The transparency of pharmaceutical company lobbying in Britain and Europe is a complex and highly debated issue.

While both jurisdictions have implemented mechanisms to shed light on these activities, critics consistently argue that the current systems are inadequate and fail to provide a full and accurate picture of how money and influence are used to shape public policy.

The transparency is often described as a facade, masking a significant portion of lobbying that remains opaque.

Transparency in the European Union (EU)

The primary tool for lobbying transparency in the EU is the EU Transparency Register, a database created by the European Commission, European Parliament, and Council. It is designed to make visible "what interests are being pursued, by whom and with what budgets."

• Voluntary...with a catch: The Register was originally voluntary. However, since 2014, the European Commission has required that to have a meeting with a Commissioner, a member of their cabinet, or a Director-General, a lobbyist must be registered. This has made the register "de facto mandatory" for those seeking high-level access. In 2021, a new interinstitutional agreement made the register mandatory for all three institutions, although its enforcement and scope are still debated.

• Financial Disclosures: Registered organizations, including pharmaceutical companies and their trade associations, are required to disclose their lobbying spending within certain brackets. For instance, a company might report its spending as being between €1 million and €1.5 million. This system, however, has major flaws:

  • Under-reporting: Many organizations, including pharmaceutical firms, have been found to under-report their lobbying expenses. A 2012 report by Corporate Europe Observatory and Health Action International found that while the pharmaceutical industry declared spending of around €40 million annually, the true figure could be as high as €91 million. This is because companies often choose to declare the lowest possible bracket and some simply don't register their activities.

  • Incomplete Data: The register's reliance on self-reported data means there is no way to independently verify the accuracy of the figures provided. There are no significant penalties for providing false or misleading information, which undermines the integrity of the data.

• The Revolving Door: The Transparency Register does little to track the "revolving door" phenomenon, where former government officials and regulators take on high-paying jobs in the pharmaceutical industry. This gives companies invaluable insider knowledge and a network of contacts, a form of influence that is difficult to quantify or regulate. While some rules exist to prevent immediate conflicts of interest, their enforcement is weak.

• Meetings Transparency: The EU also publishes records of high-level meetings between officials and lobbyists. This is a step towards transparency, but it only scratches the surface. As pointed out by organizations like Corporate Europe Observatory, most lobbying takes place at lower, "unit" levels of the Commission, where there are no public records of meetings. This "transparency facade" allows the industry to exert significant influence out of public view.

Transparency in the UK

The UK's approach to lobbying transparency is widely considered to be even weaker than the EU's, with a more fragmented and less effective regulatory framework.

• The 2014 Lobbying Act: The primary piece of legislation is the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014. However, it is a narrow piece of legislation that has been widely criticized. It only applies to "consultant lobbyists"—that is, those who lobby on behalf of a third party and are paid for their services.

  • In-house Lobbying Loophole: This leaves out the vast majority of lobbying activity, which is conducted by "in-house" lobbyists employed directly by companies. As a result, the register of lobbyists covers only a tiny fraction of the total lobbying activity in the UK. Pharmaceutical companies, with their extensive in-house public affairs teams, are able to operate largely outside the scope of this register.

  • No Spending Disclosure: Unlike the EU's register, the UK's version does not require the disclosure of how much money is spent on lobbying activities. It simply requires consultant lobbyists to list their clients.

• All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs): A key channel for pharmaceutical influence in the UK is through All-Party Parliamentary Groups. These informal, cross-party groups of MPs and Lords are often funded by external organizations, including pharmaceutical companies.

  • Lack of Scrutiny: A 2021 study from the University of Bath revealed that pharmaceutical companies had provided over £1 million to health-related APPGs over a six-year period. While the funding is listed in the Register of APPGs, the links between the funding and the groups' activities are not always clear. This system has been criticized for being a "backdoor" for corporate influence, as it provides lobbyists with privileged access to the heart of Parliament.

  • Industry-led "Transparency": The pharmaceutical industry itself, through the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), has its own voluntary disclosure system called "Disclosure UK." This database reveals payments and other benefits given to healthcare professionals and organizations. While this is a step towards greater openness, it is an industry-led initiative and is not subject to independent regulatory oversight.

Conclusion

In both Britain and Europe, the transparency of pharmaceutical lobbying is more a promise than a reality. While some measures are in place, they are riddled with loopholes that allow significant lobbying activity to remain hidden from public scrutiny. The systems fail to adequately capture the scale of financial spending, the influence of the "revolving door," or the subtle but powerful impact of funding parliamentary and patient groups. This lack of transparency is not merely an administrative issue; it creates a democratic deficit, making it difficult for citizens and policymakers to identify and evaluate potential conflicts of interest and ensuring that the public good remains the priority in health policy decisions.