more presence missions, better ability to swarm disputed areas, and greater diplomatic/soft-power options (HADR, anti-piracy, port calls). For signaling and day-to-day coercion below the threshold of war, numbers matter a lot. 

3) Quality and survivability concerns (documented and plausible)

• Damage control & design for maintenance: Chinese analyst translations and open-source reporting show the PLAN still needs to professionalize shipboard damage-control planning and training; some older designs also made maintenance difficult by not prioritizing accessibility. Those weaknesses matter when ships are hit or operate far from home. 

• O&M and sustainment burden: Building ships is cheaper than operating them. Analysts warn China faces long-term funding and industrial strain to sustain a 400+ ship navy (spare parts, depot maintenance, crews, fuel, munitions). If operations tempo rises, these costs and seams in logistics will be exposed. 

• Visible workmanship issues & corrosion stories: Public images and reporting (including periodic photos of rust and weld anecdotes) have fueled questions about build quality on some platforms — not proof of systemic failure, but indicators that peacetime appearance can mask long-term upkeep problems. 

4) Human factors: crews, training, and real wartime practice

Rapid shipbuilding can outpace the pipeline of experienced sailors, aviators, and maintenance personnel. Damage control, complex carrier flight ops, and sustained ASW/anti-air operations require institutional experience that accrues over years and combat exposure — something the PLAN largely lacks. 

5) How that shows up in combat risk

• In a high-intensity fight against a peer, vulnerabilities matter: poor damage control, limited logistics, inexperienced carrier aviation, and inadequate spare stocks increase the chance that isolated hits or attrition will cascade into major capability loss.

• Conversely, for short, localized campaigns or peacetime coercion, quantity plus A2/AD missiles and submarines can be decisive. 

China has converted extraordinary industrial capacity into a numerically large and increasingly modern navy — so the shiny is real and dangerous in peacetime competition. But sheen ≠ guaranteed survivability: sustainment, damage control, crew experience, and long-term operations funding lag behind the pace of new construction, which raises risk in prolonged, high-intensity combat against a peer.

By John Uju-Ikeji