South Korea risks squandering a historic chance to join the US nuclear buildout, with missteps straining a partnership vital for energy, AI, and global competition.

South Korea is blowing a big opportunity to participate in the US nuclear energy buildout, and time is not on its side.

In order for the United States to meet, or even come close to achieving, the Trump administration’s directive to begin construction on 10 new large reactors by 2030, a close partnership between the United States and South Korean nuclear industries is imperative. 

But South Korea’s President Lee Jae-myung left his August summit with President Trump with barely a trace of progress on this nuclear partnership and not even a fact sheet on accomplishments or next steps. 

A highly anticipated Westinghouse-Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) nuclear power joint venture (Team KORUS) faltered before the While House meeting even convened.

Political Mistakes

The United States Congress opened the door to foreign ownership of American nuclear power plants in the ADVANCE Act that was signed into law by President Joe Biden in July 2024. The legislation lifted a previous ban on foreign ownership and opened it to US allies in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and India, with approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

This opening, paired with the Trump administration’s aggressive nuclear construction ambitions and determination to win the AI race, is an unprecedented opportunity for the Korean nuclear industry to participate in the building of 10 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear energy in America.

But both sides seem to be oblivious to how their actions are undermining this necessary partnership, particularly since it has only recently recovered from five years of acrimony. The Trump administration’s tough tariff policy, resulting in 15 percent duties, set a confrontational tone. Then the immigration raid at the Hyundai-LG electric vehicle (EV) battery factory in Georgia, which resulted in 250 detained Korean citizens, further strained ties. The raid resulted in a self-inflicted wound since these workers were building batteries in America, a goal of the administration. Korean officials across the ideological spectrum have expressed outrage at what they consider a “slap in the face” for investing in the United States.

At the same time, the Lee government has made a very questionable decision to open a transparently political investigation into the January 2025 agreement between Westinghouse, KHNP, and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). That deal ended a damaging five-year freeze of nuclear cooperation. But it is a political football for Lee’s party in the National Assembly.

The deal was necessary because both sides finally agreed that the Korean reactors contain Westinghouse-licensed components, and they realized that each country needs the other to effectively compete in the global nuclear market. 

The Westinghouse-KEPCO-KHNP deal allows for South Korea’s construction of two new APR-1400 reactors in the Czech Republic, a project that will net the country almost $18 billion. 

According to reporting, the agreement is a 50-year deal under which KHNP must provide Westinghouse with $825 million in contracts and licensing fees for every APR1000 and APR-1400 reactor it builds. It also bars the Korean companies from pursuing nuclear reactor business opportunities in North America, Britain, Japan, Ukraine, and the EU, except for the Czech Republic. And it requires Korean lines of credit for reactors and a certification to Westinghouse that its own small reactors do not contain Westinghouse intellectual property. 

It is unclear what Lee’s endgame is in questioning the deal, as he is unlikely to get a better agreement and risks the country’s position as a reliable nuclear supplier. If he torpedoes the agreement, the Czech deal and many other nuclear energy opportunities will unravel for South Korea. 

This bilateral fight over the reactor’s intellectual property dates to the first Trump administration. But back then, the global and US nuclear markets looked much more dismal. As nuclear power has strengthened as a response to clean energy demand, energy security, and AI data center power, the market has dramatically expanded.

Questionable Korean Strategy

One thing that has become clear in the past ten months is that Donald Trump is not bluffing about his goals of achieving energy and AI dominance. Both these objectives will depend on the expansion of nuclear energy.  

South Korea is being invited into this nuclear growth, but apparently has its own price. Perhaps Korean officials and executives believe that they have superior leverage because their engineering, procurement, and construction prowess is considered an essential component for a rapid large reactor buildout. 

But if the real demand is that a Korean label be affixed to a reactor built in America, that is a long shot at best and may result in shooting its own industry in the foot. 

The new US-South Korea trade agreement included a Korean pledge to invest $350 billion in American industries, including nuclear energy. Korean companies want to participate in the American nuclear market.

On the sidelines of the Trump-Lee summit, KHNP and Doosan Enerability paired with X-Energy and Amazon to support the deployment of 5 GW of nuclear power in the United States by 2039. The goal is to power data centers with the Xe-100 SMR. Korean companies have previously committed investment and componentry for other small reactor companies, including NuScale and TerraPower.

Powering Nuclear Geopolitics

The inability to come to terms on a bilateral US-South Korean nuclear energy partnership also prevents the rapid formation of a powerful and needed response to the state-owned nuclear export companies of Russia and China. Stymying the nuclear exports of these authoritarian nations is a joint political objective. 

The Trump administration has surprisingly embraced an industrial policy approach to strengthening key technology areas. This could ultimately include nuclear energy. That could unlock expanded American, Korean, and other Sovereign Wealth Fund financing for nuclear construction abroad and in the U.S.

But the American market is not going to wait for South Korea if it continues to delay. US data centers could quadruple energy demand by 2030, according to one forecast, and construction of these power-hungry facilities is booming in several regions of the country.

Nuclear needs to be ready when the data centers are, and Team United States-Korea (KORUS) is a democratic nation coalition that can drive that nuclear build-out, forcing Putin and Xi to look on from the sidelines.