China's naval shipbuilding program is a remarkable example of state-directed industrial power, but there are credible arguments that its sheer quantity may be outpacing its ability to ensure consistent quality and, most critically, combat survivability.

The Argument for Quantity as a Quality of its Own

China's shipbuilding capacity is staggering. Its shipyards produce more ships by tonnage than the next several countries combined. This industrial might allows the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to rapidly expand and modernize its fleet, replacing older, less capable vessels with modern, multi-mission ships.

Proponents of the "quantity has a quality all its own" argument point to several advantages:

• Mass Production and Learning: The sheer volume of shipbuilding provides invaluable experience for engineers, designers, and shipyard workers. This rapid iteration allows for the swift correction of flaws and the refinement of new designs. While early ships of a class may have issues, subsequent vessels benefit from this learning process.

• Redundancy and Resilience: In a prolonged, high-intensity conflict, a navy's ability to absorb losses and replace damaged or destroyed vessels is crucial. China's shipbuilding capacity provides a level of redundancy that few, if any, other navies can match. Even if a number of its ships are lost, it can potentially replace them far more quickly than its adversaries.

• Wargaming and Training: A larger fleet provides more platforms for training and realistic exercises, allowing the PLAN to develop and test new doctrines and tactics. This is a critical step in building a professional force, even in the absence of real combat experience.

The Argument for Quality and Survivability Deficits

Despite the impressive numbers, a closer look reveals potential weaknesses that could prove decisive in a real conflict:

• Untested Designs and Systems: Many of the PLA's new warships, including its aircraft carriers and advanced destroyers, have not been tested in combat. There is a risk that systems that perform well in controlled exercises may fail under the stress of a real war. Reports from analysts and even some Chinese sources suggest issues with quality control, from propulsion systems to a reliance on foreign components for critical systems.

• Logistical and Maintenance Burden: A rapidly expanding fleet requires a massive, equally capable logistics and maintenance infrastructure. The PLAN's ability to maintain a fleet of over 370 ships, some of which are operating far from home ports, is unproven. A ship's combat survivability is directly linked to its ability to sustain damage and continue fighting, which is dependent on robust damage control, repair capabilities, and trained crews.

• Human Capital: While China is building high-tech ships, it must also train the personnel to operate them effectively. A naval culture of professionalism, flexible command, and decentralized decision-making takes time to develop, and it is a resource that cannot be mass-produced. There are ongoing concerns about the PLA's institutional culture, which has historically prioritized political loyalty to the Communist Party over combat readiness and technical proficiency.

• Vulnerabilities in Ship Design: While ships like the Type 055 destroyer are formidable, analysts question how they would fare against an adversary with advanced anti-ship missiles and robust electronic warfare capabilities. Survivability is not just about a ship's armor or firepower but also its ability to withstand a hit, quickly assess damage, and remain in the fight—a capability only truly proven in battle.

In conclusion, China's shipbuilding output is a formidable strategic advantage that provides redundancy and a platform for learning and growth. However, this quantity does not automatically guarantee quality or combat survivability. The ultimate strength of the PLAN will be determined not just by how many ships it can build, but by how well those ships and their crews perform when facing a determined and capable enemy.