China's lack of modern combat experience is a major handicap for its armed forces compared to the U.S. and NATO, whose personnel have been continuously engaged in combat and counterterrorism operations for decades.

This experience gap is arguably the single greatest vulnerability for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in a potential high-intensity conflict.

The "Peace Disease" 

The last time the PLA was involved in a major conflict was during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Since then, its armed forces have not operated under the stress of real combat.

This lack of experience, which some Chinese military commentators refer to as "peace disease," creates a number of critical unknowns:

• Untested Leadership: The current generation of PLA commanders has not had to make split-second, high-stakes decisions under fire. The U.S. and NATO, in contrast, have a deep bench of leaders, from junior officers to senior generals, who have been forged in the crucible of war.

• Unproven Joint Operations: While the PLA has made significant progress in integrating its different services—air force, navy, army, and rocket force—in exercises, the effectiveness of these joint operations has never been tested in combat. Real warfare introduces chaos, friction, and unforeseen challenges that can break down even the most well-planned operations.

• Logistical Weakness: A military's logistics and maintenance capabilities are its lifeblood, and they are only truly tested in a prolonged conflict. The U.S. and NATO have spent decades refining their ability to move and sustain forces across vast distances, a capability the PLA has not had to demonstrate.

A Façade of Modernity?

While China's military has modernized at a remarkable pace, acquiring high-tech platforms like stealth fighters, aircraft carriers, and advanced missile systems, this impressive hardware does not automatically translate into battlefield effectiveness.

• Human Element: The skill and training of the personnel operating this equipment are arguably more important than the equipment itself. The U.S. and NATO have a culture of tactical autonomy and decentralized command, empowering lower-level leaders to make decisions on the battlefield. The PLA's institutional culture, which is heavily influenced by the Chinese Communist Party's rigid, top-down control, may not be flexible enough for modern warfare.

• Force Multipliers: Combat experience allows a military to understand how to best integrate different assets to create a synergistic effect. The U.S. and NATO have spent decades mastering how to coordinate air, naval, and ground forces, as well as cyber and space assets, into a cohesive fighting force. The PLA, despite its technological gains, still lacks this deep well of institutional knowledge.