To ensure that public health policies are not disproportionately shaped by corporate lobbying, both the UK and the EU have implemented a range of safeguards.

These measures are designed to promote transparency, prevent conflicts of interest, and provide a counterweight to the influence of well-funded industries.

However, a significant body of research and analysis suggests that these safeguards are often insufficient and contain loopholes that allow corporate influence to persist.

Safeguards in the European Union

The EU has a more developed framework for regulating lobbying compared to the UK, centered around the EU Transparency Register and a series of ethical rules.

1. The EU Transparency Register: This register, managed jointly by the European Parliament, the Council, and the European Commission, is the cornerstone of EU lobbying safeguards.

• Mandatory Registration: For lobbyists to meet with senior officials—including Commissioners, their cabinet members, and Directors-General—they must be registered. This principle of "conditionality" makes registration a prerequisite for high-level access.

• Financial and Personnel Disclosure: Registered organizations must disclose their lobbying budgets, the number of people they employ to lobby the EU institutions, and the specific policy areas they are interested in. This provides a basic level of transparency, allowing the public to see who is trying to influence policy and with what resources.

• Meeting Transparency: The European Commission and the Parliament publish records of meetings between their high-level officials and lobbyists. This makes it possible for the public and other stakeholders to see who is meeting with whom and on what topics.

2. Ethics Rules and Conflict of Interest Policies: The EU institutions have internal rules to prevent conflicts of interest.

• Code of Conduct: The European Parliament has a code of conduct for its members (MEPs) that requires them to disclose financial interests and to avoid conflicts of interest. Similarly, the European Commission has a Code of Conduct for Commissioners that sets out rules on integrity and conduct.

• "Cooling-off" Periods: There are rules governing the "revolving door" phenomenon. For instance, former Commissioners are subject to a "cooling-off" period of two years (three years for the Commission President) before they can take up a new role, during which time the Commission's independent ethical committee scrutinizes the appointment. This is intended to prevent former officials from immediately leveraging their public service connections for private gain.

Safeguards in the UK

The UK's system for regulating lobbying is more fragmented and, according to many, less effective than the EU's.

1. The Register of Consultant Lobbyists: The primary legal safeguard is the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014.

• Narrow Scope: The Act only requires "consultant lobbyists"—those who lobby on behalf of a third party—to register. This leaves a massive loophole for "in-house" lobbyists, who are employed directly by a company. The vast majority of pharmaceutical lobbying in the UK is conducted by in-house teams and is therefore not subject to the mandatory register.

• No Financial Disclosure: Unlike the EU's register, the UK's version does not require lobbyists to disclose how much they spend on their activities. This makes it impossible to see the financial scale of lobbying efforts.

2. Codes of Conduct and Ethical Principles:

• Ministerial Code: The UK's Ministerial Code sets out principles of conduct for ministers, including rules on gifts and hospitality. The code is intended to prevent ministers from being improperly influenced, but it is not legally binding and its enforcement is dependent on the Prime Minister.

• NHS Conflict of Interest Guidance: NHS England and other health bodies have guidance on managing conflicts of interest for their staff and board members. This is crucial in the context of the NHS, where staff may interact with pharmaceutical companies that seek to sell their products. These policies require staff to declare any personal or financial interests that could influence their professional judgment.

• All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs): While not a formal safeguard, the Register of APPGs provides a degree of transparency on the funding of these groups by corporate and other interests. This allows the public to see, for instance, which pharmaceutical companies are funding health-related APPGs.

Critiques of the Current Safeguards

Despite these measures, critics argue that the safeguards are insufficient to prevent undue corporate influence, especially from the pharmaceutical industry.

• Lack of Enforcement and Sanctions: In both the UK and the EU, the lobbying rules often lack robust enforcement and meaningful sanctions for breaches. In the EU, non-compliance with the transparency register or ethics rules often results in a warning or temporary de-listing, rather than a significant fine. In the UK, the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists has limited powers and cannot enforce disclosures from in-house lobbyists.

• The "Revolving Door" Remains Open: While there are rules, the "revolving door" continues to spin. Former officials from regulatory bodies like the UK's MHRA and the EU's EMA often move into senior roles at pharmaceutical companies. Their insider knowledge and networks are a form of influence that a simple register cannot capture.

• Focus on "Direct" Lobbying: Most of the safeguards focus on direct meetings and financial disclosures. They often miss the more subtle and strategic forms of influence, such as funding patient groups, supporting academic research, or commissioning think tank reports. These activities can be used to legitimize industry-friendly positions and create a public narrative that benefits corporate interests, all while appearing to be independent.

• The Power Imbalance: Ultimately, the sheer scale of the financial resources and expertise that the pharmaceutical industry can deploy to influence policy dwarfs that of public health advocates and civil society organizations. While safeguards may exist, they do little to address this fundamental power imbalance.

In conclusion, while safeguards are in place in both the UK and the EU to promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interest, they are widely seen as having significant weaknesses.

They fail to capture the full scope of lobbying, particularly by in-house teams, and they struggle to address the "revolving door" and the more subtle forms of influence.

As a result, the challenge of ensuring that public health policies are not disproportionately shaped by corporate lobbying remains a significant concern.