The effectiveness of existing lobbying transparency registers in the EU and the UK in disclosing pharmaceutical influence is a subject of significant debate.

While these registers represent a step toward greater openness, they are widely considered to be flawed and insufficient, failing to provide a comprehensive and accurate picture of the industry's influence.

The EU Transparency Register: A Façade of Transparency?

The EU Transparency Register is a joint initiative of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission. It is often cited as a model for lobbying regulation, but its effectiveness in revealing pharmaceutical influence is limited by several critical shortcomings.

• Voluntary, with Loopholes: The register was originally voluntary, a weakness that was partially addressed by making registration a prerequisite for high-level meetings. However, this still leaves many loopholes. Many meetings, particularly at lower, "unit" levels of the European Commission, are not subject to the same disclosure requirements. Reports by organizations like Corporate Europe Observatory have shown that the vast majority of lobbying takes place at these lower levels, out of public view. A 2015 report found that meetings with pharmaceutical lobbyists at the unit level of DG Research and Innovation were ten times more frequent than at the top level.

• Inaccurate and Under-reported Data: The register relies on self-reported data, and there are no significant penalties for providing inaccurate information. A 2017 report found that while the pharmaceutical industry and its trade associations declared spending of around €40 million annually, the true figure could be as high as €91 million per year. This is because many companies either under-report their lobbying expenses or choose not to declare them at all. This lack of rigorous enforcement means the publicly available figures are likely a conservative estimate of the industry's total lobbying expenditure.

• The Revolving Door: The register does not effectively track the "revolving door" phenomenon, where former EU officials and regulators take high-paying jobs in the pharmaceutical industry. This gives companies invaluable access to insider knowledge and a network of contacts that is a powerful form of influence but is not captured by financial disclosure requirements. The EU's ethical committees that oversee these transitions have been criticized for their lack of rigor and enforcement power.

The UK's Transparency of Lobbying Act: A Flawed System by Design

The UK's system for lobbying transparency is generally regarded as one of the weakest in the democratic world. The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 has been widely criticized for its narrow scope and lack of teeth.

• The "In-house" Lobbying Loophole: The most significant flaw of the Act is that it only applies to "consultant lobbyists" – individuals or firms who lobby on behalf of a third party for payment. It explicitly excludes "in-house" lobbyists, who are employed directly by a company. This is a massive loophole, as most large pharmaceutical companies have extensive in-house public affairs teams. As a result, the register covers only a tiny fraction of total lobbying activity in the UK. Transparency International UK has estimated that the register captures only about 4% of lobbying activity.

• No Financial Disclosure: Unlike the EU register, the UK's version does not require lobbyists to disclose how much money they spend on their activities. It simply lists the clients that consultant lobbyists represent. This makes it impossible to gauge the financial scale of pharmaceutical lobbying and to understand who is wielding the most financial influence.

• Fragmented and Late Data: While some transparency is provided by departmental releases of ministerial meetings, this information is often published months after the fact, making timely public scrutiny impossible. Furthermore, the data is scattered across different departmental websites, making it difficult to get a complete picture of lobbying activities.

The Consequences of Opaque Influence

The ineffectiveness of both the EU and UK registers has serious consequences, particularly for the pharmaceutical industry, whose policy positions are directly tied to public health outcomes.

• Regulatory Capture: The lack of transparency facilitates a risk of regulatory capture, where the interests of the industry become prioritized over the public good. Without a clear and comprehensive view of lobbying activities, it is difficult to identify and challenge potential conflicts of interest.

• Power Imbalance: The sheer financial firepower of the pharmaceutical industry is masked by these flawed registers. Civil society organizations, patient groups, and NGOs that advocate for public health spend a fraction of what the industry spends. The lack of transparency further exacerbates this power imbalance, making it harder for public interest groups to compete in policy debates.

• Erosion of Public Trust: When scandals emerge that reveal lobbying activities not captured by the official registers, it damages public trust in the political system. The public is left with the perception that the rules are weak and that policymakers are more responsive to corporate interests than to the needs of their constituents.

In conclusion, while the existing EU and UK lobbying registers are presented as tools for transparency, they are not effective in fully disclosing the extent of pharmaceutical influence.

The EU's register is undermined by under-reporting and loopholes, while the UK's is fundamentally flawed by its narrow scope and lack of financial disclosure.

A truly effective system would require mandatory registration for all lobbyists, comprehensive financial disclosures, and strong, legally enforceable rules that address the "revolving door" and other forms of informal influence.