An independent European security structure may be difficult establish, but there is no other alternative to deter Russia.

Europe is at an inflection point. Whether Donald Trump coerces President Volodymyr Zelensky to accept a peace deal favorable to Russia or walks away from the conflict altogether, European leaders can no longer count on the United States to be their security guarantor. They can continue to flatter Trump and lobby congressional leaders in the hope that security ties will not be severed. Or they can plan to defend themselves against a militant Russia without the American backstop.

The transatlantic relationship, which has underpinned global stability since 1949, has frayed on trade and security grounds. To placate Trump and sustain America’s presence in Europe, the European Union acceded to a one-sided trade agreement with the United States in July. The agreement caps tariffs on most EU exports to the United States at 15 percent tariffs, a figure far higher than the current 1.5 percent, in exchange for the elimination of tariffs on US industrial goods and preferential market access for agricultural products. French prime minister Francois Bayrou called it an act of “submission.” To secure Trump’s commitment to NATO’s collective security, the European allies agreed a month earlier at a summit meeting in The Hague to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. 

Given Trump’s unpredictability, however, the European allies cannot be certain that the president’s trade and fiscal demands will not change. True, Trump has approved new arms transfers to Ukraine paid for by the European allies, and he has been angered by Russia’s relentless bombardment of cities, such as the August 29 strike on Kyiv. However, given the view of the Trump administration and much of the public that China poses a greater threat, it would be foolhardy to conclude that such aid signals a sustained willingness to defend Ukraine or its European allies.

The president displayed his striking inconstancy at the August 15 summit in Alaska with President Vladimir Putin. Neither his earlier demand for a ceasefire nor his warning to Russia of “severe consequences” if it failed to do so was achieved. Nor did the summit result in the security guarantees for Ukraine that European leaders had called for. 

As evidenced by the chummy banter between Trump and Putin, the summit revealed the increased rapprochement between Russia and the United States. Putin made no promises or concessions because he believes that time is on his side both on the battlefield and in his negotiations with Trump. Indeed, eager to claim credit for a deal, Trump has placed the onus on Zelensky to end the war, which likely means conceding the roughly 20 percent of the Donbas that Russia does not militarily control.

Territorial gains in Crimea and the Donbas will embolden Putin to replicate his success in Ukraine elsewhere, for Putin’s goal has always been to restore the empire that the Soviet Union lost in 1991. Moldova would be a likely next target, since it offers the same pretext of a Russian-speaking population in need of “protection.” It could also be one of the Baltic states, though a direct attack there would trigger an Article 5 response from NATO, which defines an attack on any member as an attack on all members. More broadly, Putin could expand Russia’s influence in NATO countries, such as Slovakia and Hungary, which seek to normalize relations with Moscow.

The European allies are not oblivious to the threat posed by an adversary that allocates one-third of all government spending to defense. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has warned allies that Russia could launch an attack against Europe by 2030. But the Europeans are psychologically ill-prepared for it. 

Except for the countries on NATO’s eastern frontier, most allies are risk-averse. They fear taking steps that would unintentionally decouple the United States from Europe. As an analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies averred, the more the allies rearm, “the more excuse they will give US policymakers to leave.” Moreover, fearful of rising populism, political leaders have not prepared their publics for the possibility of a military conflict with Russia.

Though European support for strategic autonomy has increased in recent years, the allies are nowhere near fielding an efficient fighting force that adversaries would fear, as French president Emmanuel Macron has observed. Despite larger defense budgets, European countries prioritize their own industries. The result is a fragmented procurement system of multiple tanks or howitzers, which impedes interoperability and thus the creation of a coordinated fighting force. Similar fragmentation is hindering the EU’s competitiveness in international trade, as noted in the September 2024 report by former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi. 

To build an independent defense force, European leaders would need to abandon their parochialism and focus on the most effective weapon systems, regardless of which countries develop them, as the shared usage of these systems would lower procurement costs. According to Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank, a minimum of 1400 tanks and 300,000 infantry would be necessary to prevent a successful Russian offensive in the Baltic states. 

Europe would also need to overcome deficiencies in air power—common fighter jets capable of high-intensity conflict, air-refueling capability, airborne electronic warfare, and intelligence, for which it significantly relies on the United States to provide. The same is true for missile defense systems, satellite imagery for target acquisition, and the command and control necessary for complex military formations during wartime.

At the end of the Cold War, the creation of an independent European security structure was mooted among some foreign affairs professionals. It did not emerge for many reasons, including the desire in Europe, as in the United States, to scale back military spending and fund social programs. Allied fears of decoupling from the United States and the latter’s desire to preserve its dominant role in Europe were critical factors. 

Some 35 years later, amid renewed Russian expansionism, Europe is no longer secure. Nor can it confidently rely on America’s commitment to its defense. If Europe is to be free and democratic, it will have to adjust to both realities and rely on its independent defense capabilities.