Taiwan’s Long Sword II Could Deter China

Taiwan’s military has long wanted a more comprehensive air defense network, especially in light of China’s growing threat to its tiny island. The Land Sword II is meant to make that defense more complete. That system, according to Dylan Malyasov of Defence-Blog.com, “fills a critical gap in the island’s layered air defense network by enhancing mobility and reaction time, especially against low-flying threats in coastal and forward areas.”

That last bit is important. The Ukraine War has highlighted the effectiveness of drones both in offensive and defensive roles. Meanwhile, the recent India-Pakistan conflict has demonstrated that Chinese military technology is not to be underestimated by Western-aligned forces, such as Taiwan. In the recent fight on the subcontinent, Pakistani forces employing Chinese-built weapons and warplanes (and drones) were far more effective against their Indian rivals than anyone in the West assumed they would have been.

What’s more, Taiwan’s geography lends itself to being isolated by a Chinese naval blockade. Being overly reliant on Western-produced weapons is problematic for the island—hence the national quest to indigenize as much of their weapons infrastructure as possible. If the island is blockaded, they need local supply chains and stockpiles to sustain them.  

Taiwan’s Air Defense Is Missing the Mark

But this is likely too little, too late.

Reports suggest that Taiwan possesses merely six batteries of the Land Sword II SAM system. Each battery includes a CS/MYS-951 Battle Management Center, a CS/MPQ-951 radar unit, and four to five missile firing units, with a total of 30 mobile missile launchers and 246 Sky Sword II missiles across the six batteries. These systems were ordered in 2019 and are only just now coming online. Six batteries are not enough. They’re not even a stopgap. 

Under current conditions, Taiwan’s air defenses, while useful, will not keep a sustained Chinese invasion of the island away. They will merely delay it. And delaying tactics only work if Taiwan has allies willing to enter the fray on their behalf.

And—at least the way things stand now—there is virtually no chance that American, Japanese, or other nation’s troops will rush in to repel a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. It will be up to the Taiwanese themselves.

Taipei should certainly keep the systems it has, but it should stop procuring new ones. Instead, all of the efforts of Taiwan’s government should be directed into building massive numbers of drone swarms and anti-tank weapons—and arming as many of the island’s population as possible. 

Taiwan Must Be Ready for an Insurgency

What’s more, long-range civil defense programs should be enacted now to honeycomb the island with defensive pockets and the infrastructure needed to maintain an insurgency. 

Conventional tactics will not save Taiwan. Given time, it will be overrun. Its systems, like the Long Sword II, will not stop an invasion of the island. These small numbers of systems will be targeted and destroyed.

Only a traditional insurgency will work—a plan of drawing the Chinese in close to their isolated island and then not letting the Chinese invaders go until they bleed to death via traditional insurgency tactics is the only pathway forward. Until it realizes this, Taiwan’s government is wasting precious time and money.