If it does not recognize and institutionalize Germany’s political centrality, Europe is doomed to indecision and irrelevance.

The question is no longer whether Germany should lead Europe, but rather how Europe can adapt to the reality that Germany already does. Despite decades of carefully choreographed multilateral diplomacy designed to obscure this fundamental truth, the economic, demographic, and geopolitical forces that propel German leadership are too powerful to be ignored or artificially constrained.

Germany’s Economic Gravity

Germany’s economic dominance within the European Union is not merely a matter of current statistics—though those are compelling enough. With an economy representing nearly 25 percent of the EU’s GDP and a manufacturing base that remains the envy of the industrialized world, Germany is Europe’s economic powerhouse. However, more importantly, it serves as Europe’s economic anchor during times of crisis.

The 2008 financial crisis, the Eurozone debt crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic all demonstrated the same pattern: when European stability was threatened, it was German fiscal capacity and political will that ultimately determined the response. The European Central Bank may be headquartered in Frankfurt by coincidence, but German economic philosophy—emphasizing price stability, fiscal discipline, and export competitiveness—has become European economic orthodoxy by necessity.

More significantly, Germany’s central geographic position makes it the natural hub for European integration in an era of renewed great power competition. As tensions with Russia persist and China’s influence in Europe grows, the continent needs a leader capable of navigating between American security guarantees and European strategic autonomy. Germany’s complex relationship with both powers—economically interdependent yet politically wary—positions it uniquely to chart this course.

This is not German imperialism; it is a law of economics. Capital flows, trade relationships, and industrial supply chains naturally organize around centers of productivity and stability. Attempting to disperse this gravitational pull through complex institutional arrangements has created neither genuine shared leadership nor sustainable alternatives to German influence.

The EU Cannot Balance Germany

The European Union’s institutional architecture was designed in large part to prevent any single nation from dominating the others. This was understandable given twentieth-century history, but it has created a system optimized for preventing leadership rather than exercising it. The result is decision-making paralysis precisely when decisive action is most needed.

The mathematical realities of relative economic weight increasingly strain France’s attempts to maintain co-leadership through the Franco-German axis. Italy’s political instability, Spain’s regional challenges, and Poland’s democratic backsliding have removed them from serious leadership contention. The departure of the United Kingdom eliminated the only other potential counterweight to German influence within the EU framework.

Rather than continuing to pretend that this balance of power still exists, Europe would be better served by acknowledging German leadership while creating institutional mechanisms to ensure it is exercised responsibly and with due consultations of other members.

German Leadership with Constraints

Accepting German leadership does not mean accepting German hegemony. Historical memory and contemporary political realities both demand that German power be exercised within clear constraints and through genuinely multilateral institutions. But these constraints should be designed to channel German leadership constructively rather than to prevent it entirely.

The key is transforming informal German influence into formal German responsibility. When Germany leads from the shadows—as it has during various EU crises—it can avoid accountability while still determining outcomes. Explicit leadership would require explicit consultation, transparent decision-making processes, and clear mechanisms for smaller EU members to influence German priorities.

From a broader geopolitical perspective, German leadership of Europe serves American interests by creating a more coherent and capable Atlantic alliance partner. It serves Chinese interests by providing a single, substantial interlocutor for Eurasian economic integration. In a way, it even serves Russian interests by offering the possibility of a more predictable and businesslike relationship with Europe.

Most importantly, German leadership serves European interests by acknowledging reality rather than fighting it. The alternative to German leadership is not French leadership, Italian leadership, or some mythical collective leadership—it is the continued drift toward irrelevance in a world increasingly dominated by the United States, China, and other rising powers.

Germany’s reluctance to embrace explicit leadership reflects both historical sensitivity and genuine uncertainty about whether such leadership is wanted or effective. But leadership is not always a choice—sometimes it is an obligation imposed by circumstances.

The question for Europe is whether it will have German leadership exercised hesitantly and apologetically, or whether it will create frameworks that allow such leadership to be exercised confidently and cooperatively. The former approach has characterized the past decade and produced mixed results at best. The latter approach remains untested but offers Europe’s best hope for maintaining relevance and influence in an increasingly competitive international system.

Europe needs Germany to lead, not because Germany desires to lead, but because Europe needs to be led. The sooner this reality is acknowledged, the sooner Europe can begin building the institutional structures necessary to make such leadership both effective and legitimate.