China’s rapid military modernization has generated considerable attention for its advanced missile forces, electronic warfare capabilities, and growing cyber warfare infrastructure.

The PLA Rocket Force now fields hundreds of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, capable of precision strikes across the first island chain, while cyber operations increasingly target adversary communications, logistics, and command networks.

Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Air Force (PLAAF) continue efforts to develop carrier strike groups, long-range airpower, and integrated naval-air operations.

However, full operational integration across air and sea domains remains a challenge. While China’s missile and cyber capabilities are formidable, questions remain whether they can effectively substitute for the coordinated power projection, situational awareness, and joint operational flexibility provided by fully integrated air-sea forces.

1. The Missile-Centric Approach

China’s Rocket Force is a central pillar of its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. Key capabilities include:

• Ballistic Missiles: The DF-21D “carrier killer” and DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles can target ships hundreds of kilometers offshore, complicating enemy naval operations.

• Cruise Missiles: Land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles provide precision strike capability against both mobile and fixed targets.

• High-Volume Strike Capacity: Large stockpiles allow for massed salvos to overwhelm localized defenses, potentially compensating for deficiencies in aircraft and carrier-based strike power.

Advantages:

• Missiles can be deployed without full air-sea coordination, creating deterrent or offensive leverage quickly.

• They allow China to project power regionally without committing carrier groups or long-range bomber sorties.

• Missiles are less vulnerable to pilot fatigue, maintenance cycles, or aircrew attrition than manned platforms.

Limitations:

• Missiles cannot provide persistent situational awareness like aircraft or drones.

• They are limited in target discrimination and adaptability once fired. If intelligence is incorrect or dynamic conditions change, missiles cannot adjust mid-flight like multirole aircraft can.

• A reliance on salvo attacks against naval forces assumes successful targeting of moving ships under contested electronic warfare and missile defense environments—a high-risk assumption.

2. Cyber and Electronic Warfare as Force Multipliers

China has invested heavily in cyber capabilities, electronic warfare, and information operations, enabling operations such as:

• Disrupting Enemy Command and Control: Targeting communications networks to delay or confuse adversary decision-making.

• Disabling ISR Systems: Jamming or spoofing radar, satellite, and sensor networks can reduce enemy situational awareness.

• Supporting Missile Operations: Cyber and EW can improve targeting data for ballistic and cruise missiles, enhancing strike effectiveness.

Advantages:

• Cyber capabilities can force adversaries to operate cautiously, slowing operational tempo and reducing the effectiveness of high-value assets.

• They offer low-cost asymmetric options, complementing conventional kinetic strike capabilities.

Limitations:

• Cyber operations are non-lethal and indirect; while they may disrupt, they cannot replace physical air and naval presence needed for area control.

• Advanced adversaries have layered cyber defenses, redundancies, and countermeasures. Relying solely on cyber attacks carries significant uncertainty in operational outcomes.

3. Air-Sea Integration Shortfalls

Despite advances, China still faces challenges in integrating air and sea operations effectively:

• Carrier Aviation: PLAN carriers are technologically advanced but have limited operational experience, with a relatively small number of pilots trained for high-tempo carrier sorties.

• Joint Operations: Coordinating PLAAF aircraft, PLAN ships, and missile units requires sophisticated command-and-control networks, real-time intelligence, and interoperable communications—areas still under development.

• Operational Flexibility: Fully integrated air-sea operations allow rapid adaptation to changing threats. Missiles, while effective for preplanned strikes, cannot respond dynamically to enemy maneuvers in real time.

Implication: Even with robust missile and cyber arsenals, deficiencies in integration limit China’s ability to conduct sustained, adaptive operations at sea, particularly in scenarios involving peer adversaries with advanced naval and air capabilities.

4. Complementary Effects: Missiles and Cyber as Force Multipliers

Missiles and cyber capabilities do compensate to some degree for integration shortfalls:

• Shaping the Battlespace: A dense network of ballistic and cruise missiles can keep adversaries at a distance, reducing the immediate need for integrated air-sea presence.

• Intelligence Disruption: Cyber operations can degrade enemy ISR, partially offsetting limited PLAAF-PLAN coordination.

• Psychological Impact: Threats of precision missile strikes and electronic attacks can influence adversary behavior, slowing operations and creating opportunities for China’s forces.

However, these advantages are context-dependent. Against high-end opponents with layered missile defense, resilient ISR, and rapid-response capabilities, missile and cyber strikes are complementary but insufficient substitutes for coordinated joint operations.

5. Operational Risks

Relying heavily on missiles and cyber introduces several risks:

• Countermeasures and Attrition: Modern naval forces employ missile defense, electronic counter-countermeasures, and distributed command networks. Overreliance on missile salvos and cyber attacks may fail against resilient adversaries.

• Limited Persistence: Missiles provide one-time strikes; aircraft provide continuous presence, reconnaissance, and rapid response. Cyber effects are temporary unless continuously applied.

• Integration Deficiencies Magnified: Without air-sea integration, Chinese missile strikes may lack timely intelligence, risk over- or under-targeting, and reduce effectiveness, particularly in complex, multi-domain operations.

• Escalation Management: Missile and cyber attacks may provoke rapid escalation without the flexibility of conventional air-sea forces to respond proportionally.

6. Comparative Perspective

Peer adversaries, particularly the United States, rely on fully integrated carrier strike groups, long-range bombers, and ISR networks, supported by resilient logistics and air-sea coordination.

• The U.S. approach combines persistent air patrols, mobile naval assets, and real-time targeting updates, which allow adaptive responses to dynamic threats.

• Missile and cyber capabilities complement these forces but cannot replace them, highlighting the structural difference between a fully integrated air-sea power and a missile-centric approach.

China’s strategy emphasizes asymmetric deterrence, aiming to exploit vulnerabilities in adversary forward-deployed forces. Yet the lack of integration limits operational flexibility, particularly in protracted or multi-front conflicts.

7. Conclusion: Complementary, Not Substitutive

China’s missile systems and cyber warfare capabilities enhance its operational reach, deterrence, and asymmetric power projection. They provide a potent layer of offensive and defensive capability, particularly in the first island chain, the South China Sea, and near coastal regions.

However, these tools cannot fully substitute for the flexibility, adaptability, and persistent presence offered by integrated air-sea forces. Missiles are one-shot strikes, cyber effects are temporary, and the lack of robust joint operations limits real-time operational responsiveness.

• In regional conflicts against less advanced opponents, missile and cyber strategies may compensate effectively for integration gaps.

• Against peer adversaries, high-end operations demand real-time coordination across air, sea, and missile forces—something China is still developing.

• Sustained multi-domain campaigns would expose the limits of missile-centric and cyber-heavy approaches, highlighting the need for stronger integration, trained carrier aviators, and flexible command structures.

In sum, missiles and cyber capabilities are force multipliers, not replacements. They allow China to project power asymmetrically, complicate enemy planning, and provide operational leverage. Yet true operational dominance in high-intensity, integrated air-sea warfare will require sustained improvements in coordination, training, and joint operational experience—areas where China continues to invest but has not yet fully mastered.