China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past two decades.

From a historically land-centric, infantry-heavy force, it has evolved into a modernized, multi-domain military with advanced missiles, stealth fighters, naval carrier groups, and cyber and space capabilities.

Military parades, international exhibitions, and media coverage often emphasize China’s growing sophistication, projecting an image of invincible power.

Yet the critical question remains: Is the PLA genuinely ready for high-intensity conflict, or is it primarily a showpiece—a “paper tiger” impressive in appearance but untested in combat?

While China’s investment in modern equipment and doctrine is real, several factors suggest caution when equating modernization with operational effectiveness.

1. The Nature of a “Paper Tiger”

The term “paper tiger” implies a force that appears strong but lacks true combat credibility. Characteristics often include:

• Technological showmanship over functional reliability

• Large numbers without operational proficiency

• Limited combat experience

• Organizational or logistical shortcomings that degrade sustainability

The PLA shows many of these traits in certain domains. While impressive on paper, questions remain about whether its equipment, training, and doctrine would hold up against a peer adversary in high-intensity warfare.

2. Technological Modernization vs. Combat Experience

China has fielded several advanced platforms:

• Aircraft: Stealth fighters (J-20), multirole aircraft (J-16), long-range bombers (H-6K/N)

• Naval assets: Type 055 destroyers, Type 052D frigates, carriers (Liaoning, Shandong, Fujian)

• Missile systems: Ballistic and cruise missiles capable of precision strikes, anti-ship capabilities, and regional deterrence

• Cyber and electronic warfare: Tools for disrupting adversary communications, targeting networks, and ISR

However, operational testing in real combat remains minimal. Unlike the U.S. or NATO, which have decades of high-intensity combat experience in multiple theaters, the PLA has not faced a peer adversary in modern warfare since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict, which was limited in scope and scale.

Implication: The PLA’s platforms have unproven reliability under wartime stress, and their performance in multi-domain, contested environments remains uncertain.

3. Training and Pilot/Operator Experience

Modern platforms require highly trained personnel to achieve effectiveness:

• PLAAF pilots have fewer flight hours compared to U.S. and allied counterparts. Limited combat exposure means fewer lessons learned under fire.

• PLAN crews have practiced carrier operations extensively in exercises, but real-world combat is far more complex. High-tempo, multi-threat environments may expose deficiencies in coordination, situational awareness, and damage control.

• Missile operators and cyber teams must integrate targeting, ISR, and operational intelligence in real time. While simulations and exercises provide training, they cannot fully replicate the unpredictability and stress of actual conflict.

Implication: Even technologically advanced platforms can underperform if operators lack combat experience and sustained exposure to high-pressure scenarios.

4. Logistics, Maintenance, and Sustainability

A modern military’s effectiveness is not only a function of hardware but also of logistics and operational endurance:

• Aircraft readiness: Advanced jets like the J-20 require intensive maintenance. Limited engine reliability and a shortage of experienced ground crews can reduce sortie rates in prolonged campaigns.

• Naval operations: Carrier strike groups demand extensive support—fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and repairs. Forward-deployed operations in contested waters increase vulnerability to attrition.

• Supply chains: Multi-front conflicts, such as over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or along the Indian border, would stress logistical networks, potentially limiting operational reach.

Implication: Without robust sustainment, even a technologically modern force risks rapid degradation under prolonged combat, a hallmark of “paper tiger” behavior.

5. Doctrine and Joint Operations

Modern warfare relies on jointness—integration across air, land, sea, cyber, and space domains:

• China has made strides in joint command structures, but exercises remain largely scripted and controlled.

• Real-world warfare involves fluid conditions, unexpected threats, and rapid adaptation—conditions where integrated decision-making is rigorously tested.

• Multi-domain coordination with missiles, cyber assets, and conventional forces is still evolving. Misalignment or delayed responses could reduce combat effectiveness.

Implication: A lack of true joint operational experience leaves the PLA vulnerable to coordination failures, especially in multi-front, high-intensity conflicts.

6. Strategic Overstretch and Multi-Front Risk

China’s military ambitions—over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and potentially along the Indian border—create risks of operational overstretch:

• Simultaneous campaigns would strain personnel, aircraft, naval vessels, and missile units.

• Command and control systems could be stressed by geographically dispersed operations.

• Adversaries with coalition support could exploit China’s lack of formal allies, applying pressure in multiple theaters.

Implication: A “paper tiger” often appears strong until it is tested under the stress of extended or multi-front conflict, exposing vulnerabilities in logistics, manpower, and coordination.

7. Counterpoints: Modernization Is Real

Despite these limitations, it would be inaccurate to dismiss the PLA entirely as a “paper tiger”:

• Rapid modernization has produced credible regional strike capabilities, particularly in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operations.

• Technological asymmetry in certain domains—missiles, cyber, and regional surveillance—provides leverage over less advanced adversaries.

• Training reforms and joint exercises demonstrate progress toward operational proficiency.

Caveat: These strengths may allow China to win short, decisive engagements or deter regional adversaries, but sustained, high-intensity conflict against peer opponents remains untested and uncertain.

8. Psychological and Political Signaling

China’s military parades and media campaigns serve dual purposes:

• Domestic morale and legitimacy: Demonstrating progress and national strength.

• Deterrence signaling: Communicating to regional powers and global actors that China is a serious military force.

While these parades and public displays enhance perceived power, they do not substitute for actual combat experience, which ultimately determines a force’s credibility.

Implication: The PLA risks creating an image of invincibility that may overstate actual readiness—a classic “paper tiger” scenario.

9. Conclusion: Potential vs. Proven Capability

The PLA has transformed into a technologically modern, regionally potent force capable of asymmetric deterrence and short-term power projection. Its missile systems, stealth fighters, naval modernization, and cyber capabilities give it significant advantages in regional conflicts.

However, several factors suggest that operational effectiveness under high-intensity, sustained warfare remains unproven:

1. Limited combat experience among pilots, sailors, and commanders.

2. Maintenance and logistics vulnerabilities that could reduce operational tempo.

3. Joint operational integration gaps, particularly in complex, multi-domain scenarios.

4. Strategic overstretch risk in simultaneous conflicts across Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indian border.

5. Psychological and signaling effects that may exaggerate perceived capability relative to tested readiness.

In essence, the PLA is not a paper tiger in all respects. It is a modernizing military with credible capabilities, particularly in regional deterrence and short-term operations. Yet until it is tested in sustained, high-intensity combat, some of its strengths remain largely theoretical. It could be formidable against weaker adversaries, but the true measure of combat credibility—resilience under attrition, operational flexibility, and joint warfare effectiveness—remains unproven.

The PLA today walks a fine line between genuine power and perceived strength. Its future trajectory will likely hinge not only on continued technological advancement but also on experience, training, and the ability to sustain operations under real-world pressures. Until then, the risk of the “paper tiger” label—impressive in parades but untested in war—remains a valid caution.