When China paraded its new stealth fighters, hypersonic missiles, and growing fleet of warships, it was signaling to the world that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is becoming a “system of systems” force—one that blends air, sea, space, and missile power into a coherent whole.

But behind the sleek displays of hardware lies a more difficult question: 

How well integrated are China’s forces in real combat scenarios?

The answer reveals both remarkable progress and serious limits.

1. The Doctrinal Push Toward “Joint Operations”

For much of its history, the PLA operated as a collection of stove-piped branches. The army dominated, while the navy, air force, and missile units were largely auxiliary. That began to change with the 2015 military reforms, when Xi Jinping reorganized the PLA into theater commands, each tasked with joint operations in a specific region (Eastern Theater for Taiwan, Southern Theater for the South China Sea, etc.).

The goal was clear: integrate air, naval, and missile forces under one unified chain of command, so that in wartime, a theater commander could synchronize air strikes, missile salvos, and naval maneuvers without bureaucratic delays.

This structure mirrors the U.S. model of combatant commands, a system proven in Iraq, Afghanistan, and across global contingency operations. On paper, the PLA has taken a major step toward joint warfighting.

2. Air Power as the Integrating Glue

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is central to this integration. With over 2,000 combat aircraft, including J-10s, J-11s, J-16s, and the stealthy J-20, it represents the spearhead of offensive power projection.

But its role is not just about dogfighting. In joint operations, the PLAAF would:

• Provide air cover for PLA Navy (PLAN) carrier groups and surface fleets.

• Suppress enemy defenses so the PLA Rocket Force can launch missile barrages effectively.

• Integrate with early-warning and reconnaissance assets, including airborne AWACS (KJ-2000, KJ-500) and space-based surveillance.

In theory, this creates a layered defense and strike architecture: the air force blinds and weakens the enemy, the missile force delivers precision strikes, and the navy secures the maritime battlespace.

3. Integration with the Rocket Force

Perhaps the PLA’s most powerful branch is the Rocket Force, which fields DF-21D and DF-26 “carrier-killer” missiles, as well as long-range conventional and nuclear strike systems.

Integration here is critical. For missile strikes to succeed, accurate targeting data is needed—often supplied by airborne surveillance aircraft or drones under PLAAF control. Likewise, PLAAF fighters would need to suppress or destroy enemy missile defenses to ensure salvos land effectively.

Recent PLA exercises have reportedly tested “strike packages” where fighters, bombers, and missile units rehearse time-sensitive targeting in unison. For example, in a Taiwan contingency, PLAAF J-16s might launch standoff missiles against radar sites, clearing the way for Rocket Force ballistic strikes on airbases. The Eastern Theater Command has conducted joint simulations along these lines.

However, the Rocket Force’s semi-independent culture poses challenges. It has traditionally answered directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC), not theater commands, raising questions about how seamlessly it would share targeting authority in a crisis.

4. Integration with the Navy

The PLA Navy’s rise adds another layer of complexity. Modern destroyers (Type 052D, Type 055) and carriers (Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian) require air cover, surveillance, and strike coordination from the PLAAF.

But here lies a challenge:

• Carrier aviation is still immature. PLAN J-15 pilots lack the depth of experience seen in U.S. Navy carrier wings.

• Air-sea coordination is limited. The U.S. has decades of joint training between Navy and Air Force units (e.g., Red Flag, Rim of the Pacific exercises). The PLA is only beginning large-scale joint drills involving both PLAAF and PLAN aviation.

• Command rivalries remain. While the theater command model aims to unify them, the Air Force and Navy often compete for prestige and resources.

This could prove decisive in wartime. For instance, defending a carrier group against U.S. submarine and air threats would require seamless PLAAF fighter coverage, PLAN shipboard defenses, and Rocket Force missile umbrella—all tightly synchronized. China has never tested this under combat conditions.

5. The Real-World Obstacles to Joint Combat Integration

Despite advances, significant gaps remain:

• Training depth: PLAAF pilots average fewer annual flight hours than their U.S. counterparts, and joint exercises are still scripted rather than free-play.

• C2 complexity: Theater commands are new and untested in war. The ability to rapidly fuse data from satellites, drones, radars, and ships into a common operational picture is uncertain.

• Information warfare: The PLA relies heavily on cyber and electronic warfare, but in practice, jamming and counter-jamming could complicate coordination among services.

• Cultural inertia: The PLA has long struggled with rigid hierarchy and risk-averse decision-making, the opposite of the initiative-driven culture needed for fluid joint operations.

6. Lessons from Abroad

The U.S. military took decades of real wars—from Vietnam to Iraq—to refine joint integration. Even then, coordination failures persisted. China, by contrast, has not fought a major war since 1979. Its reforms are being tested only in peacetime exercises.

Russia’s struggles in Ukraine also provide a cautionary tale: a military that looks integrated on paper can stumble badly in execution if joint doctrine and culture are not deeply ingrained.

Conclusion: Impressive Progress, Unproven Execution

China’s effort to integrate air, naval, and missile power into a seamless combat machine is ambitious and, in some areas, impressive. The creation of theater commands, modernized command-and-control networks, and exercises rehearsing coordinated strikes suggest serious preparation for high-end warfare.

Yet the reality is that true jointness cannot be declared—it must be earned in battle or honed through decades of realistic training. For the PLA, much of this remains theoretical. In a real combat scenario against a peer adversary like the United States or Japan, China’s integration would be tested in the fog and friction of war for the first time.

The PLA may one day wield a genuinely integrated “system of systems” capable of denying U.S. power projection in East Asia. But for now, its air, naval, and missile forces remain more coordinated than ever before—yet still short of the seamless joint warfighting prowess they aspire to project.