When military analysts debate the future of global airpower, the discussion often circles back to the United States and China.

The U.S. Air Force and Navy have long prided themselves on unmatched pilot training depth, sustained combat experience, and a doctrine of joint operations honed over decades. 

By contrast, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone rapid modernization—fielding stealth fighters, advanced drones, and long-range missiles—but questions remain whether its human element, particularly pilot training and combat readiness, has kept pace.

The answer matters profoundly. In an era where technology alone cannot guarantee victory, pilot training depth often determines who dominates the skies.

The Hardware Leap: J-20s and Beyond

China’s development of the Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter stands as a symbol of its military ambitions. Backed by modern radar, electronic warfare suites, and the introduction of new engines, the J-20 gives the PLAAF a fifth-generation platform capable of competing, at least on paper, with U.S. F-22s and F-35s.

Beyond the J-20, the PLAAF has rapidly fielded the J-16 multirole fighter and modernized legacy platforms like the J-10C. Meanwhile, China’s emphasis on long-range air-to-air missiles, notably the PL-15, is designed to offset Western advantages by threatening U.S. aircraft from standoff distances.

Yet, while these aircraft are formidable, they are only as effective as the pilots flying them.

Training Depth: Where the West Still Leads

The United States and its allies have cultivated a training-centric culture. For decades, U.S. pilots have flown 200+ hours annually, supplemented by extensive simulator time. Large-scale exercises such as Red Flag in Nevada or NATO’s Air Defender emphasize complex, multi-domain warfare—pitting pilots against sophisticated “aggressor” squadrons to replicate peer-level threats.

China, until recently, trained differently. PLAAF pilot training emphasized scripted engagements—predictable scenarios focused on technical proficiency rather than creativity under duress. A 2018 Pentagon report noted that many Chinese pilots lacked exposure to “free air combat training,” the kind of unscripted dogfighting scenarios Western aviators take for granted.

The result? While Chinese pilots might master platform operation, they historically struggled with adaptive decision-making in dynamic, contested environments.

Signs of Change: Aggressor Squadrons and Realistic Drills

Recognizing this gap, Beijing has moved decisively to overhaul training. Over the past decade, the PLAAF has:

• Established aggressor units, flying older J-10s and J-11s in “red force” roles to simulate adversary tactics—an unmistakable borrowing of the U.S. Air Force model.

• Increased unscripted training, encouraging pilots to operate in more fluid combat environments with less reliance on pre-set maneuvers.

• Expanded large-scale drills, often involving joint operations with the PLA Navy Air Force and Rocket Force, simulating the kind of integrated warfare China would expect in a Taiwan or South China Sea scenario.

China’s Golden Helmet competition, an annual event since 2011, rewards top-performing pilots and has been described by Chinese state media as the PLAAF’s equivalent of “Top Gun.”

These reforms suggest that Beijing not only recognizes its shortcomings but is actively attempting to close the training gap.

Numbers vs. Depth

Even with reforms, the PLAAF faces a scale problem. China boasts one of the world’s largest combat aircraft fleets, with more than 1,900 combat aircraft. Training enough pilots to operate them effectively, let alone at Western proficiency levels, remains a monumental challenge.

Western analysts point out a critical gap: quality of flight hours. While PLAAF pilots are now flying more annually—sometimes approaching 150 hours—the depth of combat realism still lags. In the U.S., exercises simulate jamming, AWACS coordination, joint-service integration, and live-fire scenarios under heavy duress. China’s reforms are progressing, but the system has yet to demonstrate the same breadth of combat realism.

Moreover, pilot retention remains an issue. As China pushes its best pilots into test units or “model” squadrons, scaling those skills across the force is uneven. The U.S. Air Force benefits from decades of institutionalized knowledge-sharing; China is building such traditions almost from scratch.

The Combat Experience Gap

Perhaps the starkest difference lies in actual combat experience. U.S. pilots have logged thousands of sorties in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and beyond. Israeli, British, and French aviators share similar records of combat-tested performance.

Chinese pilots, by contrast, have virtually no modern combat experience. Since the Korean War, the PLAAF has not fought a high-intensity air campaign. This leaves unanswered questions: How would PLAAF pilots respond under real fire? Could they improvise when communications are disrupted, or when losses mount?

For now, this remains a critical unknown.

Technology as a Crutch—or a Multiplier?

One way China seeks to offset its training gap is through technology integration. Advances in artificial intelligence, sophisticated simulators, and battlefield automation could allow pilots to train more efficiently and rely on advanced systems for situational awareness.

For instance:

• AI-enabled simulators may accelerate pilot skill development.

• Data links and ground-based command structures could help compensate for weaker individual decision-making.

• Unmanned wingmen—currently under development—may provide force multipliers, reducing the demand on human pilots.

But these technological aids cut both ways. If over-relied upon, they may mask deficiencies in independent pilot judgment, creating vulnerabilities against adversaries who disrupt communications or exploit electronic warfare.

China’s air force has unquestionably modernized its fleet and overhauled its training programs. The days of strictly scripted drills are fading; aggressor units and unscripted combat exercises are reshaping the PLAAF into a more adaptable force. Yet the transformation is incomplete.

Western air forces maintain a decisive edge in pilot training depth, realism of exercises, and combat experience. For China, scaling reforms across its massive force, closing the realism gap, and confronting the absence of combat-tested pilots remain critical hurdles.

Thus, while the PLAAF has the hardware to rival Western airpower, it does not yet have the human depth to ensure consistent superiority in a high-intensity, peer-level conflict. Until China proves otherwise in combat, its training programs remain a work in progress—serious, ambitious, but still trailing the standards set by Western air forces.