China's air force, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), has made significant strides in modernizing its pilot training, but it has not yet reached the depth and combat realism needed to truly rival Western air superiority.

While it has invested heavily in new training aircraft and has streamlined its pipeline, it still faces fundamental challenges related to a lack of combat experience and a different institutional culture.

The Modernization of the PLAAF's Training Pipeline

The PLAAF has recognized its historical training deficiencies and is making concerted efforts to close the gap with Western air forces. Key changes include:

• Advanced Trainers: The introduction of advanced trainers like the Hongdu JL-10 is a major step. This new generation of jets better bridges the gap between basic trainers and modern fourth- and fifth-generation fighters like the J-10 and J-20. This allows pilots to be introduced to complex avionics and flight characteristics earlier in their careers.

• Streamlined Training: The PLAAF has been actively consolidating and streamlining its pilot training programs, shifting more of the transition training from operational combat units to dedicated flight academies. This is a crucial reform aimed at getting pilots to their combat squadrons faster and allowing those squadrons to focus on advanced, mission-specific training.

• More Realistic Scenarios: There are increasing reports of the PLAAF conducting more complex and unscripted training exercises, including low-altitude flying, day-into-night operations, and mock air combat against "aggressor" squadrons. These drills are designed to create more realistic and challenging conditions for pilots.

The Remaining Gap: Depth and Experience

Despite these improvements, the PLAAF's pilot training still faces significant limitations when compared to Western counterparts, particularly the U.S. Air Force and Navy.

• Lack of Combat Experience: This is the most critical and unresolvable issue in the short term. The PLAAF has not been involved in a major air-to-air conflict in over four decades. As a result, its pilots, from the most junior to the most senior instructors, have no firsthand combat experience. This is in stark contrast to U.S. and allied pilots who have been engaged in continuous combat operations and deployments. Combat experience is invaluable for developing tactical decision-making, resilience under stress, and an understanding of the chaos of real-world air combat.

• Fewer Flight Hours: While the PLAAF has improved its pilot flight hours, they still reportedly lag behind those of American fighter pilots. Fewer flight hours mean less time to practice complex maneuvers, master systems, and build the kind of "muscle memory" that is crucial in a high-intensity dogfight.

• Centralized Command Culture: Western air forces, particularly the U.S. Air Force, have a culture of decentralized command and tactical autonomy for pilots. This allows a flight lead to make critical, rapid decisions on the spot. The PLAAF, in contrast, operates within a highly centralized, top-down command structure. While this is improving with new joint command structures, it could still hinder the ability of pilots to adapt to rapidly changing combat scenarios without direct orders from a higher command.

• Recruitment of Foreign Experts: A clear sign of the PLAAF's training deficit is its reported efforts to recruit former Western military pilots to serve as instructors. These pilots, many of whom have significant combat and advanced training experience, are being sought to fill a critical gap in the PLAAF's institutional knowledge of Western tactics, techniques, and procedures.

In conclusion, while China's air force is rapidly building a modern fleet of aircraft, its pilot training depth and quality still lag behind the Western standard. The core weakness lies in the lack of combat experience, which no amount of simulation or advanced training can fully replicate.