China’s reliance on artificial islands and a coastal defense strategy could ultimately limit its ability to project blue-water power by tethering its military assets to a fixed, vulnerable perimeter.

While these outposts expand its regional influence, they do not provide the same flexibility and global reach as a truly expeditionary navy.

A "Great Wall at Sea"

China's strategy in the South China Sea is often described as creating a "Great Wall at Sea". By dredging and constructing artificial islands on reefs, China has established a network of fortified outposts. These bases are equipped with military facilities, including airstrips, radar systems, and missile launchers, which serve several purposes:

• Extending Sovereignty: They are physical manifestations of China's expansive territorial claims, reinforcing its presence in a contested region.

• Creating a Defensive Perimeter: The islands serve as forward operating bases, allowing China to extend its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) bubble and make it harder for other nations, particularly the U.S., to operate near its shores.

• Situational Awareness: The bases host sophisticated sensors that provide a vast network of surveillance, giving the PLA a significant advantage in monitoring the South China Sea.

This strategy is highly effective for regional control but fundamentally defensive in nature.

The Limitations of Fixed Assets

While these islands are powerful tools for regional control, they are a double-edged sword when it comes to projecting global power.

• Vulnerability: A fixed, stationary target like an artificial island is inherently vulnerable in a high-intensity conflict. Despite their fortifications, they could be targeted by a variety of modern weapons, including hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles, and submarine-launched torpedoes. They lack the mobility and survivability of a carrier strike group, which can operate from anywhere in the ocean.

• Geographic Constraints: The islands primarily enhance China's ability to operate in its "near seas" — the South and East China Seas. They do not provide a comparable ability to sustain forces in distant oceans like the Indian Ocean or the Atlantic.

• Tethering the Fleet: The coastal defense mindset and reliance on these fixed bases can limit the PLAN's ability to truly operate as a "blue-water" navy. A navy that is tied to protecting its coastal flanks is less free to conduct global missions such as power projection, sea control, and the protection of distant sea lanes of communication.

• Logistical Challenges: While China is building a modern fleet of warships and aircraft, it still lacks the global network of bases and the at-sea replenishment capability required to sustain a large fleet for prolonged operations far from home. A truly "blue-water" navy, like the U.S. Navy, relies on a vast network of allies, ports, and resupply vessels to maintain its global reach.

In summary, China's reliance on artificial islands is a strategic choice that prioritizes regional defense over global offense. While it has made the PLA a formidable force in its backyard, it also creates a dependence on fixed, vulnerable assets that could hinder its broader ambitions for blue-water power projection.